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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, Professor Cass R.
Sunstein identified the phenomenon of a regulatory paradox.' An
analogous "judicial paradox"' exists today concerning the state of
equitable remedies available under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 19743 ("ERISA"). This paradox exists not
as a result of implementation of the statute by a federal regulatory
agency, but rather as the result of numerous Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the meaning of "appropriate equitable
relief" for claims brought under Section 502(a)(3) 4 of ERISA. 5
When Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, the federal courts
were directed to develop a federal common law of ERISA
remedies.6 Over thirty years later, the body of federal common law
concerning the equitable remedies available under Section
502(a)(3) forms a virtual legal labyrinth.7 Plan participants who
1. Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxesof the Regulatory State, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
407 (1990).

2. See Judith Resnick, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury:
Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924 (2000), for an
analysis of how the institutions of the federal judiciary have developed
administrative agency-like attributes and characteristics.
3. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 29
U.S.C.) ("ERISA").
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000) ("Section 502(a)").
5. In order of decision, these Supreme Court precedents are:
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985);
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248 (1993); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516
U.S. 489 (1996); Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney,
Inc., 530 U.S. 238 (2000); Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v.
Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002); and Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services,
Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1869 (2006).
6. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 497 (noting that in interpreting ERISA, federal
courts will have to look beyond common law trust principles, taking into
account the language, structure, and congressional purposes of the statute);
Mertens, 508 U.S. at 264-65 (White, J., dissenting) (stating that courts must
work from the common law of trusts in construing the scope of appropriate
equitable relief for Section 502(a)(3)); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,
489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) ("[Clourts are to develop a 'federal common law of
rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.'" (quoting Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987))); Russell, 473 U.S. at 155-57
(Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that Congress authorized the federal courts
to fine-tune ERISA's remedial scheme by developing federal common law to
fashion appropriate equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3)); Franchise Tax
Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983) ("'[A] body
of Federal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues
involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans."'
(quoting 129 CONG. REC. 29942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits))).
7. See Great-West X, Crosby v. Bowater: The 6th Circuit Says Claim for
Violation of ERISA Doesn't Seek Equitable Relief, ERISA LIT. REP. (Glasser
Legal Works), Oct. 2004, at 11, 14 ("For a never-ending stream of surprises on
[These cases]
significant points.. .nothing compares to the current ferment ....

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:827

enter this labyrinth find that, contrary to their expectations,
federal law does not protect their rights concerning plan benefits.'
At the same time, employers who sponsor benefit plans for their
employees find that the complexities of ERISA litigation can
substantially increase the costs of plan administration and the
enforcement of plan terms during a time when employer-sponsored
benefits, particularly health care benefits, are increasingly
unaffordable. 9
Employers and plan participants are not the only parties
unhappy with the current state of ERISA remedies jurisprudence.
The level of frustration among the lower federal judiciary has
steadily escalated to the point where federal judges now use their
written opinions to call for Congressional reform of what is
perceived as an unjust remedies scheme.' ° Unfortunately, action
by Congress has not been, and is not likely to be, forthcoming."
This state of affairs has been the subject of a growing body of
scholarly critique. 2 Most recently, the theoretical foundation for
the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 502(a)(3) - the
historical distinctions between remedies available at law and in
equity (the "law-equity paradigm") - has drawn a sharp public
rebuke by Professor John H. Langbein of Yale Law School.
Professor Langbein has traced the root of the problem to
fundamental errors made by the Supreme Court in a series of
opinions construing the meaning of "equitable" relief under
Section 502(a)(3). 3 Professor Langbein proposes that the remedy
of make-whole relief available under the common law of trusts
should be available as "equitable relief' under Section 502(a)(3). 4
The prospect of make-whole relief under Section 502(a)(3)
raises several questions. First, what does the universe of breach of
fiduciary duties claims, which are most closely associated with
make-whole relief under the common law of trusts, look like?
Second, what doctrinal theory should guide the federal courts in
determining the types of "equitable relief' available for other types
of claims brought under Section 502(a)(3) that do not involve an
alleged breach of fiduciary duty?

can only hasten the day - which can't come soon enough for us - when the
Supreme Court takes another stab at straightening out the meaning of
equitable relief.").
8. See discussion infra Parts II.A.1-4.
9. See discussion infra Part II.A.5.
10. See discussion infra Part II.A.6.
11. See discussion infra Part II.A.6.
12. See discussion infra Part II.C.
13. See generally John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by "Equitable:
The Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Mertens, and Great-West, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003).

14. See discussion infra Part II.B.
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It is the variety of possible claims that makes interpretation
of Section 502(a)(3) so challenging for the federal judiciary. As a
governing theory, the common law of trusts becomes less
compelling for the interpretation of Section 502(a)(3) in the context
of claims that are not closely related to the trustee-based roots of
ERISA. Section 502(a)(3) also encompasses claims that are not
fiduciary in nature, such as claims against plan participants,
claims against nonfiduciary plan service providers, and claims
against third parties. Determining the remedies available under
Section 502(a)(3) for these nonfiduciary claims is a difficult judicial
task.
This Article attempts to explore and illuminate the current
theoretical void. The Article develops a statutory and policy-based
theory that reconciles Professor Langbein's analysis of equitable
relief in the context of fiduciary claims with the other types of
claims, also authorized by Section 502(a)(3), that are not strongly
rooted in the common law of trusts and trustees. In the course of
developing this statutory and policy-based theory, the Article
makes the following claims:
1.
The Supreme Court has been laboring under the
misperception that the universe of defendants and related claims
under Section 502(a)(3) is unlimited and presents a judicial
slippery slope. 15 Based on this false premise, the Supreme Court
has miscalculated the potential risk of "slippage" and overreacted
by embracing the law-equity paradigm, resulting in a rigid rule
that only remedies "typically"6 available in a court of equity are
available under Section 502(a)(3).
2. It is possible to deduce all of the possible categories of
defendants and related claims that make up the universe of
private civil actions that may be brought under Section 502(a)(3).
These categories of defendants and related claims can be logically
deduced from ERISA's complex statutory scheme using a threestage modeling analysis. The results of this modeling exercise,
which takes as its inspiration the modeling exercise technique
made famous by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed,"' are
summarized in Part III of the Article and presented in detail in
Appendices A, B, and C.
3. Based on the results of the modeling exercise, there are six
possible categories of defendants and related claims under Section
502(a)(3). These six categories are:

15. See discussion infra Part II.C.
16. See discussion infra Part II.B.; see also Great-West Life-& Annuity Ins.
Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002) (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs.,
508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993)).
17. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules
and Inalienability:One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
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Violation of Plan Design Requirements
Retaliation, Improper Plan Amendment
Procedure, or Inurement of Plan Assets
Breach of Fiduciary Responsibilities
(Including Wrongfully Denied Claims for
Plan Benefits)
Violation of Plan Terms by Participants
Knowing Participation in Breach of
Fiduciary Duties or Prohibited
Transactions by Non-Fiduciary Parties in
Interest
Claims Against Third Parties

These six distinct categories of defendants and related claims
refute the characterization of Section 502(a)(3) as a potential
judicial slippery slope.
4. Once Section 502 (a)(3) is conceptualized as authorizing six
distinct categories of defendants and related claims, it becomes
possible for federal judges to use the underlying policy objectives
that are unique to each category as the basis for discerning what
types of equitable relief are "appropriate" under Section 502(a)(3).
The essence of my proposed theory is captured by the ERISA
Policy Triangle. Using the ERISA Policy Triangle, the federal
courts can achieve uniformity of interpretation by standardizing
the remedies available within each particular category, while at
the same time satisfying the need for flexibility by recognizing
that what are "appropriate" equitable remedies may differ across
categories. Different categories of defendants and related claims
raise different policy concerns, and therefore may warrant a more
narrow or a more expansive view of "appropriate" equitable relief
available under Section 502(a)(3).
5. The Supreme Court's major prior precedents interpreting
Section 502(a)(3), when stripped of superfluous dicta, can be read
as consistent with the Article's proposed approach to statutory
interpretation. Therefore, the doctrine of stare decisis does not
present an obstacle to adopting a fresh judicial approach to
interpretation of Section 502 (a)(3).
The kernel of the Article's thesis is not novel. Since the
Supreme Court first interpreted the meaning of "equitable" relief
in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 8 the Department of Labor has
urged the federal courts to consider the status of the defendant
and the nature of the claim in determining the remedies available
under Section 502(a)(3). 9 What has been lacking to date in the
scholarly literature is a rigorous and comprehensive analysis of

18. Mertens, 508 U.S. 248.
19. See discussion infra Part II.C.3.
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why the Department of Labor's position is theoretically sound as a
matter of statutory construction. This Article presents the
theoretical case for the Department of Labor's long-standing
litigation position. The Article demonstrates that a statutory and
policy-based theory is the superior approach to judicial
interpretation of Section 502(a)(3).
A cautionary word is appropriate before the reader proceeds
to the body of the Article. To reduce the length of the Article, I
have assumed that the reader has an intermediate level of
familiarity with ERISA's statutory provisions and the Supreme
Court's major precedents in the area."° These precedents are
discussed in the Article without providing background information
to the reader. Novices to ERISA are strongly encouraged to read
the original Supreme Court cases in conjunction with Professor
Langbein's article,2' which provides a detailed analysis of the
major Supreme Court precedents of Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Russell, Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, and GreatWest Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson. ERISA experts
who are interested solely in my conclusions should proceed
immediately to Part III.C of the Article and begin reading at that
point.

II. THE JUDICIAL PARADOX OF EQUITABLE REMEDIES UNDER
ERISA
A. Illustrationsof the JudicialParadox
Over thirty years ago, Congress determined that federal law
exclusively should regulate employee benefit plans. Since the
enactment of ERISA in 1974,22 these plans and the benefits they
provide to employees have become increasingly important fixtures
in the modern workplace.
During this period, the designs,
features, and types of benefits provided by employer-sponsored
plans have evolved in response to broad societal, demographic and
economic trends. Retirement plans have moved increasingly from
a paternalistic, employer-managed system to one where the plan's
participants are primarily responsible for funding and managing
their own retirement assets.3 In the health care area, employers
20. See precedents listed supra note 5.
21. Langbein, supra note 13.
22. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 & 29

U.S.C.).
23. See generally Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined ContributionParadigm,
114 YALE L.J. 451 (2004) (discussing the rise of the defined contribution plan);
Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model of Retirement Plans
Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L. J. 1, 4-13 (2000)
(discussing the individual responsibility model).
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have responded to rising costs by replacing the traditional insured
health care plan, first with employer "self-insured" health care
plans,2 4' and later with managed care plans.25 These trends have
caused the roles and responsibilities of persons associated with
employee benefit plans - the sponsoring employer, the plan's
participants, and the other parties who assist in managing and
administering employee benefit plans - to change dramatically.
Yet ERISA's core statutory provisions that regulate the conduct of
persons associated with employee benefit plans and provide a
remedy for violations have remained remarkably consistent since
their enactment in 1974.
As a result, the federal courts
increasingly have struggled to apply ERISA's original statutory
language to situations arising in today's modern workplace.
Many of these modern ERISA claims are brought under
Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA27 ("Section 502(a)(3)"), a key provision
that authorizes private civil actions. Section 502(a)(3) authorizes
a plan participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to bring a claim in
federal court to obtain injunctive or "other appropriate equitable
relief' to remedy any violation of title I of ERISA, or to enforce the
terms of an employee benefit plan."8 On its face, the statutory
language of Section 502(a)(3) appears to offer a flexible mechanism
by which the federal courts may address issues concerning
employee benefit plans that Congress did not anticipate in 1974.
The very nature of Section 502(a)(3) as a flexible "catchall
remedial provision,"29 however, has proven problematic. First in
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates," again in Great-West Life & Annuity

24. See Colleen E. Medill, HIPAA and Its Related Legislation:A New Role
for ERISA in the Regulation of Private Health Care Plans?,65 TENN. L. REV.
485, 491-93 (1998) (explaining the differences between insured and employer
self-insured health care plans and the financial incentive for employers to selfinsure their health care plans).
25. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 369-70 (2002)
(discussing the increase in managed care plans as the dominant form of health
plan coverage); Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000) (discussing the
fiduciary implications of managed care plans).
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000) (fiduciary duties); 29 U.S.C. § 1105
(2000) (co-fiduciary duties); 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)-(b) (2000) (prohibited
transactions); 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2000) (liability for breach of fiduciary duty);
29 U.SC. § 1132(a) (2000) (civil actions and remedies).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) ("Section 502(a)(3)").
28. The complete text of Section 502(a)(3) reads:
A civil action may be brought - by a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of
this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce

any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
29. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 512 (1996) (Thomas, J. dissenting).
30. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
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Insurance Co. v. Knudson,31 and most recently in Sereboff v. Mid
Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.,3"the Supreme Court has defined
the nature of equitable relief available under Section 502(a)(3) not
as a flexible remedial mechanism, but rather by reference to the
historical distinctions between remedies available at law and
remedies available in equity (the "law-equity paradigm").33 Under
the law-equity paradigm, equitable remedies under Section
502(a)(3) include injunction, mandamus, restitution, and
enforcement of an equitable lien or a constructive trust, but
exclude compensatory damages.34
It is the combination of Section 502(a)(3) as the catchall claim
of last resort for private litigants under ERISA, coupled with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of equitable relief based on the
law-equity paradigm, that has led to the judicial paradox of
Section 502(a)(3). The crux of the paradox lies in the application
of the Supreme Court's law-equity paradigm by the lower federal
courts to situations that are far different from the circumstances of
Mertens and Great-West." The cases described below illustrate
how the judicially created paradox of "equitable" relief under
Section 502(a)(3) operates in a variety of contexts.
1. Illegal Plan Terms
Congress intended ERISA to regulate strictly the methods by
which a participant's benefits in a retirement plan are accrued and
become vested." In Crosby v. Bowater Inc. Retirement Plan," a
class of plan participants alleged that their employer's retirement
plan used a method to calculate the lump sum value of their
retirement benefits that violated the statutory vesting rules of
ERISA Section 203(a).' The district court agreed that the plan's

31. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
32. 126 S.Ct. 1869 (2006).
33. See Langbein, supra note 13, at 1350.
34. See Sereboff, 126 S.Ct. at 1874-75 (permitting enforcement of an
equitable lien based on a pre-existing agreement); Great-West, 534 U.S. at
210-11, 216-17 (discussing remedies typically available in equity); Mertens,
508 U.S. at 256 (recognizing that "equitable relief' refers to categories of relief
available in equity).
35. Great-West Life IX: Millsap, Qualchoice, and Skretvedt, ERISA LIT.
REP. (Glasser Legal Works), Aug. 2004, at 13.
Call us in a rut, but neither we nor the circuit courts are able to stay
away from [Great-West]. As the decisions discussed in this article show,
the question of what counts as "equitable relief' that can be awarded on
a claim brought under ERISA §502(a)(3) just keeps coming to the
surface in a wide variety of cases.

Id.
36. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1053-1054 (2000) (listing the requirements for the
accrual of benefits).
37. 382 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2004).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a).
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method of calculation was illegal and granted summary judgment
to the plaintiffs, ordering the plan to recalculate the lump sum
benefit amounts due the plaintiffs and to refund immediately the
amount of any underpayments with interest. On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit dismissed the plaintiffs' claim because the remedy ordered
by the district court - a payment of money - was not "equitable"
under Section 502(a)(3). 39 The plaintiffs were left without any
recourse, despite the fact that the plan used a method that was
illegal under ERISA to calculate the lump sum value of their
retirement benefits, and the plan paid the plaintiffs a lesser
amount than they were entitled to receive under the statutory
vesting rules of ERISA.
2.

Retaliatory Conduct by Employers

Congress intended ERISA to protect the rights of plan
participants by prohibiting retaliatory actions that adversely
impact the terms or conditions of the participant's employment,
with the termination of employment being the most severe type of
retaliation.0 This statutory prohibition is found in ERISA Section
510 of ERISA ("Section 510").4" Section 502(a)(3) serves as the
claim and remedy provision for a Section 510 violation.42
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Great-West, the lower
federal courts awarded back-pay, and sometimes awarded frontpay, as equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3) if the employer
illegally retaliated against a plan participant in violation of
Section 510 by terminating the participant's employment.43 After
Great-West, backpay and frontpay may no longer be available as
39. Crosby, 382 F.3d at 594. The court in Crosby noted:
But what if the benefits are not claimed to be due under terms of the
plan, strictly speaking, but under the terms of a statute - in this case

ERISA §203(a), -

setting forth requirements that the plan must

satisfy? The answer, we believe, depends on whether the claim for
benefits allegedly due under the statutory requirements is or is not, at
bottom, a claim for injunctive or other equitable relief. No matter how

well founded it may be as a matter of substantive law, a claim for
benefits is not cognizable under §502(a)(3) of ERISA unless it is a claim
for "equitable relief."

Id. (citation omitted).
40. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000).

41. § 1140.
42. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142-44 (1990)
(stating that Congress intended Section 502(a)(3) to be the exclusive remedial
provision for ERISA violations, including Section 510 violations).
43. See Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017, 1022-23 (6th Cir. 1995)
(awarding both back-pay and front-pay); Warner v. Buck Creek Nursery, Inc.,
149 F.Supp. 2d 246, 256-57 (W.D. Va. 2001) (awarding both back-pay and
front-pay); Anglin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 139 F. Supp. 2d 914, 921 (N.D. Ill.
2001) (granting plaintiff the right to seek restitution in the form of back-pay);
Russell v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 921 F. Supp. 143, 152 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)

(concluding that back-pay is an equitable remedy).
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an equitable remedy, as illustrated by the Tenth Circuit's decision
in Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp."
In Millsap, a class of plan participants alleged that their
employer closed one of its manufacturing plants for the illegal
purpose under Section 510 of preventing employees who worked at
the plant from attaining eligibility for benefits under their
retirement and health care plans. After a ten day bench trial, in a
"thorough
published
order.. .reciting
its
findings
and
conclusions,"" the district found that the employer's actions
violated Section 510,6 a conclusion that was "undisputed" by the
parties when the case eventually reached the Tenth Circuit.47
The district court's remedy for the violation of Section 510
was at the heart of the appeal in Millsap. The district court
awarded $90 million in backpay to the class of plaintiffs as
equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3) because under the
circumstances (the plant had been closed since 1993)
reinstatement of employment was impossible. On appeal, the
Tenth Circuit rejected the district court's remedy, based on the
Supreme Court's analysis in Great-West, because
8 backpay was not
an "equitable" remedy under Section 502(a)(3).1
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Lucero of the Tenth Circuit
captured perfectly the judicial paradox of Millsap.
Under the majority's result, the class plaintiffs are entitled to
neither reinstatement nor back pay. Not only does the majority's
holding fail to deter ERISA violations, it also encourages employers
who violate ERISA to delay proceedings as long as possible, leading
to the strange result that... the most egregious offenders could be
subject to the least sanctions.4
3. FiduciaryIrresponsibility
Congress intended ERISA to regulate the conduct of plan
fiduciaries who administer employee benefit plans." Among the
duties ERISA imposes on plan fiduciaries is the fiduciary duty of
prudence." The panel decision in the Fifth Circuit case of Milofsky
44. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglass Corp., 368 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2004).
45. Id. at 1248.

46. Millsap v. McDonnell Douglass Corp., 162 F.Supp. 2d 1262, 1298 (N.D.
Okla. 2001).
47. Millsap, 368 F.3d at 1249.
48. Id. at 1260.

49. Id. at 1261 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
50. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1113 (2000) (listing the fiduciary responsibility
provisions of ERISA).

51. 29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1)(B). ERISA's other primary fiduciary duties are
the duty of loyalty, also known as the exclusive benefit rule, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(A)(i)-(ii), the duty of prudent diversification, 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(C), and the duty to follow the terms of the plan unless such terms
are inconsistent with the requirements of title I of ERISA, 29 U.S.C.
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v. American Airlines, Inc.52 illustrates the controversy concerning
ERISA remedies when the alleged breach of a fiduciary duty by an
ERISA fiduciary injures less than all of the participants in the
plan.
In Milofsky, a small regional airline was acquired by the
parent company of American Eagle, Inc. ("American Eagle"). At
the time of the acquisition, the regional airline had 218
participants in its combination profit sharing and 401(k)
retirement plan. These participants were told that their accounts
would be transferred to a comparable 401(k) plan sponsored by
American Eagle. The fiduciary for the 401(k) plan sponsored by
American Eagle allegedly failed to transfer the accounts in a
timely and prudent manner, thereby causing the 218 former
participants in the regional airline's retirement plan to suffer an
investment loss.
These 218 participants were the plaintiffs in Milofsky. They
brought a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under Sections 409
and 502(a)(2) of ERISA53 ("Section 409" and "Section 502 (a)(2),"
respectively) against the fiduciary for the American Eagle 401(k)
plan seeking restoration of the investment losses to their
individual plan accounts caused by the fiduciary's breach of
fiduciary duty. The Fifth Circuit panel, in a 2-1 decision, affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claim. The panel
majority reasoned that the plaintiffs' claim affected only 218
individual accounts out of the much larger American Eagle 401(k)
plan. Therefore, the panel majority concluded, the plaintiffs' could
not bring their claim under Sections 409 and 502(a)(2) because the
relief sought would not flow to the plan "as a whole."'
The panel majority in Milofsky noted that the plaintiffs did
have standing to bring their claim under Section 502(a)(3) of
ERISA.
At the same time, the panel majority implicitly
acknowledged the futility of such a claim due to the inadequate
remedy available, stating:
Section 502(a)(3) is available for individualized relief such as that
sought in this case. Though that subsection explicitly limits recovery
to equitable relief and might deny the plaintiffs the particular
remedy they desire, that is all that is available under the remedial
§ 1104(a)(1)(D).

52. 404 F.3d 338 (5th Cir. 2005).
53. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109, 1132(a)(2) (2000).
54. Milofsky, 404 F.3d at 343-47. The Fifth Circuit's panel decision in
Milofsky created a split among the circuits concerning whether a subclass of
plan participants may bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim under ERISA
Sections 409(a) and 502(a)(2). See In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA
Litigation, 420 F.3d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 2005) (permitting a subclass claim under
Section 502(a)(2)); Kuper v. lovenko, 66 F.3d 1447, 1453 (6th Cir. 1995)
(concluding that plaintiffs may sue as a subclass participant of a plan for

breach of fiduciary duty).
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scheme designed by Congress. Despite the policy arguments the
plaintiffs
advance, our task is to apply the text, not to improve upon
55
it.
Judge King dissented from the Milofsky panel decision on the
ground that the result paradoxically thwarted Congressional
intent:
At the end of 2003, over $2.3 trillion in assets were held in
individual account plans, representing well over half of all pension
plan assets in the United States. The majority's holding means that
those participants in individual account plans who are unfortunate
enough to be forced to litigate in the Fifth Circuit will be unable to
recover monetary losses to the plans caused by fiduciary breaches
when fewer than all plan participants would benefit from the
litigation, thereby limiting recovery to the equitable relief available
under § 502(a)(3) of ERISA. To deprive plan participants in such
circumstances of a § 409 remedy for breach of fiduciary duty
effectively nullifies Congress's intent to provide a high level of
protection to any and all plan participantsfrom fiduciary abuse.'
The saga of Milofsky did not end with the panel decision. The
Fifth Circuit subsequently granted a motion for rehearing en
banc."7 In a cryptic two-page, per curiam opinion, the Fifth Circuit
sitting en banc reversed the Milo[sky panel decision and remanded
the case back to the district court for further consideration."8 The
Fifth Circuit's en banc opinion stated only that the plaintiffs were
"entitled to further development of their breach of fiduciary duties
claims" brought under Section 502(a)(2), and explained that
"[mleasured by the principles of notice pleading and the standards
controlling dismissal under Fed. R.Civ. P. 12(b)(6)," the district
court erred in dismissing these claims.59
The underlying substantive issue left unresolved in Milo[sky
is an important one that arises in multiple contexts. The remedy
sought by the 218 plan participants in Milofsky potentially was
unavailable under Section 502(a)(3) because under the Supreme
Court's law-equity paradigm, an award of monetary relief for
investment losses may not qualify as "equitable" relief.60 The
question of whether monetary relief is available under Section
502(a)(3) arises if breach of fiduciary duty causes either an actual
economic loss in value to a participant's retirement account,61 or
55. Milofsky, 404 F.3d at 346-47 (internal quotations omitted) (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 348 (King, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
57. Milofsky v. American Airlines, Inc., 418 F. 3d 429 (5th Cir. 2005).
58. 442 F.3d 311 (2006).
59. Id.
60. See Milofsky, 404 F.3d at 347 n.23 ("The Supreme Court has indicated
that compensatory and punitive damages may not be available under ERISA
§ 502(a)(3).").
61. The most notorious examples of actual economic loss to participant
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the loss of an investment opportunity that results in the slower
appreciation of the account's value. 2 A breach of fiduciary duty
can cause a participant to pay additional income taxes that could
have been avoided if the participant had received complete and
accurate tax information concerning the participant's benefit
distribution options. 3 A breach of fiduciary duty also can cause
the participant to forfeit monetary benefits, such as life insurance
benefits or disability benefits, that are paid by an insurer through
the employer's plan.' In each instance, the end result is the same

accounts are the Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing 401(k) plan cases
involving company stock as an investment option. Goeres v. Charles Schwab
& Co., 33 Emp. Ben. Cas. 2302 (N.D. Cal. 2004), illustrates a breach of
fiduciary duty claim that does not involve allegations concerning company
stock as a plan asset. In Goeres, an actual economic loss of over $1 million to
allegedly resulted from the plan administrator's negligent refusal to distribute
the account balance to the deceased participant's designated beneficiary. Id.
62. See Helfrich v. PNC Bank, 267 F.3d 477, 481 (6th Cir. 2001)
(participant sought monetary award for the difference between what his
retirement plan account would have earned if the administrator had
transferred his account to higher performing mutual funds in accordance with
participant's instructions rather than transferring account to lower
performing money market fund); Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d
938, 944 (8th Cir. 1999) (participant sought monetary award for the difference
between what his retirement plan account would have earned if the
administrator had not wrongfully withheld payment of his account for three
and one-half years and what the account actually earned during the period).
63. See Griggs v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 385 F.3d 440, 454 (4th Cir.
2004) (affirming order allowing plaintiff to rescind original pay-out of taxable
lump sum distribution and elect monthly annuity payment); Farr v. U.S. West
Comm., Inc., 151 F.3d 908, 916 (9th Cir. 1998) (seeking among other damages
a surcharge equal to taxes paid on lump-sum distribution as a result of
defendant's failure to inform plaintiff of income tax consequences of
distribution); Armstrong v. Jefferson Smurfit Co., 30 F.3d 11, 12 (1st Cir.
1994) (seeking damages for defendant's failure to inform about income tax
ramifications of a lump-sum payment); Glencoe v. Teachers Ins. and Annuity
Ass'n of America, 69 F. Supp. 2d 849, 852 (S.D. W.Va. 1999) (seeking complete
restoration of distributed funds); Cunningham v. Dun & Bradstreet Plan
Servs., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 932, 934 (N.D. Miss. 1995) (seeking money damages
for tax consequences suffered for plan fiduciary transferred funds); cf. Fraser
v. Lintas, 56 F.3d 722, 723 (6th Cir. 1995) (dismissing claim under Section
502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA for reimbursement of income taxes paid on lump sum
distribution on theory that income taxes were not included in the "benefit due"
under the plan).
64. See Callery v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 392 F.3d 401, 404-05 (10th Cir. 2004)
(holding that damages were not available under Section 502(a)(3) against plan
administrator who failed to provide accurate information concerning coverage
under employer's life insurance plan); Allinder v. Inter-City Prods. Corp., 152
F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that damages were not available under
Section 502(a)(3) against plan administrator who refused to complete form
necessary for participant to file claim with insurance company for disability
benefits); Kishter v. Principal Life Ins. Co., 186 F. Supp. 2d 438, 445-46
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that damages were not available under Section
502(a)(3) against plan administrator who failed to provide accurate
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- the injury caused by the breach of fiduciary duty results in a
lesser benefit amount (or no benefits at all) for the plan
participant. To redress the injury, monetary relief is required.
To justify a monetary remedy under Section 502(a)(3), prior to
the Supreme Court's decision in Great-West' some federal courts
characterized a monetary award as "restitution."
The strong
emphasis in Great-West on whether the defendant has been
unjustly enriched by the claimed misconduct" appears to foreclose
the possibility of monetary restitution for many types of breach of
fiduciary duty claims. For example, if the breach of fiduciary duty
involved an imprudent delay in executing a participant's
investment direction, or a failure to prudently select and monitor
the plan investment options, usually the breaching fiduciary has
not been personally enriched. Rather, it is the participant's
retirement account that has suffered an investment loss or a lost
investment opportunity. Where the breach of fiduciary duty is a
failure by the plan fiduciary to explain the adverse income tax
consequences associated with a benefit distribution option, it is the
United States Treasury, not the plan fiduciary, who is enriched by
the failure to disclose. In situations involving insured benefits, the
typical fiduciary breach involves either a failure to accurately
disclose crucial coverage information or a lack of prudence in
preparing or processing the paperwork required to be submitted
under the insurance policy to qualify for the plan's benefits. When
the insurance company refuses to pay the benefits provided under
the policy, it is not the imprudent fiduciary who is enriched, but
rather the insurance company, who received the premium
payments but who is not obligated under the terms of the
insurance policy to make payment of the claimed benefits. In each

information concerning her coverage under employer's life insurance plan);
Peterman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 217 F.Supp.2d 807, 809-10 (E.D. Mich. 2002)
(holding that monetary relief was unavailable for damages sustained as a
result of plan administrator's failure to provide accurate information
concerning life insurance policy).
65. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
66. See Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 202 F.3d 138, 150 (2d Cir. 1999)
(discussing the issue of restitution as an equitable remedy); Fotta v. Trustees
of United Mine Workers of Am. Health & Ret. Fund, 165 F.3d 209, 213-14 (3d
Cir. 1998) (noting that restitution is widely recognized as a tool of equity);
Ream v. Frey, 107 F.3d 147, 153 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997) (allowing claim for
restitution of participant's account plus lost investment opportunity costs even
though bank as fiduciary was not unjustly enriched); Howe v. Varity Corp., 36
F.3d 746, 756 (8th Cir. 1994) (giving relevant examples of restitution used as a
monetary award); Laurenzano v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mass., Inc.
Ret. Income Trust, 134 F. Supp. 2d 189, 196 (D. Mass. 2001) (pointing out that
other equitable remedies, in addition to restitution, take the form of monetary
damages).
67. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 212-16 (describing the different views
regarding restitution as an equitable remedy compared with a legal remedy).
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of these situations, someone other than the breachingfiduciary has
been "enriched" as a consequence of the fiduciary's misconduct. If,
as Great-West suggests, the fiduciary's unjust enrichment is a
prerequisite to equitable restitution under Section 502(a)(3), the
injured participant may be left without a remedy under ERISA.
Moreover, any state law remedy is likely preempted.' In other
words, there are numerous contexts in which a plan participant
may be "betrayed" by an ERISA fiduciary's breach of duty, and yet
be left "without a remedy."69
4. Mismanaged Health Care
My fourth illustration involves the pernicious combination of
ERISA's broad preemption of state law and the limited remedies
available under ERISA in the context of benefits decisions made
by managed care plans. Cicio v. Does" illustrates how the judicial
paradox operates in the context of these situations, which I refer to
as "managed care cases."
In Cicio, the claim was based on the plan's refusal to provide
preauthorization for a medical treatment for cancer that had been
recommended by the participant's treating physician. The plan
later authorized an alternative, and less costly, treatment. During
the time delay before the alternative treatment was authorized by
the plan, the participant's physical condition deteriorated to the
point that further treatment was no longer a viable medical
option. Two weeks after the plan authorized the alternative
treatment, the participant died.7
In managed care cases such as Cicio, typically the participant
is gravely ill, the medical treatment sought is expensive (hence,
the need for preauthorization by the plan to ensure payment), and
the plan initially denies the request for preauthorization. The
usual justification for denying the requested medical treatment is
that the proposed treatment does not satisfy the plan's
requirement that the treatment must be "medically necessary."72

If another less costly treatment is available, the plan may propose
to pay for the alternative treatment, as was the case in Cicio.73
The factual scenarios giving rise to managed care cases follow
familiar patterns. The less costly treatment authorized by the
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
69. Allinder, 152 F.3d at 553.
70. 321 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003), rehearing after remand, 385 F.3d 156 (2d
Cir. 2004).
71. Cicio, 321 F.3d at 87-88.
72. See id. at 87.
73. Id. at 88. In Cicio, the treating physician sought preauthorization from
the plan to perform high dose chemotherapy with a double stem cell
transplant. Id. at 87. The plan initially denied this treatment, but later
approved the treatment of high dose chemotherapy with a single stem cell

transplant. Id. at 88.
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plan may be less effective and death results.74 The less costly
treatment may cause injury that could have been avoided if the
plan had approved the treating physician's original treatment
recommendation."5 Or, the participant's physical condition may
deteriorate during the time delay while the plan considers the
requested medical treatment to the point where the treatment is
no longer a viable medical option.76 Finally, the plan may not
authorize or offer any medical treatment at all. In the most
catastrophic of these "no treatment" cases, the participant dies as
a result.77
In managed care cases, the injured plaintiff (or the plaintiffs
estate) usually begins by filing various state law claims in state
court. The plan administrator's virtually automatic defense is to
remove the case to federal court on the basis of complete
preemption under ERISA,7 s followed in short order by a motion to
dismiss the plaintiffs state law claims as preempted by ERISA.79
Often the federal district court judge will permit the plaintiff to
amend the original complaint to state a claim for wrongful denial
of benefits under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B).8 ° Most plaintiffs
amend the complaint to state an ERISA claim grudgingly due to
the remedy available under Section 502(a)(1)(B), which is limited
to the benefits that are due under the terms of the plan.
The remedy offered by Section 502(a)(1)(B) in managed care
cases provides cold comfort to the widow or widower of the
participant, and effectively no compensation for the participant
who has incurred personal injury or economic loss as a result of
the wrongfully denied claim for medical treatment. The "price"
paid for a wrongful denial of a claim for plan benefits is merely
74. See Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 245-46 (3d Cir. 2000)
(mentally ill participant committed suicide when provider did not hospitalize
her due to plan's financial incentives discouraging hospitalization); Corcoran
v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (a nine month old
fetus died in the womb when plan administrator substituted ten hours per day
of fetal monitoring at home for treating physician's recommended treatment of
hospitalization with twenty-four hour fetal monitoring).
75. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 205 (2004) (adverse drug
reaction and post-surgical second hospitalization); Defelice v. Aetna U.S.
Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 468 (3d Cir. 2003) (infection resulting in
hospitalization).
76. See Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2003) (participant later died);
Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 270 (3d Cir. 2001)
(participant suffered permanent chronic back pain).
77. See Bauman v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151, 156 (3d Cir.
1999)(infant discharged twenty-four hours after birth developed meningitis

and died within forty-eight hours of birth); Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d
350, 352 (3d Cir. 1995) (failure of plan physician to authorize diagnostic blood
test resulted allegedly in participant's death).
78. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987).
79. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000) ("Section 502(a)(1)(B)").
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what the plan should have paid according to the terms of the plan.
Such a limited remedy:
eliminates an important check on the thousands of medical
decisions routinely made in the burgeoning utilization review
With liability rules generally inapplicable, there is
system.
medical
of
substandard
deterrence
less
theoretically
decisionmaking. Moreover, if the cost of compliance with a standard
of care (reflected either in the cost of prevention or the cost of paying
judgments) need not be factored into utilization review companies'
cost of doing business, bad medical judgments will end up being
cost-free to the plans that rely on these companies to contain
medical costs. ERISA plans, in turn, will have one less incentive to
seek out the companies that can deliver both high quality services
and reasonable prices."
5. IncreasedPlan Costs for Employers
Managed care cases under ERISA have attracted public
attention because these cases present compelling stories and
involve sympathetic plaintiffs. Less sympathetic, but equally
compelling from the perspective of employers who sponsor
employee benefit plans for their employees, is the adverse impact
of the judicial paradox on plan administration and the ability of
the plan administrator to enforce the terms of the plan.
Although ERISA's primary goal was to protect the benefits of
plan participants, Congress's secondary goal in enacting ERISA
was to encourage the growth of employer-sponsored benefit plans
by avoiding undue administrative burdens that might deter
voluntary plan sponsorship. 2 This secondary goal is supported by
514(a). 83
the broad preemption of state laws under ERISA Section
Congress intended ERISA preemption of state laws to result in
uniform federal standards that would reduce the complexity and
related costs of plan administration for employers who operated in
multiple jurisdictions.'
Uncertainty concerning the availability of equitable relief
under Section 502(a)(3) to enforce the terms of the employer's plan
has led to increased plan administrative costs in a variety of
contexts. For example, employers who offer health care plan
benefits to their employees often do so through self-insured health

81. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1338 (5th Cir.
1992).
82. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262-63 (1993) (noting the

competing nature of these two goals).
83. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
84. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2000); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 150

(2001) (recognizing the burden that ERISA's preemption rule was designed to
avoid).
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care plans.' When a self-insured plan pays for the medical care of
a participant who has been injured, the terms of the plan usually
require that the participant must reimburse the plan for the
medical expenses paid for by the plan if the participant later
recovers from the third-party tortfeasor who caused the
participant's injuries.86
If the injured plan participant later
recovers against the tortfeasor, the participant may refuse to
reimburse the plan. To enforce the terms of the plan, the plan
administrator must sue the participant for "equitable relief" under
Section 502(a)(3) to compel reimbursement.
Claims against a plan participant to compel reimbursement
also arise in the context of disability benefit plans where the
participant later receives a retroactive payment of Social Security
disability benefits, 7 or instances where the plan administrator
mistakenly has made an overpayment of benefits to the
participant. In each of these circumstances, the ability of the plan
administrator to effectively enforce the terms of the plan through a
claim for reimbursement may be uncertain due to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v.
Knudson"8 and Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc. 9
The facts of Great-West illustrate the high litigation costs
often associated with the enforcement of a health care plan
reimbursement clause.
The main defendant in Great-West
("Knudson") had health care coverage through a health care plan
sponsored by her husband's employer.
Knudson became a
quadriplegic as the result of a car accident, incurring $411,157.11
in medical expenses. Of this amount, the employer's self-insured
plan paid $75,000, and the remainder was paid by the plan's stoploss insurance carrier ("Great-West"). 9 Knudson filed a tort action
in state court against various alleged tortfeasors to recover for her
injuries. The parties to this state court action negotiated a
settlement of $650,000.
Notice of this proposed state court
settlement was mailed to Great-West as the assignee of the plan
fiduciary's right to enforce the terms of the reimbursement
clause.91 Great-West attempted unsuccessfully to remove the state
court tort action to federal court. The state court later approved
the settlement agreement.92 Under the terms of the settlement
85. See Medill, supra note 24, at 496.
86. See generally THOMAS H. LAWRENCE & JOHN M. RUSSELL, ERISA
SUBROGATION: ENFORCING RECOUPMENT PROVISIONS IN ERISA-COVERED
WEALTH AND DISABILITY PLANS (1999).

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
assert
92.

See discussion infra Part III.C.3.d.
534 U.S. 204 (2002).
126 S.Ct. 1869 (2006).
Great-West, 534 U.S. at 207-08.
Id. This assignment gave plaintiff Great-West derivative standing to
the plan's fiduciary's claim under Section 502(a)(3). Id.
Id. at 208.
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agreement, Great-West received $13,828.70 for past medical
expenses paid by the plan.
The die was cast in the Great-West litigation when the state
court approved the terms of the tort settlement agreement. Under
the settlement agreement, payment by the tort defendants was
structured so that $256,745 of the settlement proceeds were paid
directly to a special needs trust. 3
Great-West refused to cash the check it received for
$13,828.70, its share of the tort settlement proceeds. Instead,
Great-West filed a claim in federal district court seeking
"injunctive and declaratory relief' under Section 502(a)(3). GreatWest sought to enforce the plan's reimbursement clause against
Knudson through a court order requiring Knudson personally to
reimburse the plan. '
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court
rejected the claim to enforce the terms of a reimbursement clause
against Knudson under Section 502(a)(3) because "to impose
personal liability on [the plan participant] for a contractual
obligation to pay money [is] relief that was not typically available
in equity." 5
Great-West is paradoxical on several levels. Great-West has
made it difficult and costly for employers who sponsor health care
plans to enforce a reimbursement clause and recoup the plan's
medical expenses that have been recovered by a participant in a
tort action in state court.9 Even the most elite of ERISA lawyers,
who make their living litigating ERISA's complexities, find
daunting the procedural and substantive barriers that Great-West
presents for the enforcement of a plan reimbursement clause.97
More fundamentally, Great-West, is paradoxical because even
though the Supreme Court purported to reaffirm its earlier
decision in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates," the rationales of the two
decisions are inapposite from a policy perspective. The explicit
93. Id. at 207-08. A special needs trust is a common law express trust
containing a distribution provision that authorizes the trustee only to
distribute trust assets for the "special" needs of the trust beneficiary, and

prohibits the trustee from distributing trust assets for any necessities (such as
medical care) that are provided by government programs (such as Medicaid).
94. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 208

(2002).
95. Id. at 210.
96. See Robert N. Eccles & David E. Gordon, Great-West Life & Annuity
Ins. Co. v. Knudson: Supreme Court Announces That It Was Not Kidding in
Mertens v.Hewitt Associates, ERISA LIT. REP (Glasser Legal Works), Feb.
2002, at 3; Robert N. Eccles & David E. Gordon, Great-West Life - The First
100 Days, ERISA LIT. REP (Glasser Legal Works), April 2002, at 1.
97. See Supreme Court Announces That It Was Not Kidding, supra note 96,
at 3 ("[Wle are all somewhat baffled about what to do the next time a plan
wants to be repaid for medical expenditures on behalf of a participant who has
recovered from a tortfeasor.").
98. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
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policy rationale relied upon by the Supreme Court in Mertens was
to avoid increasing the costs to employers of sponsoring benefit
plans.' In contrast, the majority in Great-West simply ignored the
countervailing policy argument that the consequence of thwarting
the plan's ability to enforce a reimbursement clause by denying a
remedy under Section 502(a)(3) would be to increase the costs to
employers of sponsoring health care plans for their employees. °°
Unlike Great-West, Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services,
Inc.'1 presented a relatively simple set of facts. Joel and Marlene
Sereboff were participants in an employer-sponsored health care
plan that contained a reimbursement clause. The Sereboffs, who
were residents of Maryland, were injured in an automobile
accident and later recovered a settlement from the tortfeasor who
caused their injuries. Throughout the tort litigation, the health
care plan asserted its right to reimbursement from the Sereboffs if
the Sereboffs prevailed. When parties settled the tort litigation,
the settlement proceeds were divided between the Sereboffs'
California tort attorney as payment for attorney's fees and the
Sereboffs.
Using their share of the tort settlement proceeds, the
Sereboffs placed the exact amount claimed by the health care plan
for reimbursement into a separate investment account. When the
Sereboffs refused voluntarily to reimburse the health care plan,
the health care plan filed a claim against the Sereboffs under
Section 502(a)(3) seeking equitable relief.
In Sereboff, the
particular form of equitable relief sought by the plan was an
equitable lien or a constructive trust on the settlement proceeds
held in the Sereboffs' investment account. The Supreme Court in
Sereboff held that the health care plan's remedy in the form of an
equitable lien "based on an agreement" (i.e., based on the terms of
the health care plan) concerning the funds held in the investment
account was
"equitable" relief within the meaning of Section
2
502(a)(3).11
Unlike Great-West, in Sereboff the reimbursement claim was
limited to a separate and identifiable fund controlled by the plan
participants and the fund had adequate assets fully to reimburse
the plan."
The very simplicity of the facts in Sereboff leaves
unresolved several issues that swirl around the equitable lien or
constructive trust remedy. These issues are likely to arise in the
context of more sophisticated variations on the basic fact pattern
in Sereboff. For example, the tort recovery funds held by the
99. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262-63.
100. See Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002
SUP. CT. REV. 343,350 (2002).
101. 126 S.Ct. 1869 (2006)
102. Id. at 1874-75.
103. Id. at 1873.
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participant may not be sufficient fully to reimburse the plan, and
the plan administrator may seek to recover part of the tort
recovery funds paid to the participant's tort attorney as attorney's
fees. °" Or, the tort recovery funds may be paid directly from the
tortfeasor to the trustee of an express trust established for the
benefit of the participant, as was the case in Great-West. In
addition, the participant, the participant's tort attorney, or the
participant's trustee may commingle the tort recovery funds with
other assets, or spend the funds, and then assert that a separate
fund no longer exists upon which an equitable lien or a
constructive trust may be imposed. These more sophisticated
variations on Sereboff are all ways that a plan participant may
seek to avoid the obligation to reimburse the plan.
In attempting to clarify Great-West, °' which emphasized the
technical nuances of remedies available in common law courts of
equity, the Supreme Court's decision in Sereboff leaves employers,
plan administrators, and the lower federal courts without clear
guidance as to how far equitable relief in the form of an equitable
lien or a constructive trust under Section 502(a)(3) extends.
Although the Supreme Court in Sereboff rejected the contention
that Great-West "endorsed application of all the restitutionary
conditions" required to be satisfied before a court of equity would
award relief," Sereboff leaves unresolved the fundamental
question of exactly when strict compliance with the technical
requirements of the common law for equitable relief is required.
The resulting uncertainty is likely to lead to years of costly
litigation as the lower federal courts attempt to apply Great-West
and Sereboff to different factual situations.
6. JudicialFrustration(and CongressionalPassivity)
As these cases illustrate, the Supreme Court's interpretation
of "equitable relief' under Section 502(a)(3) is "one of the critical
Not
issues that dominates much of ERISA litigation.""7
surprisingly, federal judges have begun to express their own
growing sense of frustration with the judicial paradox of ERISA
remedies."' The unanimous panel opinion by Judges Moore, Clay
104. See Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferror,
354 F.3d 348, 357 (5th Cir. 2003); Admin. Comm. o the Wal-Mart Assocs.
Health & Welfare Plan v. Varco, 338 F.3d, 680, 683-84 (7th Cir. 2003); Hotel
Employees Int'l Union Welfare Fund v. Gentner, 50 F.3d 719, 723 (9th Cir.
1995); Greenwood Mills, Inc. v. Burris, 130 F.Supp.2d 949, 958 (M.D. Tenn.
2001).
105. See Sereboff, 126 S.Ct. at 1874 (explaining how the facts of Great-West
made the relief sought not "equitable").
106. 126 S.Ct. at 1876 (emphasis added).
107. Robert N. Eccles & David E. Gordon, Under the Radar,ERISA LIT. REP.
(Glasser Legal Works), Oct. 2001, at 1-2.
108. See Farr v. U.S. West Communications, 151 F.3d 908, 917 (9th Cir.
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and Gilman of the Sixth Circuit in Allinder v. Inter-City Products
Corp.' 9 is typical of this judicial sentiment:
Many commentators have noted that the Supreme Court's 5-4
decision in Mertens has resulted in a "betrayal without a remedy"
for employees who pursue ERISA claims beyond the simple recovery
of benefits. The outcome in this case lends support to such criticism.
[The plaintiff-participant] would have been entitled to monetary
damages under the state-law claims she originally filed. These
claims, however, were extinguished by ERISA's ever-expanding
preemptive black hole. ERISA, in turn, provides infertile soil for an
employee to cultivate a meaningful remedy for anything beyond the
recovery of basic benefits. Employees may seek monetary damages
on behalf of the plan for an employer's breach of fiduciary duty.
They may not, however, seek similar relief for their own benefit
when an employer breaches its fiduciary duty. Instead, employees
are left with the often-inadequate remedy of an injunction,
imposition of a constructive trust, or the removal of the fiduciary. In
this way, the combination [of the employee's] state cause of action
[being] preempted by ERISA even while ERISA denies him any
alternative remedy.. .is disappointingly pernicious to the very goal
and desires that motivated Congress to enact [ERISA] in the first
place.
Constrained as we are by both ERISA's statutory provisions and the
Supreme Court's constructionof that language, this case provides no

1998) (Hawkins, J., specially concurring) ("We have faithfully applied Mertens
and its restrictive interpretation of § 502(a)(3).... [A]s this case so aptly
demonstrates, perhaps Congress should rethink the limited remedies provided
in § 502 and afford a greater range of relief to beneficiaries when a fiduciary so
clearly breaches its duties."); Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 150 F.3d
1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 1998) ("The Basts' state law claims are preempted by
ERISA, and ERISA [Section 502(a)(3)] provides no remedy. Unfortunately,
without action by Congress, there is nothing we can do to help the Basts and
others who may find themselves in this same unfortunate situation.");
Cunningham v. Dun & Bradstreet Plan Servs., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 932, 937
(N.D. Miss. 1995) ("It does not appear that the plaintiff has any remedy for
what may be a grievous wrong against her. This is the sad truth of the
present state of ERISA law."); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Socia, 16 F. Supp.
2d 66, 73 (D. Mass. 1998) ("[ERISAI does not always vindicate traditional
notions of justice, either for the plan or for its participants."); Andrews-Clark
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 63 (D. Mass. 1997) ("Under any
criterion... the shield of near immunity now provided by ERISA [to HMO
plans] simply cannot be justified."). In Suggs v. Pan Am. Life Insurance Co.,
the court summarized the sense of judicial frustration:
[T]he overriding purpose of the judiciary is to provide justice. When
Congress passes legislation. .. "to protect.. .the interests of participants
in private pension plans and their beneficiaries".. .and yet the Courts
have to say "for what may have been a serious mistake there is no
remedy, state or federal".. .something is wrong. The system isn't
working.
Suggs v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 847 F. Supp. 1324, 1357 (S.D. Miss. 1994).
109. 152 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 1998).
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opportunity for us to redress the problems that employees face when
pursing a remedy under ERISA for an employer's or insurer's
misdeeds beyond the recovery of the basic benefits to which they are
entitled . . ."0
One proposed solution is for the Supreme Court to reconsider
its interpretation of equitable relief and broaden the availability of
monetary relief under Section 502(a)(3)."' For managed care cases
in particular, it is the lack of a consequential damages remedy
under ERISA that drives the plaintiffs legal strategy.112 Efforts by
plaintiffs' lawyers to avoid ERISA preemption of state law
malpractice claims, and thereby preserve a consequential damages
remedy under state law, have resulted in a body of caselaw under
ERISA that Judge Becker of the Third Circuit has characterized as
a "Serbonian bog" - "a mess from which there is no way of
4
Judge
extricating onself."1" In Difelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare,"
Becker summarized the growing sense of judicial frustration with
ERISA managed care cases in stark terms:
The vital thing.. .is that either Congress or the Supreme Court act
quickly, because the current situation is plainly untenable. Lower
courts are routinely forced to dismiss entirely justified complaints
by plan participants who have been grievously injured by HMOs
and plan sponsors, all because of ERISA, the very purpose of which
was to safeguard those very participants. Our dockets grow
increasingly crowded with cases where participants offer myriad
varieties of artful pleadings in their desperate attempts to
circumvent ERISA's procrustean reach, and our caselaw grows

110. Id. at 553 (citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added).
111. See discussion infra Part III.D.3.
112. See Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 106 (2d Cir. 2003), rehearing after
remand, 385 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2004) (Calabresi, J., dissenting). Judge
Calabresi succinctly described the problem presented by the lack of a damages
remedy.
The conclusion that my colleagues have reached today is a band-aid on a
gaping wound. It may provide justice to Mrs. Cicio, and I'm glad for
that, but the injury that the courts have done to ERISA will not be
healed until the Supreme Court reconsiders the existence of
consequential damages under the statute, or Congress revisits the law
to the same end.
Id. Unfortunately for Mrs. Cicio, the "band-aid" - the Second Circuit's ruling
that her state law claim of medical malpractice against the HMO was not
preempted by ERISA - was torn off when the Supreme Court remanded her
case for further consideration in light of the Court's opinion in Aetna Health,
Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004). Upon reconsideration after remand, the
Second Circuit panel concluded that "Aetna Health Inc. fatally undermines our
reasoning in the [prior] panel decision," and dismissed the plaintiffs state law
claim of medical malpractice as preempted by ERISA. Cicio v. Does, 385 F.3d
156, 158 (2d Cir. 2004).
113. See Difelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 454 & n. 1 (Becker,
J., concurring).
114. Id.
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massively inconsistent due to the sheer complexities of the subject
and lack of any meaningful guidance. There must a better way.'
In a futile attempt to provoke a dialogue with Congress and
the Department of Labor on the issue,"6 Judge Becker further
ordered that
the Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this opinion... to the
Solicitor of the Department of Labor; the Chair, Ranking Member,
Chief Majority Counsel, and Minority Counsel of the Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions; and the
Chair, Ranking Member, Chief Majority Counsel, and Minority
117
Counsel of the House Committee on Education and the Workforce.
Most recently, in Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila"8 Supreme
Court Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer joined
"the rising judicial chorus urging that Congress and [this] Court
revisit what is an unjust and increasingly tangled ERISA
regime.""9 To date, these judicial pleas for statutory reform have
fallen on deaf ears. Why has Congress not responded to these
expressions of judicial frustration? The answer lies, at least in
part, in the complex interest group politics that surround
ERISA."2
Although most public and judicial attention has been focused
on ERISA managed care cases, the cases presented illustrate that
Section 502(a)(3) cuts a much wider swath than merely claims
concerning mixed medical treatment and benefits eligibility
decisions by managed care plans. Consequently, any attempt by
Congress to amend Section 502(a)(3) is likely to face significant
opposition from numerous stakeholders in the employee benefits
system. These interested stakeholders include: employers; labor
unions; the financial services industry (whose members serve as
plan administrators and trustees and who also provides various
investment products for retirement plans); the insurance industry;
the health care industry; health care providers; and the plaintiffs
tort bar. For every stakeholder who advocates for a change by
Congress regarding the remedies available under Section

115. Id. at 467.
116. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR AN AGE OF STATUTES, 165-

66 (1982) ("In a statutory world,.. .the appropriate technique [to deal with a
statute that has become obsolete] will be to enter into a dialogue, to ask,
cajole, or force another body (usually the legislature but sometimes the
agencies) to define the new rule or reaffirm the old.").
117. Difelice, 346 F.3d at 467.
118. 542 U.S. 200 (2004).
119. Id. at 222 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
120. See Judith Resnick, Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary,
Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L. REV. 223, 269 n.253 (2003) (noting
that interest group politics complicate proposals to amend ERISA).

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:827

502(a)(3), there is another stakeholder who benefits from, and
therefore seeks to preserve, the status quo.
The complex interest group politics surrounding ERISA have
led Congress to exhibit its own brand of passivity when it comes to
amending ERISA. For two current examples, one need look no
further than legislative proposals to limit the concentration of
company stock permitted in 401(k) plans in the wake of the Enron
scandal, and legislative proposals to provide greater federal rights
to patients in managed health care plans. Despite obvious
problems and strongly favorable public sentiment, Congress has
failed to enact reform legislation in either area.
Congress similarly is unlikely to respond to calls for reform by
the federal judiciary because Section 502(a)(3) represents the
proverbial politician's Pandora's box - impossible to open without
unleashing a host of swarming lobbyists from interested
stakeholder groups upon the members of Congress. The inability
(or unwillingness) of members of Congress to achieve consensus
among various stakeholder groups concerning reform means that
if the paradox of equitable remedies under ERISA is to be
resolved, it must be resolved by the very institution that has
created the paradox - the Supreme Court itself.
B.

Scholarly Criticismand the Need for a Better DoctrinalTheory

Although a substantial body of
developed on the subject of ERISA
generally have focused their efforts on
502(a)(3) to specific types of claims. 1 '

academic literature has
remedies, prior scholars
the application of Section
An exception is Professor

121. The scholarly literature to date on ERISA Section 502(a)(3) has focused
more narrowly on specific issues. Scholars have focused on the plight of plan
participants "betrayed without a remedy." See Randall J. Gingiss, The ERISA
Foxtrot: Current JurisprudenceTakes One Step Forwardand One Step Back in
Protecting Participants' Rights, 18 VA. TAX REV. 417, 417-72 (1998)
(describing the plight of plan participants whom are left with an inequitable
remedy under ERISA); Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, Closing the Gap:
SafeguardingParticipants'Rights by Expanding the Federal Common Law of
ERISA, 72 WASH. U.L.Q. 671, 671-23 (1994) (criticizing the Supreme Court's
interpretation of ERISA which deprives plan participants of remedies that
existed prior to ERISA); George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Extracontractual
Damages Mandated for Benefit Claims Actions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 611, 611-66
(1994) (describing the problem with Section 502(a) and outlining the proper
analysis courts should use to determine whether extra contractual damages
are permissible). Scholars have focused on the availability of a monetary
award in breach of fiduciary duty cases. See generally Eduard A. Lopez,
Equitable Remedies for Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA After Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LABOR L. 323, 323-46 (1997); John D.
Shire, Note, Varity Corp. v. Howe in the Wake of Mertens v. Hewitt Associates:
Did the Supreme Court Impermissibly Authorize a Damages Award Under
ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B)?, 102 DICKINSON L. REV. 411, 411-39 (1998); Note,
Closing the Massachusetts Mutual v. Russell Gap: Monetary Damage Awards
Under ERISA Section 502(a)(3), 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 691, 691-22 (1991).
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John H. Langbein's article, What ERISA Means By "Equitable".
The Supreme Court's Trail of Error in Russell, Merten, and GreatWest.
In his article, Professor Langbein meticulously destroys
the legal reasoning that justifies the Supreme Court's law-equity
paradigm as a foundational theory for defining the types of
equitable relief available under Section 502(a)(3).
Professor
Langbein powerfully concludes:
The Supreme Court needs to confess its error in ERISA remedy law,
much as it has recently confronted its mishandling of ERISA
preemption, and to realign ERISA remedy law with the trust
remedial tradition that Congress intended in the grant of
"appropriate equitable relief." It was error to say that mandamus
was an equitable remedy; mandamus was always legal and never
equitable. It was error to say that money damages never lay for
equitable causes of action; our courts award damages for breach of
trust and for other equitable causes of action every day. It was error
to say that a Congress sitting in 1974 meant to unravel forty years
of fusion of law and equity, solely by employing the benign sounding
word "equitable" when authorizing "appropriate equitable relief." It
was error to confuse the routine judicial work of applying so abstract
a term as "appropriate equitable relief" with the forbidden activity
of implying omitted statutory provisions. Congress federalized the
law of pension and benefit plan administration for the primary
purpose of protecting plan participants and beneficiaries through a
triple regime of mandatory trusteeship, extensive fiduciary duties,
and commensurate remedies.123

See also Susan J. Stabile, Breach of ERISA FiduciaryResponsibilities: Who's
Liable Anyway?, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 135 (2001) (discussing claims
against nonfiduciaries who assist in a fiduciary's breach of duty); Susan J.
Stabile, I Believed my Employer and Didn't Sell my Company Stock: Is There
an ERISA (or '34 Act) Remedy for Me?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 385 (2003-2004)
(discussing remedies for fiduciary breach of duty related to company stock
held in a 401(k) plan). Scholars also have focused on fiduciary claims for
contribution or indemnity. See generally George Lee Flint, Jr. & Philip W.
Moore, Jr., ERISA: A Co-Fiduciary Has No Right to Contribution and
Indemnity, 48 S. D. L. REV. 7 (2003); Note, A Fiduciary'sRight to Contribution
or Indemnity Under ERISA, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 507, 507-74 (1996);
Comment, Fairness and Efficiency: Allowing Contribution Under ERISA, 80
CAL. L. REV. 1543, 1543-94 (1992); Michael J. Collins, It's Common, But Is It
Right? The Common Law of Trusts In ERISA Fiduciary Litigation, 16 LAB.
LAW 391, 412-21 (2001). Still other scholars have focused on claims for
retaliation or the enforcement of plan reimbursement clauses. See, e.g., Dana
M. Muir, ERISA Remedies: Chimera or CongressionalCompromise?, 81 IOWA
L. REV. 1, 1-53 (1995) (discussing claims alleging employer retaliation); John
R. Cella, Jr., The Pursuit of Proceeds by Plans, Participantsand Plaintiffs'
Lawyers: DissonantSolutions to an Alliterative Problem, 22 CAMPBELL L. REV.
317, 317-39 (2000) (discussing claims for reimbursement of benefits paid by
health care plans).
122. Langbein, supra note 13.
123. Id. at 1365-66.
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Professor Langbein proposes that the make-whole relief
tradition developed under the law of trusts should replace the
Supreme Court's law-equity paradigm in cases where the claim
under Section 502(a)(3) is one for breach of ERISA fiduciary
duties."' Under a make-whole standard of equitable relief, an
individual who is injured by a fiduciary's breach of duty may
recover "money
damages for consequential injury" under Section
12
502(a)(3).
Professor Langbein's article focuses on the most significant
category of claims - breach of fiduciary duty claims - and
proposing a substitute doctrinal theory for determining "equitable"
relief in these cases.
Professor Langbein's article does not,
however, purport to provide a universal solution to the judicial
paradox of ERISA remedies. Over thirty years of experience with
ERISA demonstrates that there are a variety of claims possible
under Section 502(a)(3), and not all of these claims involve
allegations of a breach of ERISA fiduciary duty.126
These
nonfiduciary claims exist in part because, although Congress
generally intended ERISA to codify the principles of fiduciary
conduct developed under the common law of trusts, Congress also
recognized that modifications to the common law of trusts were
necessary for the modern world of employee benefit plans." 7 Thus,
Section 502(a)(3) encompasses not only claims for a breach of
ERISA's statutory fiduciary duties, but also claims based on a
violation of other statutory provisions of title I of ERISA, or a
violation of the terms of an ERISA plan.'28
It is this variety of possible claims that makes interpretation
of Section 502(a)(3) so challenging for the federal judiciary. As a
doctrinal theory, the common law of trusts becomes a less
compelling basis for the interpretation of equitable relief available
under Section 502(a)(3) in the context of claims that are not closely
related to the trustee-based roots of ERISA. The combination of
124. Id. at 1324-38.
125. Id. at 1333-34, 1365-66.
126. See discussion supra Parts II.A.l.-.5.
127. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,
4649-51 (adopting appropriate modifications for employee benefit plans);
S.REP. No. 93-127 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4866
(recognizing that appropriate modifications must be made for employee benefit
plans); H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038,
5076 (detailing those modifications necessary for modern employee benefit
plans); Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) (acknowledging that
ERISA's standards and procedures reflect Congress's determination that the
common law of trusts was not appropriate protection for employee benefit

plans). Indeed, Professor Langbein acknowledges and describes various
instances where ERISA omitted areas of trust law that were inapplicable or
inappropriate for employee benefit plans.

1327-28.
128. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000).

See Langbein, supra note 13, at
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fiduciary claims not strongly linked to the common law of trusts,
such as claims against plan participants, claims against
nonfiduciary plan service providers, and claims against third
parties, has made judicial interpretation of Section 5 0 2 (a)(3) a
complex task.
The remainder of the Article explores and illuminates the
current theoretical void. The Article develops a statutory and
policy-based theory that reconciles Professor Langbein's proposed
make-whole relief in the context of fiduciary claims with the other
types of claims, also authorized by Section 502(a)(3), that are not
strongly rooted in the common law of trusts and trustees.
C. Resolving the ParadoxThrough Slippery Slope Theory
1. The Supreme Court's Perceptionof Section 502(a)(3) as a
Slippery Slope
Two yearnings influence development of any legal rule. One is the
yearning for a precise rule that serves as an unfailing guide to the
judge in making decisions and to the lawyer in predicting them.
The other is the yearning for a flexible rule that is most conducive to
sensitively administered justice - a rule that never compels bad
decisions in the interest of symmetry, elegance, or simplicity.'29
In the above quotation, Robert Keeton perfectly captures the
interpretive dilemma that lurks underneath Section 502(a)(3).
The authority of federal judges to award "appropriate equitable
relief' under Section 502(a)(3) provides tremendous flexibility to
tailor a remedy that achieves a fair and just result in any given
case. Yet this very flexibility also represents the potential for
chaos.
Without clear guidelines, each new case will bring
arguments from the parties that the federal court should award
the most generous remedy, or the most stingy one (including no
remedy at all), based on prior precedents under Section 502(a)(3).
The dilemma presented by the vague wording of Section
502(a)(3) is suggestive of the classic judicial slippery slope - the
situation where one judicial decision potentially may lead to
another through the force of judicial precedent.'3 ° My claim in this
part of the Article is that the judicial paradox of ERISA remedies
arose, at least in part,'31 because of the mistaken perception that
129. ROBERT KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS, vii (1963).
130. See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV.
L. REV. 1026, 1034 (2003).

131. Professor Judith Resnick has posited that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3) is merely

a

subterfuge for judicial hostility toward an apparently open-ended remedies
provision. See Resnick, supra note 120, at 258-61 (describing Great-West as
symptomatic of the Supreme Court's general tendency to read the remedies
provisions of federal statutes in a restrictive fashion, thereby limiting the
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Section 502(a)(3) is fraught with the dangers traditionally
associated with a judicial slippery slope. To eliminate these
perceived dangers, it appears that the Supreme Court has opted
for the lesser of two evils: a "one-size-fits-all" judicial
interpretation, justified by the Court's law-equity paradigm. The
law-equity paradigm may provide a precise and easily
administered rule, but it is a rule that in application frequently
offends judicial notions of fairness and justice.
The Supreme Court's perception of Section 502(a)(3) as
presenting a judicial slippery slope is made most transparent in
the debate between the majority and dissenting Justices in GreatWest. 3 ' In Great-West, as in Mertens, 3 a five Justice majority
viewed Congress's use of the word "equitable" in Section 502(a)(3)
as signaling Congressional intent to limit the scope of relief
available."' The only way to give this limitation substance, the
Great-West majority concluded, was to incorporate the historical
distinctions between remedies at law and remedies in equity into
the statute. In the words of the majority in Great-West:
[iut is easy to disparage the law-equity dichotomy as "an ancient
classification," and an "obsolete distinctio[n]." Like it or not,
however, that classification and distinction has been specified by the
statute; and there is no way to give the specification meaning indeed, there is no way to render the unmistakable limitation of the
statute a limitation at all- except by adverting to the differences
between law and equity to which the statute refers.
The dissenting Justices in Great-West proposed an alternative
approach to the interpretation of equitable relief available under
Section 502(a)(3). Under this alternative approach, the federal
courts would "look to the substance of the relief requested" 36 and
construe the term "equity" in a flexible manner that would be

scope of federal relief available to vindicate violations of federal rights).
Professor

Daniel

Meltzer

has

suggested

that the

Supreme

Court's

interpretation of equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3) is symptomatic of a
selective judicial passivity toward judicial lawmaking in subconstitutional
areas of federal law. See Meltzer, supra note 100, at 346-51. Although not
ruling out the possibility of mixed motives by the Justices, I am proposing a
more benign explanation, namely that even Supreme Court Justices
sometimes have difficulty with a complex federal statute, and that the
Supreme Court's interpretation based on the law-equity justification is a
plausible judicial response to the perceived dangers of a judicial slippery slope.
132. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
133. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993).

134. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 209-10 (stating that "'[elquitable' relief
must mean something less than all relief.'" (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 259
n.8)).
135. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 216-17 (citations omitted)(emphasis in
original).
136. Id. at 228.
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dependent on the context and circumstances of the case.137 The
majority in Great-West dismissed this alternative approach,
stating that "[wihat will introduce a high degree of confusion into
congressional use (and lawyers' understanding) of the statutory
term 'equity' is the rolling revision of its content contemplated by
the dissents."' 38
The majority's concern in Great-West that a context-specific
approach to equitable relief available under Section 502(a)(3)
would result in a "rolling revision" of the statutory language stems
from the assumption, apparently shared by all nine Justices, that
there are virtually no limits to the type of defendants and related
claims cognizable under Section 502(a)(3).
In an earlier
unanimous opinion in an unrelated case, the Supreme Court in
Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney'39
characterized Section 502(a)(3) as giving rise to a virtually openended universe of potential defendants:
[Section] 502(a)(3) admits of no limit (aside from the "appropriate
equitable relief" caveat... ) on the universe of possible defendants.
Indeed, § 502(a)(3) makes no mention at all of which parties
may be proper defendants-the focus, instead, is on
redressing the "act or practice which violates any provision of [title
I of ERISA].""O
If Section 502(a)(3) is theorized as presenting a potentially
infinite range of possible defendants and related claims, it is but
one small step to the conclusion that the equitable relief offered by
Section 502(a)(3) is fraught with the dangers traditionally
associated with a judicial slippery slope. If this perception of
Section 502(a)(3) is accurate, a single legal standard defining
equitable relief becomes intuitively appealing to those Justices
who have concerns about potential judicial slippery slope effects.
Moreover, if this perception is accurate, a single legal standard clear guidance - is judicially efficient. But is this perception of
Section 502(a)(3) as a potential judicial slippery slope correct?
Here, the analytical insights of Professor Eugene Volokh into the
mechanisms by which judicial slippery slopes operate suggest that
the answer to this crucial threshold question is "no."

137. Id. at 233.
138. Id. at 217 (first emphasis in original; second emphasis added).
139. 530 U.S. 238 (2000).
140. Id. at 246 (emphasis in original). This perception apparently is shared
by federal jurists at the court of appeals level. See Heimann v. Nat'l Elevator
Ind. Pension Fund, 187 F.3d 493, 504 (5th Cir. 1999) ("Unlike four of § 502's
six subsections, § 502(a)(3) is not focused on specific areas or types of
defendants."); Reich v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting
the profound uncertainty created by the vagueness and breadth of "other
appropriate relief').
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2. Slippery Slope Mechanisms and Countermeasures
In his article, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope,"'
Professor Volokh examines the theoretical mechanisms by which
various types of slippery slopes operate in order to better evaluate
the risk that a slippery slope effect will occur. Slippery slope
theory serves two useful functions. First, it can reveal slippery
slopes that "may seem intuitively plausible, but looking closer at
the potential mechanisms might persuade us that in this situation
none of them is likely to cause slippage.""" Second, a better
understanding of the mechanisms of slippery slopes can help to
craft effective countermeasures.'43
Professor Volokh defines a slippery slope as a situation
"where decision A, which you might find appealing, ends up
materially increasing the probability that others will bring about
decision B, which you oppose."44 A simple thought experiment
puts flesh on this abstract concept and places it in the concrete
context of my topic, namely Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA. Assume
that "Decision A" involves a case of breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA. Decision A would be a monetary award measured by the
make-whole relief standard under the common law of trusts
(Professor Langbein's proposed interpretation of equitable relief).'
Decision A would result in an award of money sufficient
compensate fully a plan participant who was injured by the
fiduciary's breach of duty under ERISA. You are a Supreme Court
Justice, and you find Decision A appealing because Decision A is
consistent with ERISA's purpose of regulating fiduciary conduct so
as to safeguard the rights of plan participants.
But you are also aware of another case, currently being
litigated in the lower federal courts, where the defendant is a plan
service provider who is not an ERISA fiduciary with respect to the
plan, but who provides services to a defined benefit pension plan
and the plan's fiduciary administrator.
This second case
represents "Decision B." The allegation in the Decision B case is
that the plan service provider assisted the plan fiduciary in
committing a breach of fiduciary duty by submitting false
actuarial funding reports concerning the pension plan's assets to
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. These false reports
enabled the employer to underfund the plan. When the employer
became insolvent, the assets in the plan were insufficient to pay
the retirement benefits promised to the plan participants. The

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Volokh, supra note 130, at 1026.
Id. at 1128.
Id. at 1128, 1131-32.
Id. at 1030.
See discussion supra Part II.B.
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relief sought by the plaintiffs in the Decision B case under Section
502(a)(3) is a monetary award sufficient to restore the funding of
the employer's retirement plan to the level actuarially required to
pay the plan's promised benefits.'4
As a Supreme Court Justice, you favor Decision A (a makewhole monetary award to the participant who has been injured by
a fiduciary's breach of duty), but you are opposed to Decision B (a
monetary award against a nonfiduciary plan service provider in an
amount sufficient to restore the plan's funding level). You might
oppose applying the remedies precedent in Decision A to Decision
B because you believe that requiring a defendant who is not an
ERISA fiduciary to fulfill the employer's statutory obligation to
adequately fund the plan would cause plan service providers to
charge employers more for their services to cover the costs
associated with this liability risk. Or, you might believe that the
statutory language and structure of ERISA does not support
147
financial liability against a party who is not an ERISA fiduciary.
What are the slippery slope mechanisms by which Decision A,
which you favor, could lead to Decision B, which you oppose? In
other words, how realistic are your concerns about the risk of a
judicial slippery slope?
Professor Volokh identifies two separate but interrelated
mechanisms associated with a judicial slippery slope.
These
mechanisms are the legal effect slippery slope and the
equality/administrative cost slippery slope. A legal effect slippery
slope occurs by force of legal precedent where Decision A rests on
some justification (J), and justification J also justifies Decision
B." In a legal effect slippery slope situation, the perceived danger
is created by an overly broad or vague justification J."9 An
equality/administrative effect slippery slope occurs when a judge
feels impelled to extend Decision A to Decision B, either because
the two cases seem similar and therefore (the judge believes)
should be treated equally, or because the dividing line between
Decision A and Decision B is too difficult for other judges to
administer and enforce in a consistent manner in subsequent
cases. 150
In the equality/administrative cost slippery slope
situation, the perceived danger is that other lower federal judges
(or your fellow Supreme Court Justices) may have a different
understanding of "equality" among cases, or may not be able easily

146. My description of Decision B is, of course, a simplified summary of the
actual facts in Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
147. In fact, both of these rationales were given in support of the majority's
decision in Mertens. See 508 U.S. at 253-55, 262-63.
148. See Volokh, supra note 130, at 1064.
149. See id. at 1065-66.
150. See id. at 1064-71.
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to administer a more complex rule. In either instance, the
perceived danger is that in a subsequent case Decision A
(awarding a monetary relief measured by standard that makes the
plaintiff-participant "whole") may later be broadened and applied
to justify a similar monetary award in Decision B.'"
One countermeasure to a legal effect slippery slope is to rest
Decision A on the most narrow justification J possible so that
justification J cannot be applied to Decision B.'5' Using my
example, justification J for Decision A could be based on the status
of the defendant and the nature of the claim under ERISA. In my
example, the defendant in Decision A is a fiduciary under
ERISA,ln and the claim is one for breach of fiduciary duty.TM But
this countermeasure does not necessarily resolve the potential risk
of an equality/administrative cost slippery slope. As Professor
Volokh explains, the mere fact that "a distinction between A and B
can be drawn doesn't mean that enough future judges will be
persuaded by this distinction."5 '
problem
of an
perceived
to
the
approach
One
equality/administrative cost slippery slope is to eliminate the
slippery slope risk entirely by awarding a remedy in Decision A
that is also acceptable in the Decision B situation. I call this the
"one-size-fits-all" approach to interpretation of the remedies
available under Section 502(a)(3). Professor Volokh describes this
approach as "not mak[ing] a sound decision today, for fear of
having to draw a sound distinction tomorrow. " "'
My hypothetical one-size-fits-all approach is, of course, the
Supreme Court's current law-equity paradigm. Superficially, the
one-size-fits-all approach appears to be a sensible solution to the
perceived risks associated with a judicial slippery slope. ERISA is,
after all, a federal statute well-known for its daunting complexity.

151. See id. at 1071.
152. See id. at 1066.
153. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2000) (defining a fiduciary).
154. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000) defining the duties of a fiduciary with
respect to a plan).
155. Volokh, supra note 130, at 1066-67. In Reich v. Continental Casualty
Co., Judge Richard Posner deftly expressed why other federal judges might
find Decision A persuasive authority for Decision B:
In areas of profound uncertainty, such as whether a statute that does
not explicitly impose duties on nonfiduciaries should be interpreted as
doing so implicitly because of the background of trust law against which
it was enacted and the vagueness and breadth of "other appropriate
relief' with no specified limitation as to whom the relief can be sought
from, federal law is for all practical purposes what the Supreme Court

says it is.
Reich v. Continental Cas. Co., 33 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis
added).
156. Volokh, supra note 130, at 1030.
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Because the types of cases that may be brought under Section
502(a)(3) are not limited to my two hypothetical "Decision A
versus Decision B" choices, 7 the concern that federal judges may
not be able to distinguish between different types of cases and
administer a more complex rule is a legitimate one. When this
complexity is combined with the judicial perception that an
unlimited number of cases may be brought under Section
502(a)(3), one can easily leap to the conclusion that anything other
than a single standard (the law-equity paradigm) for determining
equitable relief administratively is unworkable.
Again, Professor Volokh's theory of how slippery slope
mechanisms operate is instructive. Professor Volokh theorizes
that bounded rationality leads individuals, including federal
judges, to simplify a complex body of law by focusing on a few
general principles and forgetting the details," or by boiling1 5a9
decision down into "a brief and not fully accurate summary."
The aftermath of the Supreme Court's decision in Mertens provides
a concrete example of this phenomenon of bounded rationality in
the context of Section 502(a)(3). In the wake of Mertens, the lower
federal courts consistently summarized the Mertens decision as
based on a single justification - that equitable relief is limited to
"injunction, mandamus, and restitution"16 ° - and applied this
justification to all types of cases under Section 502(a)(3).16 ' This
occurred even though the types of defendants and the nature of
the claims brought in these subsequent cases were very different

157. See discussion supra Part II.A and infra Part III.
158. See Volokh, supra note 130, at 1090-97.
159. Id. at 1090.
160. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993). One notable
exception to this trend is Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 202 F.3d 138 (2d
Cir. 1999), where Judge Kaplan concluded that make-whole relief for economic
loss directly caused by the plan fiduciary's duty was an appropriate equitable
remedy under Section 502(a)(3). See id. at 150.
161. See Farr v. U.S. West Communications, 151 F.3d 908, 915 (9th Cir.
1998) (stating that fiduciary breached duty by providing inadequate and

misleading information to participants concerning tax consequences of early
retirement package); Allinder v. Inter-City Prods., 152 F.3d 544, 547-52 (6th
Cir. 1998) (stating that plan administrator was plainly wrong in refusing to
complete paperwork necessary for plaintiff to receive long-term disability plan
benefits); FMC Medical Plan v. Owens, 122 F.3d 1258, 1260-62 (9th Cir. 1997)
(concerning a contractual reimbursement claim brought by plan administrator
against participant); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Socia, 16 F. Supp. 2d 66, 7273 (D. Mass. 1998) (concerning a suit by plan administrator to recover
disability plan payments paid to participant).
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from the claim in Mertens,6' and the results often seemed harsh
rather than equitable.'63
One solution to my "Decision A versus Decision B" thought
experiment would be for the Supreme Court to adopt Professor
Langbein's proposed make-whole relief standard for monetary
awards as an exception for breach of fiduciary duty cases brought
under Section 502(a)(3), while retaining the law-equity paradigm
of Mertens and Great-West as the "general rule" governing all other
types of cases brought under Section 502(a)(3). Professor Volokh's
theory suggests why this solution is unlikely to appeal to those
Justices who are concerned about the potential judicial slippery
slope effects of Section 502(a)(3). According to Professor Volokh,
the phenomenon of bounded rationality means that when looking
at a
broader body of law, people are especially unlikely to precisely
absorb all the details of each past case... ; instead, they tend to try
to fit the decisions into a general mold that stresses one or two basic
principles at the expense of many of the details.... One classic
example of such a general mold is "This is the rule, though there are
some exceptions".... But at some point, some people who are
surveying the body of decisions may start concluding that the law is
so internally inconsistent [due to its burgeoning exceptions] that
they can't distill any core underlying principles from it, or even that
the exceptions themselves have become the rule."
Thus, urging the Supreme Court to adopt Professor
Langbein's proposal for fiduciary duty cases as an "exception" to
the "general rule" of Mertens and Great-West is unlikely to
persuade those Justices who are, concerned about judicial slippery
slope effects. It is foreseeable that one "exception" may lead to a
second, and then to a third, and then ultimately to the erosion of
the "general rule." This erosion:risk is particularly acute in light
of the broad universe of claims that fall within the breach of
fiduciary duty category under ERISA'65 and the fact that breach of
fiduciary claims are often intertwvined with other types of claims
under Section 502(a)(3)."
Professor Volokh further suggests why, despite the
162. See Farr, 151 F.3d at 915-16 (refusing to apply "appropriate equitable
relief' as a different standard for fiduciary versus nonfiduciary); McLeod v.
Oregon Lithoprint, Inc., 102 F.3d 376, 378 (9th Cir. 1996) (ignoring fiduciary
versus nonfiduciary distinction under Mertens); Armstrong v. Jefferson
Smurfit Corp., 30 F.3d 11, 13 (1 Cir. 1994) (holding that status of defendant

as fiduciary versus nonfiduciary is irrelevant under Mertens when
determining appropriate equitable relief for alleged breach of fiduciary duty
under Section 502(a)(3)).
163. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.

164. Volokh, supra note 130, at 1093-94 (emphasis added).
165. See discussion infra Parts III.C.3.c.i.-vi.
166. See discussion infra Appendix B.
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paradoxical results produced, those Supreme Court Justices who
are concerned about the potential judicial slippery slope effects of
Section 502(a)(3) nevertheless may be reluctant to jettison the lawequity paradigm as the underlying theory for judicial
Volokh identifies this
interpretation of equitable relief.
phenomenon as the judicial-judicial attitude altering slippery
slope.'67
The judicial-judicial attitude altering slippery slope
derives from the judicial attitude that the general principles that
underlie prior precedents are presumptively morally or empirically
sound." Professor Volokh posits that lower federal court judges
may be so deferential to the general principle that underlies a
"new" precedent that they will apply this general principle to other
situations where, strictly speaking, the "new" precedent is not
binding. 9 This is, in fact, precisely what happened in the wake of
the Supreme Court's decision in Mertens.7 ' Professor Volokh
argues that to mitigate this potential risk, "various [Supreme
Court] Justices have refused to adopt new principles that lack
well-defined, coherent limits. " '7
The perceived risk of a judicial-judicial attitude altering
slippery slope may further discourage some Supreme Court
Justices from adopting Professor Langbein's proposal. Merely
substituting the principle of make-whole relief under the common
law of trusts for the Supreme Court's law-equity paradigm may
not create the "well-defined, coherent limits" that would curtail
the perceived judicial slippery slope risks presented by Section
502(a)(3). 7'
3. A "FreshStart"for Section 502(a)(3)
Thus far, slippery slope theory seems to justify the retention
of the law-equity paradigm (a clear rule) as the governing
doctrinal theory for interpretation of equitable relief available
under Section 502(a)(3). Slippery slope theory further suggests
why the Supreme Court may be reluctant to recognize make-whole
relief as an available remedy for breach of fiduciary duty claims
brought under Section 502(a)(3). But what if the perception of
Section 502(a)(3) as a potential judicial slippery slope is false?
What if, contrary to the Supreme Court's statement in Harris
Trust and Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.,73 the

167. Volokh, supra note 130, at 1098-1100.
168. Id. at 1098.
169. Id. at 1098-99.
170. See Meltzer, supra note 100, at 346 & n.2.
171. Volokh, supra note 130, at 1099.
172. For example, should the theory of make-whole relief apply to claims
against nonfiduciaries who assist in a fiduciary's breach of duty? See
discussion supra note 155.
173. 530 U.S. 238 (2000).
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universe of defendants and related claims under Section 502(a)(3)
is not unlimited? What if Section 502(a)(3) can be conceptualized
as encompassing a finite number of easily recognizable and readily
distinguishable categories of defendants and related claims? Or,
in other words, what if Section 502(a)(3), when viewed in the
context of the entire statutory framework of title I of ERISA, is not
a "slope" at all, but rather is a series of well-delineated "boxes"
instead?
The central thesis of this Article, presented in Part III, is that
careful statutory analysis of the entirety of title I of ERISA reveals
there are six distinct categories of defendants and related claims
that are possible under Section 502(a)(3). These six categories are
derived from the statutory definitions and statutory provisions of
title I of ERISA. Because these six categories are uniquely
distinct, they serve as bulwarks against the risks of a judicial
slippery slope.
Once Section 502(a)(3) is conceptualized as consisting of six
distinct categories of defendants and related claims, it becomes
possible for the Supreme Court to resolve the judicial paradox of
ERISA remedies. Rather than continuing to rely on the flawed
law-equity paradigm to define equitable relief under Section
502(a)(3), the Supreme Court instead may look to the policy
objective or mix of policy objectives that underlie each category of
claims to determine "appropriateequitable relief."
The kernel of my central thesis is not new. After Mertens,
the Department of Labor vigorously advocated that the status of
the defendant as fiduciary or non-fiduciary should affect the
nature of equitable relief available under Section 502(a)(3).'
The
Department of Labor's position in these cases is similar to the
argument made by Professor Langbein, namely that the federal
courts should look to the common law of trusts and award
monetary relief when the claim under Section 502(a)(3) is brought
against a fiduciary for a breach of fiduciary duty." 5 To date, the
174. See Callery v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 392 F.3d 401, 409 (10th Cir. 2004)
("[Oither courts have rejected the distinction.. .based on the status of the
defendant as a fiduciary."); McLeod v. Oregon Lithoprint, 102 F.3d 376, 378

(9th Cir. 1996) ('[TIhe status of the defendant, whether fiduciary or
nonfiduciary, does not affect the question of whether damages constitute
'appropriate equitable relief under § 502(a)(3)." (citing Armstrong v. Jefferson
Smurfit Corp., 30 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 1994))).
175. Most recently, this position was reasserted by the Department of Labor

in its amicus curia brief in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila. 542 U.S. 200, 223-24
(2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). See also Callery, 392 F.3d at 408 ("[Almici
Secretary of Labor.. .assert[s] that the limited availability of monetary
damages in Mertens and Great-West is inapplicable in this case because those
cases involved contract breaches by non-fiduciaries, rather than a claim
against a fiduciary for a breach of fiduciary duty."). See generally Rego v.
Westvaco Corp., 319 F.3d 140, 144-46 (4th Cir. 2003); Crosby v. Bowater, Inc.
Ret. Plan, 382 F.3d 587, 596 (6th Cir. 2004); Helfrich v. PNC Bank, Inc., 267
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lower federal courts have consistently rejected this argument as
foreclosed by Mertens and Great-West."6 The Supreme Court has
not spoken definitively on this issue. 1" Thus, the door remains
open for the Supreme Court to reassess the utility of the lawequity paradigm and instead adopt a fresh start for judicial
interpretation of Section 502(a)(3). Part III of the Article presents
the statutory and policy analysis for why the Department of
Labor's proposed interpretation of Section 502(a)(3) - that the
status of the defendant and the nature of the claim is relevant to
the determination of "appropriate equitable relief' available - is on
sound (rather than slippery) footing as a matter of doctrinal
theory.
In considering the possibility of a fresh start for Section
50 2 (a)(3), the Supreme Court's recent experience with
interpretation of another difficult ERISA provision, preemption of
state law under Section 514(a),'78 is encouraging. 7 9 Section 514(a)
generally provides for preemption of all state laws that "relate to"
an employee benefit plan."s After struggling for many years with
attempting to define this opaque phrase, the Supreme Court in
New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co.' finally admitted that "our prior attempt
to construe the phrase 'relate to' does not give us much help,"'82
and decided to "go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating
difficulty of defining its key term, and look instead to the
objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide. . ..183
Section 502(a)(3), like Section 514(a), suffers from similarly
unhelpful drafting of the statutory text.
To date, when
interpreting Section 502(a)(3) the Supreme Court has looked
primarily outside of the statute, and has seized upon "an ancient
classification unrelated to the substance of the relief sought"" for
F.3d 477, 482-83; Kerr v. Charles F. Vatterott & Co., 184 F.3d 938, 945 (8th
Cir. 1999); Rogers v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 944 (5th
Cir. 1999); McLeod, 102 F.3d at 378; Armstrong, 30 F.3d at 13.
176. See Callery, 392 F.3d at 409 ("While the arguments of amici that we
should look to the common law of trusts and award monetary damages
pursuant to an equitable breach of trust by a fiduciary may have been
compelling before Great-West, they are not so now."); Crosby, 382 F.3d at 596
(stating that the argument that money damages should be awarded in a suit
against a fiduciary is "explicitly rejected" by Great-West).
177. See discussion infra Part III.D.4.
178. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
179. See Langbein, supra note 13, at 1331-32; Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 107
& n.1 (2d Cir. 2003) (Calabresi, J., dissenting).
180. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
181. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
182. Id. at 655.
183. Id. at 656.
184. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 224
(2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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interpretive guidance. The results, as demonstrated by the cases
described in Part II of the Article, have proven unsatisfactory.
Rather than continuing to draw ever finer distinctions
between remedies available at law and in equity,'85 this Article
proposes that the Supreme Court should modify its approach to
Section 502(a)(3) by looking first inside the provisions of title I of
ERISA to ascertain how Section 502(a)(3) functions within the
context of the overall statutory scheme to facilitate and serve
ERISA's various policy objectives.'86 This foundation of statutory
structure and closely related policy objectives, instead of a "rigid
1
and time-bound conception of the term 'equity,',87
should
determine what constitutes "appropriate equitable relief' for
claims brought under Section 502(a)(3). Part III of the Article
develops this fresh judicial approach to interpretation of Section
502(a)(3).
III. A STATUTORY AND POLICY-BASED THEORY FOR JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 502(A)(3) CLAIMS AND REMEDIES
Section 502(a)(3) has proven troublesome for the federal
courts because the statutory language on its face appears to be
ambiguous.
Rather than identifying particular types of
defendants and related claims, Section 502(a)(3) is written in an
open-ended fashion. Section 502(a)(3) states:
A civil action may be brought by a participant, beneficiary, or
fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any
provision of [title I of ERISA] or the terms of the plan, or (B) to
obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violation
or (ii) to enforce any provision of [title I of ERISAI.l
In failing to identify the universe of possible defendants and
related claims, Section 502(a)(3) essentially creates a logic puzzle.
Three types of potential plaintiffs - participants, beneficiaries, and
fiduciaries - are expressly identified by the statute. The types of
defendants, and the claims that plaintiffs may bring against them,
are not. This leads to two questions: What types of claims, against
what types of defendants, are permitted for these plaintiffs? What
forms of "equitable" relief are "appropriate" remedies for these
claims?
When faced with a seemingly open universe of possible
185. See id. at 214 ("Admittedly, our cases have not previously drawn this
fine distinction between restitution at law and restitution in equity ...").
186. Cf ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 143-44 (1997)
("The more episodic and oblivious of adjacent law modem legislation becomes,
the more crucial is the judicial function of making sense out of the whole,

which can be achieved in principled fashion only through the application of
legitimate interpretive techniques." (emphasis added)).

187. Great-West, 534 U.S. at 224 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
188. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000).
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defendants, related claims, and potential remedies, one useful
analytical technique made famous by Guido Calabresi and A.
Douglas Melamed is to model the universe of possible outcomes." 9
There is, of course, a significant distinction between the Calabresi
and Melamed model and the modeling exercise presented in this
Article. Calabresi and Melamed examined common law rules,
whereas this model examines a statutory set of rules. Despite this
difference, I believe that the modeling technique presented in the
Article is consistent with the spirit of the Calabresi and Melamed
modeling technique, which aims to develop a doctrinal theory that
ties together and makes sense of a seemingly disjointed body of
law as a whole, and in the process identify claims that
theoretically are possible but that have not yet appeared before
the courts.
Part III of the Article summarizes the results of a modeling
exercise I conducted using a three stage analysis. The foundation
for the modeling exercise is ERISA's statutory structure. The
statutory definitions and the interrelationships among ERISA's
statutory provisions reveal that the statute has its own internally
consistent logic. It is this internal logic that drives the modeling
exercise, and ultimately produces a doctrinal theory grounded in
the statute as a whole. In short, the "answer" to the logic puzzle of
Section 502(a)(3) lies in the role that Section 502(a)(3) plays within
the context of title I of ERISA.
The first order analysis of the modeling exercise, described in
Part III.A, deduced the universe of possible defendants. The
result of the first order analysis was a plaintiff-defendant matrix.
The second order analysis, described in Part III.B., focused on the
most problematic aspect of the statutory language of Section
502(a)(3), namely defining the universe of possible claims. The
second order analysis examined all of the statutory provisions of
title I of ERISA and grouped these statutory provisions by their
common characteristics. This process condensed the statutory
provisions of title I of ERISA to four groups of possible claims.
Claims alleging a violation of plan terms (a type of claim expressly
authorized by the text of Section 502(a)(3) 19 °) formed a fifth group
of possible claims.
The product of the first and second order analysis of the
modeling exercise was a plaintiff-defendant-claim matrix with
sixty possible combinations. The third order analysis, described in
Part III.C., consolidated these sixty combinations to determine the
universe of categories of defendants and related claims that are
possible under Section 502(a)(3). The outcome of the modeling
exercise was six distinct categories of defendants and related

189. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 17, at 1089-1115.
190. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
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claims that form the universe of private civil actions that are
possible under Section 502(a)(3).
The six categories are
summarized below.
THE SIX CATEGORIES OF DEFENDANTS AND RELATED CLAIMS
CATEGORY

PLAINTIFF(S)

DEFENDANT

CLAIM

I

Participants/
Fiduciaries

Employee Benefit
Plan

Plan Design
Requirements

II

Participants/
Fiduciaries

Employers

Retaliation,
Improper
Amendment
Procedures,
or Inurement
of Plan Assets

III

Participants/
Fiduciaries

Fiduciaries

Breach of
Fiduciary
Responsibilities
(Including
Wrongfully
Denied
Benefits)

IV

Participants/
Fiduciaries

Participants

Violation of
Plan Terms

V

Participants/
Fiduciaries

Parties In
Interest
(Nonfiduciary)

Knowing
Participation In
Breach of
Fiduciary
Duties
Or Engaging In
Prohibited
Transactions

VI

Participants/
Fiduciaries

Third Parties

Knowing
Participation In
Breach of
Fiduciary
Duties,
Engaging
In Prohibited
Transactions, or
Participation in
Violation of
Plan Terms
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Part III.C. provides illustrations of the six categories of
defendants and related claims and describes the subtypes of
claims that exist in some of the categories. Using the results of
the modeling exercise, Part III.D. proposes a new interpretive
approach, the ERISA Policy Triangle, to the determination of
"appropriate equitable relief' under Section 502(a)(3) based on the
six categories of defendants and the related claims.
A. First OrderAnalysis: Identifying the Plaintiff-Defendant
Matrix
1. The First Limiting Parameter:Using Statutory Status to
Identify the Universe of Plaintiffsand Defendants
ERISA defines and regulates the conduct of persons... based
upon their relationship to an employee benefit plan.'92 As a
general rule, the statutory provisions of title I of ERISA expressly
regulate only persons who have a certain status, a specific type of
relationship to a plan that is recognized and defined by the
statute.193
This relationship-based statutory construct formed the
starting point for the modeling exercise.
ERISA's statutory
definitions operate to limit those persons who are subject to the
system of regulation created under title I of ERISA. Based on this
insight, the first order analysis of the modeling exercise used the

191. ERISA defines a "person" as "an individual, partnership, joint venture,
corporation,
mutual
company,
joint-stock
company,
trust, estate,
unincorporated organization, association, or employee organization."
29
U.S.C. § 1002(9) (2000). I use the same definition throughout the Article.
192. See 29 U.S.C. § 1021 (2000) (regulating plan administrators and
employers who sponsor plans); 29 U.S.C. § 1024 (2000) (regulating plan
administrators); 29 U.S.C. § 1059 (2000) (regulating employers who sponsor
pension plans and plan administrators); 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (2000)
(regulating employers who sponsor plans); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a), (b), (d) (2000)
(regulating plan fiduciaries); 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (2000) (regulating plan
fiduciaries); 29 U.S.C. § 1105(b) (regulating plan trustees); 29 U.S.C. § 1106
(2000) (regulating plan fiduciaries and parties in interest); 29 U.S.C. § 110911 (2000) (regulating plan fiduciaries); 29 U.S.C. § 1112 (2000) (regulating
plan fiduciaries and plan officials); 29 U.S.C. § 1161
(2000) (regulating
sponsors of group health plans); 29 U.S.C. § 1166(a) (2000) (regulating
employers who sponsor group health plans, plan participants, and plan
administrators).
193. See statutes cited supra note 192. Section 502(l), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l)
(2000), which allows the Secretary of Labor to penalize virtually any "person"
who knowingly participates in a fiduciary's breach of duty, or who engages in a
prohibited transaction, represents the sole exception to this general rule. See
discussion infra Parts III.C.3.e-f.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[39:827

statutory definitions found in Section 3 of ERISA'9 ' ("Section 3") as
a limiting parameter for determining the universe of potential
defendants.
2. The Plaintiff-DefendantMatrix
Section 502(a)(3) expressly is limited to three types of
plaintiffs: (1)
participants;'95 (2) beneficiaries;'96 and (3)
97
fiduciaries.' To simplify the universe of potential plaintiffs under
Section 502(a)(3), I combined participants and beneficiaries into a
single group of possible plaintiffs (hereinafter collectively referred
to as "participants") because these two groups are functionally
analogous.9
The two types of possible plaintiffs identified by
Section 502(a)(3) - participants and fiduciaries - formed the first
column of the plaintiff-defendant matrix.
The second column of the plaintiff-defendant matrix consisted
of six types of possible defendants. Participants (again, defined to
include beneficiaries) and fiduciaries are both distinct status
groups recognized by title I of ERISA through the definitions in
Section 3. Therefore, these two groups also were included as
possible defendants. A third type of possible defendant recognized

194. 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2000).

195. ERISA defines a "participant" as:
[Any employee or former employee of an employer, or any member or
former member of an employee organization, who is or may become
eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan
which covers employees of such employer or members of such
organization, or whose beneficiaries may be eligible to receive any such
benefit.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(7).
196. ERISA defines a "beneficiary" as "a person designated by a participant,
or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to
a benefit thereunder." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8).
197. ERISA defines a fiduciary in functional terms based upon the person's
relationship with the plan. The statutory language states:
a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he
exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting
management of such plan or exercises any authority or control
respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders
investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect,
with respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any
authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary
authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such
plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). In addition, ERISA requires that the written
document establishing the plan must "provide for one or more named
fiduciaries who jointly or severally shall have authority to control and manage
the operation and administration of the plan." 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000).
198. ERISA defines both participants and beneficiaries as individuals who
are or may become eligible to receive a benefit from the plan. Compare 29
U.S.C. §1002(8) with 29 U.S.C. § 1002(9).
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by title I of ERISA is the employee benefit plan itself.'99
Employers... and employee organizations (primarily labor
unions)"0 ' formed a fourth type of possible defendant. Because
employers and employee organizations often are functionally
analogous in their role as plan sponsors,2 to simplify the universe
of potential defendants under Section 502(a)(3), I combined
employers and employee organizations into a single group of
possible defendants (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"employers").
Parties in interest' formed a fifth type of possible defendant.
ERISA's definition of a party in interest is very broad, and
includes a fiduciary, 4 the employer who sponsors the plan,0 ' and
any employee of the employer who sponsors the plan."° To avoid
overlapping categories of defendants, I used the term "party in
interest" to refer to all persons who satisfied the statutory
definition of a party in interest under Section 3(14), excluding any
person who also qualified as a fiduciary, the plan's sponsoring
employer, or as an employee who was a plan participant. This
199. ERISA provides that "[an employee benefit plan may sue or be sued
under [title I] as an entity." 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1) (2000). Money judgments
obtained against an employee benefit plan are enforceable against the plan as
an entity. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(2). Such money judgments are not enforceable
against other persons associated with the plan (e.g., a plan fiduciary), unless
liability under ERISA has been separately established against such person.
Id.
200. ERISA defines an employer as "any person acting directly as an
employer, or indirectly in the interest of an employer, in relation to an
employee benefit plan; and includes a group or association of employers acting
for an employer in such capacity." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(5) (2000). Because the
provisions of title I of ERISA that are enforceable through Section 502(a)(3)
apply to both single-employer plans, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(41), and multiemployer plans, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37)(A), for purposes of simplicity the
modeling exercise did not distinguish between these two types of plans.
201. ERISA defines an employee organization as
any labor union or any organization of any kind, or any agency or
employee representation committee, association, group, or plan, in
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole
or in part, of dealing with employers concerning an employee benefit
plan, or other matters incidental to employment relationships; or any
employees' beneficiary association organized for the purpose in whole or
in part, of establishing such a plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(4).
202. See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1)-(3) (2000) (stating that title I of ERISA "shall
apply to any employee benefit plan if it is established or maintained-by any
employer... [,J by any employee organization... [, or] by both.")
203. ERISA defines a party in interest based on the person's relationship
with the plan itself, or with the employer who sponsors the plan. The
statutory definition is quite complex. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (2000) (defining
party in interest).
204. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(A).
205. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(14)(C)-(D).
206. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(H).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[39:827

approach meant that the typical party in interest defendant in the
modeling exercise was a plan service provider who provided
professional services in a nonfiduciary capacity, such as actuarial,
record keeping, ministerial claim processing, brokerage, or legal
services for a plan.
Persons who did not fit into any of the five types of possible
defendants described above were assigned to a residual sixth
group of possible defendants. I designated this residual sixth
group as "third parties" because these defendants do not have a
relationship with an employee benefit plan that is expressly
recognized by the statutory definitions of Section 3. Although a
group of defendants consisting of "everyone else" seemed
disconcerting at first, in the context of actual ERISA litigation this
group of defendants appeared to be quite small. Third party
defendants are third party defendants precisely because they do
not have a direct connection or relationship with an employee
plan. Rather, as demonstrated later in Part III of the Article, a
third party defendant becomes involved in a claim under Section
502(a)(3) as the result of his or her relationship or transaction
with a person who is a fiduciary, party in-interest, or a participant
with respect to a plan.2"7
The result of the first order analysis was a two-column, two
by six matrix, presented in Table 1 below.
TABLE 1
THE PLAINTIFF-DEFENDANT MATRIX
PLAINTIFF

1. Participants
2. Fiduciaries

DEFENDANT

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Employee Benefit Plan
Employers
Fiduciaries
Participants
Parties In Interest
Third Parties

B. Second Order Analysis: Identifying Groups of Claims Based on
Common Characteristics
The first order analysis of the modeling exercise determined a
finite number of plaintiffs and possible defendants using the
statutory definitions in Section 3 of ERISA. The second order
analysis reduced the seemingly unlimited universe of possible
claims under Section 502(a)(3) - any violation of title I of ERISA or
of plan terms - into a finite number of groups of possible claims.

207. See discussion infra Part III.C.3.f.
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Accomplishing this task required a comprehensive review of all of
the statutory provisions of title I of ERISA. °8
The second order analysis focused on identifying common
characteristics among the various statutory provisions of title I of
ERISA. This common characteristic analysis revealed that the
statutory provisions of title I consist of four groups of possible
claims. I added to these four groups of statutory claims a fifth
group of claims based on the common characteristic that the
plaintiffs claim asserts on a violation of the terms of an employee
benefit plan. This fifth group of claims derives from the statutory
language of Section 502(a)(3), which expressly authorizes claims to
enforce the terms of a plan.2" The five groups of possible claims
under Section 502(a)(3) produced by the second order analysis of
the modeling exercise are summarized in Table 2.
TABLE 2
THE UNIVERSE OF POSSIBLE CLAIMS UNDER SECTION

502(A)(3)

1. Violation of Statutory Plan Design Requirements
2. Retaliation Against Participants, Improper Plan
Amendment Procedures, or Inurement of Plan Assets
3. Breach of Fiduciary Responsibilities (Including
Wrongfully Denied Benefits)
4. Prohibited Transactions
5. Violation of Plan Terms
The common characteristics that determined the five
groupings of possible claims under Section 502(a)(3) are explained
below.

208. Title I of ERISA is divided into seven parts. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 10211031 (2000) (establishing reporting and disclosure requirements for sponsors
of employee benefit plans); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (2000) (establishing
minimum participation and vesting requirements for employee pension benefit
plans); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (2000) (setting out minimum funding
requirements for sponsors of certain types of employee pension benefit plans);
29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (2000) (containing ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions
and prohibited transaction rules); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1147 (2000) (governing
civil enforcement, administrative procedures, and preemption of state law); 29
U.S.C. §§ 1161-1169 (2000) (requiring group health plans to offer continued
coverage to plan participants under specified circumstances); 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1181-1185b (2000) (establishing requirements for group health plans
concerning participants' eligibility and pre-existing condition exclusionary
periods, maternity benefits, mental health benefits, and breast-cancer-related
benefits). In reviewing the statutory provisions of title I of ERISA, I organized
the task by focusing on each of these seven parts and then reviewing the
statutory provisions within each part.
209. 29 U.S.C. §1132(a)(3) (2000).
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Violation of Statutory Plan Design Requirements

ERISA regulates pension and health care plans through
statutory standards for plan design.21 ° Group 1 claims share the
common characteristic that the claim relates to a violation of one
of these statutory standards for plan design. ERISA does not
authorize an independent civil cause of action against the
employer who sponsors the plan for a violation of these statutory
plan design standards."
Rather, these statutory standards
governing plan design can only be enforced as a claim brought
under Section 502(a)(3) based on a violation of a statutory
provision of title I of ERISA.
2. RetaliationAgainst Participants,Improper PlanAmendment
Procedures,or Inurement of PlanAssets
Group 2 claims represent violations of ERISA that involve
either a retaliatory employment action under Section 510,12 a
failure to follow the procedures for a plan amendment that are
described in the plan document pursuant to Section 402(b)(3),2 11 or
the inurement of plan assets to the benefit of the employer in
violation of Section 403(c)( 1).214 The common characteristic among
Group 2 claims is that these provisions regulate the conduct of the
employer when the employer is not acting as a fiduciary. It is this
common characteristic that distinguishes Group 2 claims from
Group 3 claims, which involve a breach of fiduciary duty by a
210. See 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (establishing minimum participation standards for
pension plans); 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (establishing minimum vesting standards for
pension plans); 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (establishing minimum benefit accrual
requirements for pension plans and restrictions on pension plan amendments);
29 U.S.C. § 1055 (establishing joint and survivor and pre-retirement survivor
annuity requirements for pension plans); 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (establishing other
requirements for the form and payment of benefits from pension plans); 29
U.S.C. § 1058 (establishing restrictions on the merger or consolidation of plans
or the transfer of plan assets); 29 U.S.C. § 1082 (establishing minimum
funding standards for pension plans); 29 U.S.C. § 1102 (requiring plans to be
established by a written instrument that contains specified procedures for
funding, allocation of administrative responsibilities, and plan amendments);
29 U.S.C. § 1103 (requiring plan assets to be held in trust); 29 U.S.C. § 1107
(restricting assets a plan may hold); 29 U.S.C. § 1161 (requiring group health
plans to offer continuation of coverage under specified conditions); 29 U.S.C.
§ 1169 (establishing certain other standards for group health plans); 29 U.S.C.
§ 1181 (establishing limitations on pre-existing condition coverage exclusions
for health plans); 29 U.S.C. § 1182 (prohibiting discrimination based on
health-status related factors for health plans); 29 U.S.C. § 1183 (regulating
multi-employer health plans); 29 U.S.C. § 1185 (establishing minimum benefit
standards for mothers and newborns); 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (establishing
standards for mental health benefits).
211. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2000).

212. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000).
213. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (2000).
214. 29 U.S.C. §1103(c)(1) (2000).
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person (including an employer) who is acting as a fiduciary with
respect to the plan.
Section 510 of ERISA protects the rights of plan participants
by generally prohibiting interference with those rights (or the
future attainment of those rights) through a retaliatory
employment action such as termination, discipline, discrimination,
or suspension of employment.
When an employer makes an
employment-related decision concerning personnel, the employer
normally is not acting as a fiduciary with respect to the plan.215
ERISA does not authorize an independent civil cause of action for
a violation of Section 510.16 Section 510 is enforced through a
claim brought under Section 502(a)(3)." 7
When an employer amends an ERISA plan, under the settlor
function doctrine the employer is not acting as a fiduciary.218
Therefore, the employer's decision to amend the plan is not subject
to a claim of breach of fiduciary duty. 1 9 Section 402(b)(3) of ERISA
("Section 402(b)(3)") requires that every plan must describe a
procedure for amending the plan and for identifying the persons
with authority to amend the plan.22 ° This statutory provision,
which functions as a corollary to the written plan document rule of
Section 402(a)(1) of ERISA2 1 ("Section 402(a)(1)") requires that the
employer must comply with the plan's stated amendment
procedures when amending the plan.22 The "heart" of a claim
based on an improper amendment concerns a fact-intensive
inquiry into the issue of compliance with the plan's stated
amendment procedure.22

215. An exception would be when the employer, acting as the named plan
fiduciary, makes employment decisions concerning individuals who are
serving as fiduciaries with respect to the plan, such as the decision to
discharge a individual who serves as the administrator of the plan.
216. 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
217. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Mc Clendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142-44 (1990).
218. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 444-45 (1999);
Lockheed Corp. v. Spinks, 517 U.S. 882, 889-91 (1996); Curtiss-Wright Corp.
v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) see also discussion infra Part III.D.1.
219. See Hughes Aircraft Co., 525 U.S. at 444-45 (noting that generally an
employer's decision to amend a plan does not implicate the employer's
fiduciary duties); Lockheed Corp., 517 U.S. at 889-91 (noting that employers
may amend employee plans without being subjected to "fiduciary review");
Curtiss-WrightCorp., 514 U.S. at 78 (explaining that employers do not act in a
fiduciary capacity when amending their plans).
220. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (2000).
221. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1).
222. See Curtiss-WrightCorp., 514 U.S. at 78-81 (outlining the requirements
of Section 402(b)(3)).
223. Id. at 85.
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Section 403(c)(1) of ERISA2 24 ("Section 403(c)(1)") known as
the anti-inurement clause, states in relevant part that "the assets
of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall
be held for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to
participants in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying
Section
reasonable expenses of administering the plan."225
403(c)(1) is a specific prohibition on conduct by the employer, when
acting in its employer capacity rather than as a fiduciary, that
involves the assets of the plan. For example, an anti-inurement
claim is possible when the employer amends the terms of the plan
so that the assets of the plan benefit the employer, and, as a result
of the plan amendment, the plan assets are not used for the
payment of benefits to plan participants.226
ERISA does not authorize an independent civil cause of action
for a plan amendment that is improperly enacted, or for the
improper inurement of plan assets to the benefit of the employer.227
Like a violation of Section 510, these statutory requirements must
be enforced through a claim brought under Section 502(a)(3) based
on a violation of the relevant statutory provision of title I of
ERISA.
3. Breach of FiduciaryDuties
Group 3 claims involve conduct by a fiduciary that violates
the fiduciary and co-fiduciary duties listed in Section 404(a)228and
Section 405229 of ERISA ("Section 404(a)" and "Section 405,"
respectively). Breach of fiduciary duty claims today are the most
numerous type of claim, the most significant from a policy
perspective, and the most controversial in terms of the remedies
available under Section 502(a)(3).
Section 404(a) imposes four primary duties on fiduciaries.
to plan participants (also
These duties are: (1) the duty of loyalty
21
2 4
known as the exclusive benefit rule); (2) the duty of prudence;

224. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (2000).
225. § 1103(c)(1).
226. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jackson, 525 U.S. 432, 441-43 (1999)
(concluding that the employer's amendment changing the benefit amounts
paid by the plan did not violate the anti-inurement clause because ultimately
the assets remained inside the plan and were eventually used to pay benefits

to other plan participants).
227. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).
228. 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000).
229. 29 U.S.C. § 1105 (2000).
230. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A). Group 3 claims for breach of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty may overlap with Group 4 claims involving a violation of the
prohibited transaction rules of ERISA. Group 4 claims are discussed infra Part
III.B.4.
231. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B).
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(3) the duty of prudent diversification of plan assets; 232 and (4) the
duty to follow the terms of the plan, unless such terms are
contrary to a statutory provision of title I of ERISA.2
Section 405 imposes duties in certain circumstances on one
fiduciary (the "co-fiduciary") for a breach of fiduciary responsibility
by another fiduciary. Under Section 405(a), the co-fiduciary is
liable for the other fiduciary's breach of duty if the co-fiduciary
knows, or should know, of the fiduciary's breach, and either
participates in the breach, undertakes to conceal the breach, or
fails to take corrective measures.1 4 In addition, a co-fiduciary is
liable if the co-fiduciary's own breach of fiduciary duty, such as a
failure to prudently monitor the other fiduciary, enables the other
fiduciary to commit a breach. 5 Section 405 also contains 23a6
separate set of specialized co-fiduciary duty rules for co-trustees
and investment managers."
4. Prohibited Transactions
Group 4 claims assert a violation of the prohibited transaction
rules of Section 406 of ERISA 8 ("Section 406"). Section 406
creates two sets of prohibited transaction rules. The first set of
rules, contained in Section 406(a), applies to persons who are
parties in interest.239 In the first order analysis of the modeling
exercise, I defined the category of defendants classified as "parties
in interest" to exclude any person who also qualified as a fiduciary,
the employer who sponsored the plan, or an employee who was
also a plan participant. 24 ° The second set of rules, found in Section
406(b), apply only to persons who are fiduciaries. To distinguish
between these two sets of prohibited transaction rules, in the
discussion below I refer to the Section 406(a) rules as party in
interest prohibited transactions,and to the Section 406(b) rules as
fiduciary prohibited transactions.

232. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C).
233. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
234. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(1), (a)(3).
235. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(2) (2000).
236. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(b).
237. 29 U.S.C. § 1105(d).
238. 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (2000). See Donovan v. Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455,
1464-65 (5th Cir. 1983) (asserting that the prohibited transactions rules of
Section 406 are built upon the principle that certain types of transactions
involving plan assets should be made illegal per se because such transactions
historically have entailed a high risk of abuse). Section 406(a)(5), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1106(a)(5), incorporates by reference the limitations of Section 407 on
employer securities or employer real property held as plan assets. Id.
239. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a).
240. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
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The party in interest prohibited transaction rules broadly
prohibit a fiduciary of the plan from causing the plan to enter into
various types of transactions between the plan and a party in
interest that involve plan assets." 1 The premise underlying the
party in interest prohibited transaction rules is that a party in
interest, by definition, has some connection with the plan or the
plan's sponsor that may potentially influence the judgment of the
plan's fiduciary in authorizing the transaction between the plan
and the party in interest.24
Fiduciary prohibited transactions under Section 406(b) are
based on the premise that a fiduciary of a plan must have an
undivided duty of loyalty to the plan.4 3 Section 406(b) prohibits a
fiduciary from engaging in a self-dealing transaction involving
plan assets.244 A fiduciary also cannot engage in a transaction
where a conflict of interest exists, directly or indirectly, between
the fiduciary and the plan or the participants of the plan. 5
Finally, a fiduciary is prohibited from receiving a "kickback" from
a third party who transacts with the plan.'
The fiduciary prohibited transaction rules of Section 406(b)
obviously overlap with the fiduciary's duty of loyalty under Section
404(a)(1)(A). In assigning statutory provisions to groups of claims,
I assigned the fiduciary prohibited transaction rules to Group 4
claims having the common characteristic of being a prohibited
transaction, rather than assigning such claims to Group 3. I
preserved fiduciary prohibited transactions as part of a separate
claim group (rather than merging such claims into Group 3 claims)
at this stage of the modeling exercise because the per se nature of
a prohibited transaction violation eliminates the sometimes
difficult burden of proving causation of injury to the plan that

241. Section 406(a) prohibits the direct or indirect sale or exchange of
property, the lending of money or other extension of credit, and the furnishing
of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest.
Section 406(a) also prohibits the direct or indirect transfer of plan assets to, or
use by, or for the benefit of, a party in interest. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(4). Section
406(a)(5) prohibits the acquisition by the plan of any employer security or
employer real property in excess of certain limits specified in section 407 of
title I of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)-(5).
242. See Comm'r v. Keystone Consolidate Ind., Inc., 508 U.S. 152, 160 (1993)
("Congress' goal was to categorically bar a transaction that was likely to injure
the pension plan."); Donovan, 716 F.2d at 1464-65.
243. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(e)-l; Morton Kieven, The Fiduciary's Duty of
Loyalty Under ERISA Section 406(b)(1), 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 561,
561-64 (1988).
244. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1) (2000).
245. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2).
246. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(3).
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must be established for a breach of fiduciary duty claim. 47 On the
same set of facts, this additional burden of proof could cause a
breach of fiduciary duty claim to fail, whereas a fiduciary
prohibited transaction claim could succeed.
5.

Violation of Plan Terms

Group 5 claims are distinct from the first four groups of
claims because the underlying common characteristic is an alleged
violation of the terms of an employee benefit plan. Group 5 claims
expressly are authorized by Section 502(a)(3) to enforce the
written terms of the plan document. Because ERISA preempts
state law breach of contract claims," a claim to enforce the terms
of the plan under Section 502(a)(3) is the only statutory
mechanism available to remedy a violation of the written terms of
the plan.
Given that Group 5 claims originate from the terms of the
plan document rather than the statutory provisions of title I, in
theory, it is possible to have an unlimited number of Group 5
claims. As a practical matter, Group 5 claims usually center
around the past, present, or future payment of money from the
plan. 49
6.

The Question of "Omitted" (FederalCommon Law) Claims

The second order analysis of the modeling exercise assumed
that a viable claim under Section 502(a)(3) must be a claim that
asserts an express statutory violation or a claim to enforce the
express terms of the plan. This assumption necessarily foreclosed
the possibility that additional claims could be implied under
Section 502(a)(3) as part of the federal common law of ERISA. I
use the term "federal common law claim" in this part of the Article
and in Appendix A to describe any claim brought under Section
502(a)(3) that does not allege a violation of an express statutory
provision of title I of ERISA or the terms of a plan.
The status of federal common law claims under ERISA is
controversial. Some federal judges apparently view the creation of
federal common law claims under ERISA as a regular occurrence
and one well within the federal judiciary's prerogative." ° Other

247. See COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW:
POLICY AND PRACTICE, 530 (2004).
248. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).

249. See discussion infra Parts III.C.3.d. & f.
250. See Beach v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 382 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir.
2004) (stating that "ERISA preempts state law relating to pension plans, and
federal courts regularly create federal common law (based on contract and

trust law) to fill the gap.").
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federal judges appear to be reluctant to recognize federal common
law claims due to the concern that implying such claims usurps
Congress's legislative authority.51 Still other federal judges view
implied federal common law claims under ERISA as permissible,
but only in exceptional circumstances. 5 '
Section 502(a)(3) presents the possibility for federal common
law claims because the statutory language awkwardly juxtaposes
the distinct legal concepts of a claim and a remedy. Section
502(a)(3) begins by describing the universe of possible claims as
any private civil action brought by a participant or fiduciary to
enforce the statutory provisions of title I of ERISA or the terms of
an employee benefit plan. The statutory language then concludes
by defining the available remedies as consisting
of either
253
injunctive or "other appropriate equitable relief."
Ideally, Congress would have drafted Section 502(a)(3) much
more precisely by sorting through the statutory scheme,
identifying the various possible statutory claims, and specifying
the remedy for each statutory claim. Instead, what Congress did in
drafting Section 502(a)(3) was effectively to delegate this task to
the federal judiciary.
Although the clumsy statutory language of Section 502(a)(3)
leaves open the possibility, there are several reasons why the
better interpretation is to read Section 502(a)(3) as excluding
federal common law claims. Excluding federal common law claims
is more consistent with the overall statutory scheme of title I of
ERISA and with the doctrine of complete preemption. Moreover,
close examination of the most prevalent federal common law
claims that have been asserted under Section 502(a)(3) reveals
that such claims are either unnecessary because a statutory-based
claim is available, or such claims are an illegitimate attempt to
circumvent the statutory scheme of fiduciary liability established
by title I of ERISA. For these reasons, I excluded federal common
law claims from modeling exercise. A detailed discussion of my
reasoning in excluding federal common law claims is contained in
Appendix A of the Article.

251. See Coleman v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 54, 58 (4th Cir. 1992)
("Federal common law, however, does not grant federal 'courts carte blanche
authority... to re-write a federal statute.'").
252. See Local 6-0682 Int'l. Union of Paper Workers v. Nat'l. Indus. Group
Pension Plan, 342 F.3d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Federal courts do have a
certain latitude to create federal common law under ERISA. This authority,

however, is limited to instances in which ERISA is 'silent or ambiguous,'
where there is an 'awkward gap in the statutory scheme,' or where it may 'be
said that federal common law is essential to the promotion of fundamental
ERISA policies."').
253. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000).
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Intertwined FiduciaryClaims

In reviewing all of the statutory provisions of title I of ERISA
and assigning each provision to a group of claims based on
common characteristics, I found numerous statutory provisions
that directly or indirectly require a fiduciary of the plan to act or
refrain from acting. If the fiduciary failed to comply with these
statutory requirements, then in addition to a statutory violation
the fiduciary's conduct also would constitute a breach of the
fiduciary's duty of prudence under Section 404(a)(1)(B)."
I call
this phenomenon the problem of intertwinedfiduciary claims.
The phenomenon of intertwined fiduciary claims under
Section 502(a)(3) arises because the same set of circumstances can
generate a breach of fiduciary duty claim as well as a claim based
on another statutory provision.
The problem of intertwined
fiduciary claims is not limited to the fiduciary's duty of prudence.
Intertwined fiduciary claims also exist for the fiduciary's duty of
loyalty,255 the fiduciary's duty of prudent diversification, 56 and the
fiduciary's duty to follow (or disregard) the written terms of the
plan.5 7
The phenomenon of intertwined fiduciary claims likely
contributes to the judicial perception that Section 502(a)(3)
presents a judicial slippery slope. To better understand the
phenomenon of intertwined fiduciary claims, as part of the
modeling exercise I focused on the following two questions:
(1) Why does a breach of fiduciary duty claim become
intertwined with the other four groups of claims that are
possible under Section 502(a)(3)?
(2) What makes a breach of fiduciary duty claim distinct from
each of the other four groups of claims that are possible under
Section 502(a)(3)?
Close examination of the answers to these two questions
revealed that the phenomenon of intertwined fiduciary claims does
not present an obstacle to identifying discrete categories of
defendants and related claims under Section 502(a)(3). A detailed
description of the analysis I used in arriving at this conclusion is
contained in Appendix B.

254. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000).

255. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2000).
256. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(C) (2000).
257. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000).
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Conclusion: The Plaintiff-Defendant-ClaimMatrix

Consolidating the statutory requirements of title I of ERISA
into four groups of statutory claims and adding a fifth group of
claims based on a violation of the terms of the plan resulted in a
three column, 2 by 6 by 5 model matrix. This matrix is presented
in Table 3.
TABLE

3

THE PLAINTIFF-DEFENDANT-CLAIM MATRIX
PLAINTIFF

DEFENDANT

1. Participants

1. Employee Benefit Plan

2. Fiduciaries

2. Employers
3. Fiduciaries
4. Participants

CLAIM

1. Plan Design
Requirements
2. Retaliation,
Improper
Amendment
Procedures, or

5. Parties In Interest
6. Third Parties

Inurement of Plan
Assets
3. Breach of
Fiduciary Duties
4. Prohibited
Transactions
5. Plan Terms

C. Third OrderAnalysis: Deducing the Universe of Section
502(a)(3) Claims
1.

ConsolidationPrinciplesUsed in the Third OrderAnalysis

The result of the second order analysis was a plaintiffdefendant-claim matrix that produced sixty possible combinations
of plaintiffs, defendants, and claims. The third order analysis
consolidated these sixty possible combinations into six distinct
categories of defendants and related claims.
Appendix C
documents in detail the procedure I used to arrive at the six
categories of defendants and related claims. The discussion below
summarizes this process.
Impossibility eliminated thirty-six combinations for one of
two reasons. Some combinations were impossible because the
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defendant could not cause the violation that gave rise to the
underlying claim." 8 Other combinations were impossible because
the settlor function doctrine protects the employer, as a defendant,
from fiduciary liability.2
In several instances, the only distinction between certain
combinations was that the combination involved a different type of
plaintiff. Where the defendant and the claim were the same, I
consolidated by grouping these defendants and related claims
together.6 0 This resulted in each of the six categories having as
possible plaintiffs either participants (defined to include
beneficiaries) or fiduciaries.
I further consolidated where a common statutory source
produced multiple claims. This consolidation affected two sets of
defendants and related claims. In the first set, the statutory
source for claims under Section 502(a)(3) against a nonfiduciary
who participated in either a breach of fiduciary duty or a
prohibited transaction is Section 502(l) of ERISA.26 ' Because these
claims originated from a common statutory source, I consolidated
the affected combinations into a single category.2"2
In the second set, my reasoning was that both fiduciary duties
and the prohibited transaction rules derive from a common
statutory source, the "Fiduciary Responsibility" provisions found
This common statutory source
in part 4 of title I of ERISA."
justified consolidation of claims against a fiduciary for authorizing
or engaging in a prohibited transaction with breach of fiduciary
duty claims into a single category having fiduciaries as
defendants.2
After consolidating the combinations, six distinct categories of
defendants and related claims emerged as the final result of the
modeling exercise. The six categories of defendants and related
claims that form the universe of private civil actions possible
under Section 502(a)(3) are presented in Table 4.

258. These combinations are labeled as "Impossible" in Appendix C.
259. See discussion infra Part III.D.1 (discussing the settlor function). These
combinations are labeled as "not possible due to settlor function doctrine" in
Appendix C.
260. These combinations are labeled as "common defendant/common claim"
in Appendix C.
261. See discussion infra Part III.C.3.e.
262. See infra Appendix C, combinations #33-36, #45-48.
263. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (2000); see Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 143 (1985).
264. See infra Appendix C, combinations #29-30, #41-42
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TABLE 4
THE SIX CATEGORIES OF DEFENDANTS AND RELATED CLAIMS
CATEGORY

PLAINTIFF(S)

DEFENDANT

Category I

Participants/
Fiduciaries

Employee Benefit Plan Design
Plan
Requirements

CLAIM

Category II Participants/

Employers

Retaliation,
Improper
Amendment
Procedures, or
Inurement of Plan
Assets

Category III Participants/
Fiduciary

Fiduciaries

Breach of
Fiduciary Duties
(Including
Wrongfully Denied
Claims for Plan
Benefits)

Category IV Participants/
Fiduciaries

Participants

Violation of Plan
Terms

Category V Participants/
Fiduciaries

Parties In
Interest
(Nonfiduciary)

Knowing
Participation In
Breach of
Fiduciary Duties
Or Engaging In
Prohibited
Transactions

Category VI Participants/
Fiduciaries

Third Parties

Knowing
Participation
In Breach of
Fiduciary Duties,
Engaging In
Prohibited
Transactions, or
Violation of Plan
Terms

2. Claims Expressly Authorized by Other Provisionsof Section
502(a)
At this stage in the modeling exercise I considered the context
of Section 502(a)(3) within the overall structure of ERISA's civil
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claims and remedies provision, Section 502(a). 65' Section 502(a)(3)
2 66
is preceded by two other significant subsections - 502(a)(1)(B)
and 502(a)(2)2 67 - that authorize specific types of claims and
remedies.
Based on the reasoning of the Supreme Court's
decisions in Varity2' and Russell,269 I examined whether each of
the six categories in Table 4 above contained a claim specifically
addressed by these other subsections of Section 502(a). If so, I
further asked whether the remedy under the other subsection
should be exclusive, or whether additional equitable relief might
be appropriate in individual cases under Section 502(a)(3). I
concluded that claims under Section 502(a)(1)(B) could give rise to
a claim for additional equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3)
based on a breach of fiduciary duty claim. I further concluded that
some Category III claims for breach of fiduciary duty should be
limited exclusively to the remedies of Section 502(a)(2).
a.

Section 502(a)(1)(B) Claims

Section 502(a)(1)(B) authorizes a participant to bring a civil
action to appeal a claim for plan benefits denied by the plan's
administrator. °
Section 502(a)(3) provides a mechanism to
provide additional individualized relief beyond the limited remedy
available under Section 502(a)(1)(B) for injury caused by a plan
administrator's wrongful denial of a claim for plan benefits. To
date, the lower federal courts have refused to grant such
additional relief under Section 502(a)(3) based on the Supreme
Court's statements concerning the relationship between Section
502(a)(1)(B) and Section 502(a)(3) in Varity Corp. v. Howe. 71
In Varity, the plan participants brought a claim under Section
502(a)(3) for individual relief for breach of fiduciary duty based on
false statements, knowingly and intentionally made by the
employer in its fiduciary capacity, concerning the future financial
viability of the employer's health care plan. One of the objections
to the plaintiffs' claim for individual relief under Section 502(a)(3),
made by amici counsel in support of the defendant employer, was
that permitting breach of fiduciary duty claims by individual
participants would "complicate ordinary benefit claims by dressing
them up in 'fiduciary duty' clothing. 272 In rejecting this argument,
the Supreme Court stated in relevant part:

265. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2000).
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2).
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
Russell, 473 U.S. 134.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
516 U.S. 489 (1996).
Id. at 514.
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Second, characterizing a denial of benefits as a breach of fiduciary
duty does not necessarily change the standard a court would apply
when reviewing the administrator's decision to deny benefits. After
all, Firestone, which authorized deferential court review when the
plan itself gives the administrator discretionary authority, based its
decision upon the same common-law trust doctrines that govern
standards of fiduciary conduct .... Third, the statute authorizes
"appropriate"equitable relief. We should expect that courts, in
fashioning "appropriate" equitable relief, will keep in mind the
special nature and purpose of employee benefit plans, and will
respect the policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain
remedies and the exclusion of others. Thus, we should expect that
where Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a
beneficiary's injury, there will likely be no need for further equitable
relief, in which case such relief normally would not be
"appropriate." "'
Although this statement from Varity is clearly dicta, it has
proven to be powerful dicta nonetheless. Post-Varity, the lower
federal courts have uniformly rejected claims for additional
equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3) for individual injuries to
participants caused by a plan administrator's wrongful denial of
plan benefits.274
Closer examination of these statements in Varity suggests
that the Supreme Court did not prohibit absolutely the availability
of additional equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3). Rather,
these statements can be read to suggest a much more
sophisticated analytical approach to the interrelationship between
Section 502(a)(1)(B) and Section 502(a)(3). First and foremost, the
Varity Court's remarks implicitly affirm that the conduct of the
administrator in interpreting the plan is fiduciary in nature
because this power derives from the principles developed under
the common law of trusts and the duties of the trustee in
administering the terms of the trust. Second, the Varity Court's
statements can be read as suggesting that considerations of
additional equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3) should be
policy-driven. The policy objectives implicated by the nature of the
particular claim can be used to discern whether relief under
Section 502(a)(3), in addition to the relief provided by Section
502(a)(1)(B), would be "appropriate" under the totality of the
circumstances. It is only with these caveats that the Varity Court
concludes that additional relief under Section 502(a)(3) "normally
would not be 'appropriate.'2 75
What was left unsaid by the Supreme Court in Varity was a
discussion of the alternative situation, namely that under some
273. Id. at 514-15 (quotations and citations omitted).
274. See Larocca v. Borden, 276 F.3d 22, 28-29 (1st Cir. 2002) (collecting

federal circuit court cases).
275. 516 U.S. at 515 (emphasis added).
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circumstances the policy objectives that underlie ERISA may
make additional relief under Section 502(a)(3) "appropriate" when
a participant has been injured by a plan administrator's wrongful
denial of a claim for plan benefits. The Supreme Court's first point
- that the conduct of the administrator in interpreting the terms of
the plan is fiduciary in nature - forms the starting point for
connecting the proverbial dots of the Supreme Court's cryptic
statements in Varity and constructing a theory of the
interrelationship between Section 502(a)(1)(B) and Section
502(a)(3).
If fully articulated, a plausible theory based on Varity would
employ the following logic. When an administrator abuses its
fiduciary discretion in interpreting the terms of the plan to deny
the participant's claim for benefits, the administrator has, at a
minimum, also breached his fiduciary duty to follow the terms of
the plan under Section 404(a)(1)(D).276 To automatically award
additional equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3) as a per se
breach of fiduciary duty would, as the Varity Court noted, render
the distinction between claims filed under Section 502(a)(1)(B) and
Thus, the
claims filed under Section 502(a)(3) meaningless.
"normal" outcome of a successful claim for wrongfully denied plan
benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B) will be the limited remedy
provided under that provision.
There may, however, be circumstances where the policies
underlying ERISA justify awarding additional relief under Section
502(a)(3) to supplement the limited remedy afforded by Section
Additional relief under Section 502(a)(3) is
502(a)(1)(B).
permissible based on the plan administrator's underlying breach of
fiduciary duty in wrongfully interpreting the terms of the plan.
Based on this logic, I retained a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty in wrongfully interpreting the terms of the plan as a special
subset of Category III claims for breach of fiduciary duty. Later in
Part III.D.3 of the Article, I propose a standard for the federal
courts to use in determining when additional relief under Section
502(a)(3), based on a wrongfully denied claim for plan benefits,
would be "appropriate."
b.

Section 502(a)(2) Claims and the Payee Principle

Section 502(a)(2) 277 authorizes a participant or fiduciary to
bring a civil action for relief under Section 409.278 Section 409(a),
276. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000).

The administrator's decision also

could have been motivated by considerations other than the interests of the
plan participants, such as a conflict of interest, that would give rise to a claim
of breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty under Section 404(a)(1)(A), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1104(a)(1)(A) (2000).
277. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2000).
278. 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2000).
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in turn, imposes personal liability on a fiduciary for a breach of
fiduciary duty that causes a loss to the plan itself, and further
requires that a fiduciary who profits from the use of plan assets
must restore such profits to the plan. 79 In addition, Section 409(a)
authorizes other "equitable or remedial relief as the court may
deem appropriate."" ° As interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,' the
remedies available under Section 409 are limited to the plan "as a
whole." 82 Thus, Russell functions to divide breach of fiduciary
duty claims between claims for relief to the plan "as a whole," and
claims for "individual" relief under Section 502(a)(3).
A clear standard defining a claim for relief to the plan "as a
whole" has eluded the federal courts when the claim involves a
retirement plan with individual participant accounts.m
In an
earlier article entitled Stock Market Volatility and 401(k) Plans, I
identified this characterization issue and suggested that the
"payee principle" should be used to resolve it.
[Tihe better judicial interpretation.. .is to view the relief as flowing
to the plan in accord with section 502(a)(2), so long as the monetary
award is... allocated to each participant's plan account rather than
to his personal pocketbook... [An award of money damages to the
plan [under Sections 502(a)(2) and 409(a)] will be made payable
directly to the plan's trustee. The plan trustee will then allocate the
payment among the participant's individual accounts... [T]his
approach is consistent with ERISA's fundament purpose of
protecting and preserving the retirement benefits the [individual
account] plan provides to its participants.&
Since the publication of Stock Market Volatility and 401(k)
Plans in 2001, the policy justification for the payee principle has
been officially recognized by the Internal Revenue Service. In
Revenue Ruling 2002-45, the Service concluded that an employer
may make a "restorative payment" to a qualified retirement plan
to remedy a claimed or adjudicated breach of fiduciary duty
without a violation of the restrictions imposed on employer
contributions to qualified retirement plans under Internal
Revenue Code Sections 404 and 415.285 The policy justification for
waiving application of these Internal Revenue Code requirements,
which normally would restrict the amount of the employer's
contributions to a qualified retirement plan, is to allow the

279. § 1109(a).
280. § 1109(a).
281. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
282. Id. at 140.
283. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
284. Colleen E. Medill, Stock Market Volatility and 401(k) Plans, 34 MICH.
J.L. REFORM 469,529 (2001).

285. Rev. Rul. 2002-45, 2002-2 C.B. 116.
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participants to receive the substantial economic benefits
associated with the deferral of income taxation of investment
earnings from assets held inside the plan.
Although adoption of the payee principle by the federal
judiciary will reduce the volume of breach of fiduciary duty claims
brought under Section 502(a)(3), there are still numerous
instances where a breach of fiduciary duty claim would require
relief in the form of a monetary payment to an individual plaintiffparticipant rather than to the trustee of the plan.2" The concept of
a breach of fiduciary duty claim under Section 502(a)(3), brought
in connection with a wrongfully denied claim for plan benefits
under Section 502(a)(1)(B), provides one such example. I describe
other varieties of these "true" Section 502(a)(3) claims for
individual monetary relief for a breach of fiduciary duty later in
Part III.C.3 of the Article.
3. "Testing" the Model Results: Discussion and Illustrationsof the
Six Categoriesof Section 502(a)(3) Claims
One way to test the validity of the results produced by the
modeling exercise is to compare the six categories with actual
claims brought before the federal courts under Section 502(a)(3).
In this part of the Article, I perform a comparative analysis and
illustrate the six categories with actual cases. The model appears
to be highly predictive of claims previously litigated in federal
courts under Section 502(a)(3).
A secondary purpose of the modeling exercise was to seek to
identify claims that are possible as a matter of theory under
Section 502(a)(3), but that have not yet appeared in the federal
courts. Based on the model results, there appear to be several
such claims in Category V (claims against a nonfiduciary party in
interest) and in Category VI (claims against third parties). This
part of the Article discusses these claims and the underlying
theory that justifies their future recognition by the federal courts.
a.

Category I: Violation of Plan Design Requirements

Category I claims are brought directly against the plan287 for a
violation of ERISA's statutory requirements for plan design.
Given that title I of ERISA imposes many more statutory plan
design requirements for pension plans than for welfare benefit
plans, it is not surprising that most reported decisions involving
Category I claims involve pension plans.
In the pension plan context, Category I claims are illustrated
by cases brought by plan participants that challenge the design of
286. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
287. The plan itself may be sued as an entity. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d)(1)

(2000).
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cash balance pension plans 8 or the manner in which benefits
accrued under a traditional defined benefit pension plan are
calculated once the plan has been converted to a cash balance
plan.289 Other Category I claims allege that the pension plan's
benefit design violates ERISA's vesting rules29 ° or benefit accrual
rules,29' or results in a prohibited cutback of the participants'
statutorily protected accrued benefits.29'
As originally enacted, title I of ERISA did not contain
statutory plan design requirements for welfare benefit plans, other
than the requirements that the plan must have a governing plan
document naming a plan fiduciary, and that any plan assets must
be held in a trust.293
Later, Congress enacted statutory
requirements for the benefit design of health care plans as part of
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
("HIPAA"),"' the Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of
1996 ("NMHPA"), 9' the Mental Health Parity Act of 1996
("MHPA-), 29 and the Women's Health and Cancer Rights Act of
1998 ("WCHRA). 7 These laws, which resulted in amendments to
title I of ERISA, do not authorize a separate claim under Section
502(a)(3) for their enforcement.29 A claim alleging a violation of
288. See, e.g., Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
289. For example, several federal appellate courts have ruled that the
interest rate used in calculating the participant's lump sum benefit in a cash
balance plan violated ERISA's cash out rule, 29 U.S.C. § 1053(c) (2000). See
Esden v. Bank of Boston, 229 F.3d 154, (2d Cir. 2000); Lyons v. Georgia-Pacific
Corp., 221 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2000).
290. See, e.g., Smith v. Contini, 205 F.3d 597, 603-04 (3rd Cir. 2000)
(violation of minimum vesting requirements).
291. See, e.g., DeVito v. Pension Plan of Local 819 I.B.T. Pension Fund, 975
F. Supp. 258, 267-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (violation of minimum benefit accrual
requirements).
292. See Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz, 541 U.S. 739, 743-45
(2004) (holding that anti-cutback rule applied to a suspension of benefits
clause in a multi employer plan); Hoover v. Cumberland, Md. Area Teamsters
Pension Fund, 756 F.2d 977, 981-84 (3rd Cir. 1985) (violation of rule
prohibiting reductions of accrued benefits); Laurenzano v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Mass., Inc. Ret. Income Trust, 134 F. Supp. 2d 189, 197-201 (D.
Mass. 2001) (violation of rule prohibiting reductions of accrued benefits).
293. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1102-1103 (2000) (plan document and trust
requirements); § 1051(1) (2000) (excluding welfare benefit plans from part 2 of
title I of ERISA); § 1081(1) (2000) (excluding welfare benefit plans from part 3
of title I of ERISA).
294. Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 101, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1181-82).
295. Pub. L. No. 104-204 § 601, 110 Stat. 2935 (1996) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1185).
296. Pub. L. No. 104-204 § 701, 110 Stat. 2944 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1185a).
297. Pub. L. No. 105-277, Pub. L. No. 104-204 § 701, 110 Stat. 2944 (codified
at 29 U.S.C. § 1185a). 901, 112 Stat. 2681 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1185b).
298. See supra notes 294-297; Howard v. Coventry Health Care, 293 F.3d
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these statutory requirements must be brought under Section
502(a)(3) as a Category I claim.
Although there have been few reported decisions to date,2" it
is inevitable that such Category I claims against health care plans
will be brought with increasing frequency in the future. A random
study conducted by the Department of Labor in 2001 documented
a system-wide problem of lack of compliance by health care plans
with ERISA's statutory requirements.3" The study found that a
significant percentage of health care plans were in violation of the
statutory requirements of HIPAA, NMHPA, MHPA, and
WCHRA.0 1 Eventually, plan participants (and their attorneys)
will become more knowledgeable of their rights concerning health
care plan benefits under these federal statutory standards. The
result is likely to be more Category I claims under Section
502(a)(3) brought in the federal courts.
b. Category II: Retaliation, Inurement of Plan Assets, or
Improper Amendment Procedures
Category II claims share the common characteristic that the
statutory provisions at issue regulate the conduct of the employer
when the employer is not acting in a fiduciary capacity with
respect to the plan."2 These claims are rooted in the historical
problems associated with employee benefit plans that preceded the
enactment of ERISA. 3°3
i.

Retaliation Claims Under Section 510
The classic illustration of employer retaliation under Section
510 is the infamous case of Gavalik v.Continental Can Co.3" In
Continental Can, the employer "red flagged" employees who were
about to satisfy the plan's eligibility requirements for pension
benefits and systematically laid them off before they could satisfy
the plan's service requirement for the pension benefits.
Although Section 510 claims traditionally have been

442, 444-45 (8th Cir. 2002) (refusing to imply a private civil course of action
under WCHRA).
299. See Krauss v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., No. 04 Civ. 6080, 2005 WL
3465627, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2005) (alleging WCHRA violation based on
plan terms defining covered benefits).
300. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, HEALTH DISCLOSURE AND CLAIMS ISSUES: FISCAL
YEAR 2001 COMPLIANCE PROJECT REPORT (Jan. 2003).
301. Id. at 10-16.
Of the substantive violations, fully 23.8% of the
noncompliance found by the Department of Labor involved HIPAA's
restrictions on when a plan may impose a coverage exclusion for a pre-existing
health condition. Id. at 13.
302. See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
303. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, 1-6 (2d

ed. 2000).
304. 12 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987).
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associated with pension plans due to their vesting requirements
for plan benefits, the Supreme Court has made clear that a Section
510 claim may also be brought in the context of a welfare benefit
plan."' For example, Section 510 clearly prohibits the employer
from firing an employee because the employee, a spouse, or a
dependent has incurred expensive claims under the employer's
health care plan.3" The federal courts are divided over whether
Section 510 prohibits an employer from refusing to hire an
employee due to potentially expensive claims if the employer's
health care plan covers the employee, a spouse, or a dependent of
the employee." 7
ii. Inurement Claims Under Section 403(c)(1)
Section 403(c)(1) of ERISA3a prohibits the most blatant abuse
of plan assets by preventing the employer from reclaiming and
using for the employer's own benefit the assets of the plan once
those assets have been transferred to the plan's trust. Although
Section 403(c)(1) partially duplicates the statutory language of the
fiduciary duty of loyalty found in Section 404(a)(1)(A), °9 such
duplication is necessary because, unlike Section 404(a)(1)(A), the
inurement rule applies to the employer even when the employer is
not acting as a fiduciary with respect to the plan. In most
instances, of course, where an employer is dealing with plan assets
the employer also will be acting as a fiduciary,3 10 and therefore
Section 404(a)(1)(A) will apply. As a result, Section 403(c)(1)
inurement claims brought against the employer in a nonfiduciary
capacity are infrequent.

305. See Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 514-15 (1997) (noting that Congress' use of the word
"plan" indicates an intent to apply Section 510 to non-vested employee welfare
benefit plans).
306. See Folz v. Marriott Corp., 594 F. Supp. 1007, 1014 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
307. Compare Fleming v. Ayers & Assoc., 948 F.2d 993, 997-98 (6th Cir.
1991) (stating that employer's refusal to hire employee due to medical plan
costs for coverage of employee's disabled infant violated Section 510) with
Becker v. Mack Trucks, Inc. 281 F.3d 372, 383 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that
Section 510 applies only in the context of an ongoing employer-employee
relationship).
308. 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (2000). Section 403(c)(1) provides in relevant
part that "the assets of a plan.. .shall never inure to the benefit of any
employer and shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to
participants in the plan and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable
expenses of administering the plan."
309. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2000).
310. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i) (2000) (stating that a person is a
fiduciary when exercising any authority or control over the management or
disposition of plan assets).
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Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson"' illustrates the unique
circumstances when an individual may bring an inurement claim
under Section 403(a)(1) against the employer in a nonfiduciary
capacity.
In Jacobson, the employer amended the benefit
provisions of its defined benefit pension plan so that part of the
plan's accumulated surplus was used to pay enhanced early
retirement benefits under the employer's early retirement
incentive program. Later, the employer amended the plan so that
part of the surplus would pay for pension benefits to new
participants who, unlike the plan's existing participants, were not
required to contribute to the plan. During this time the employer
itself suspended contributions to the plan because the plan's
surplus, accumulated in part from prior mandatory employee
contributions to the plan, made further employer contributions
unnecessary under ERISA's minimum funding standards.
A group of plan participants brought a claim against the
employer alleging that these plan amendments resulted in the
improper inurement of the plan's surplus assets to the benefit of
the employer in violation of Section 403(c)(1).
Because an
employer who amends its plan is acting as a settlor, not as a
fiduciary,312 the participants could not sue the employer for a
breach of fiduciary duty in amending the terms of the plan under
Section 404(a)(1)(A). One of the claims made by the plaintiffs in
Jacobson was that the plan assets improperly had inured to the
benefit of the employer ii violation of Section 403(c)(1) because the
plan's surplus assets effectively were used to finance the
employer's early retirement incentive program. In rejecting the
plaintiffs' inurement claim under Section 403(c)(1), the Supreme
Court emphasized that no inurement violation had occurred
because the employer ultimately used the plan's assets to pay
pension plan benefits to other participants in the plan. 3'
The Jacobson reasoning suggests that, conversely, an
inurement claim against the employer would arise if the employer
paid the plan's assets out of the plan for a purpose other than the
payment of benefits to participants. To illustrate, assume that the
employer has established two separate plans, a pension plan and a
self-insured health care plan for its employees. The pension plan
has a funding surplus, but the health care plan does not have
sufficient assets to pay participant health care plan claims. If the
employer amends the terms of the pension plan so that its surplus
assets are used to pay the claims of participants under the health
care plan, the employer's conduct under the reasoning in Jacobson
would violate the inurement rule. In this example, although the

311. 525 U.S. 432 (1999).
312. See discussion infra Part III.D.1.
313. Jacobson, 525 U.S. at 441-43.

The John Marshall Law Review

[39:827

pension plan's surplus assets are used to pay benefits to plan
participants, the benefits being paid would not be the benefits
promised to participants under the terms of the pension plan.
Under these circumstances, the employer's amendment would
result in the inurement of the pension plan's assets for the benefit
the employer, who otherwise would be required to contribute funds
to pay participant claims under the self-insured health care plan.
A similar inurement claim would arise if the employer's
amendment merely authorized a loan from the pension plan to the
self-insured health care plan.31 ' If the amendment authorizing the
loan was on terms that were at a market rate of investment
return, the loan might be difficult to challenge as a breach of
fiduciary duty.315 The loan could be challenged as a prohibited
transaction,3 16 but that claim must be brought against the
fiduciary that authorized the transaction (i.e., the plan's
administrator), who may not be the same person as the employer.
In this situation, a Category II claim for inurement might be the
only possible claim against the employer available under title I of
ERISA.
iii. ImproperPlanAmendment Procedure
A Category II claim may challenge a plan amendment as
improper because the employer did not follow the amendment
procedure that is required to be part of every plan document
pursuant to Section 402(b)(3). 17 This statutory requirement is
part of the written plan document rule codified in Section 402.
Under the written plan document rule, "every covered employee
benefit plan.. .is to be established and maintained in writing."318
The purpose of the written plan document rule is to provide
assurance to participants that they may examine the plan

314. Cf. Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226, 1238-39 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding
trustee's authorization of below market rate loan from over-funded pension

plan fund to under-fumded welfare benefit plan fund violated Section
404(a)(1)(A)).
315. This is because a breach of fiduciary duty claim would further require
proof of causation and loss to the plan. MEDILL, supra note 247, at 530. If the
loan is at market rate, the surplus pension plan may not suffer an investment

loss.
316. See 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(B) (2000) (prohibiting the loaning of money
or other extension of credit between a plan and a party in interest). To sustain
this prohibited transaction claim, the health care plan would have to qualify
as a party in interest with respect to the pension plan under Section 3(14) of
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14) (2000). My reading of Section 3(14) is that there
is no provision that would apply to make the health care plan a party in
interest based on these hypothetical facts.
317. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (2000).
318. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, pt. V (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5038, 5077.
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document and know with certainty their rights under the plan and
who is responsible for operating the plan.319
Implicit in Section 402(b)(3) is the principle that the employer
must follow the plan's stated procedure to amend the terms of the
From a policy perspective, Section
written plan document.
402(b)(3) serves a dual notice-reliance function. Participants know
that before the employer can alter the benefits provided by the
terms of the plan, the employer must follow the proper procedure
and make the changes to the plan in writing. Until this occurs,
the participant is entitled to rely on the plan document's terms as
written.
Benefits under a pension plan are subject to elaborate
substantive protections in terms of benefit accrual and vesting.32 °
Once accrued, benefits generally cannot be eliminated by a
subsequent plan amendment. 32 ' Similar statutory protections do
not apply to the benefits provided by welfare plans, particularly
Consequently, claims challenging the
health care plans.322
employer's amendment procedure usually are much more
significant in the context of health care plans. In effect, a claim of
an improper amendment procedure serves as a way for the plan's
participants indirectly to challenge the employer's amendment.
323
illustrates a
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen
Category II claim under Section 402(b)(3) based on an alleged
improper amendment procedure. In Curtiss-Wright,the employer
for many years sponsored a health care plan (the "retiree health
plan") for retired workers previously employed at certain
manufacturing facilities of the employer. In 1983, the terms of the
summary plan description for the retiree health plan were revised
to state clearly that if operations at one of the plan's facilities were
terminated, benefits under the plan for retirees from that facility
also would be terminated. The plan document itself did not
contain this language, but did state that "[tihe Company reserves
the right at any time and from time to time to modify or amend, in
whole or in part, any or all of the provisions of the Plan."24
Shortly after revising the summary plan description, the
employer announced that one of the facilities would close. A
company officer wrote to retirees of the closing facility and
informed them that their benefits under the retiree health plan
would be terminated. The retirees sued to block the termination of

319. See id., 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5077-78.
320. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2000).
321. See 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (2000). Some optional forms of accrued benefits
may, under limited circumstances, be eliminated. See id.
322. See 29 U.S.C. § 1051(1) (2000) (excluding welfare benefit plans from
coverage under part 2 of title I of ERISA).
323. 514 U.S. 73 (1995).
324. Id. at 76.
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their benefits. First, the retirees argued that the plan document
language quoted above failed to state an amendment procedure as
required by Section 402(b)(3). Second, the retirees argued that,
even if the plan document language was sufficient to satisfy
Section 402(b)(3), the employer failed to follow the amendment
procedure described in the plan document. The retirees requested
as a remedy under Section 502(a)(3) the retroactive restoration of
their benefits under the retiree health care plan. The district
court estimated the dollar value of these retiree benefits at
$2,681,086.
Twelve years after the termination of the retirees' benefits,
the Supreme Court heard the case. The Supreme Court resolved
the retirees' first claim by holding that the plan document
language was sufficient under Section 402(b)(3). The Supreme
Court remanded the case on the retirees' second claim, stating:
Having determined that the [retiree health] plan satisfies
§ 402(b)(3), we do not reach the question of the proper remedy for a
§ 402(b)(3) violation. On remand, the Court of Appeals will have to
decide the question that has always been at the heart of this case:
whether [the employer's] valid amendment procedure - amendment
"by the Company" - was complied with in this case. The answer will
depend on a fact-intensive inquiry, under applicable corporate law
principles, into what persons or committees within [the employer]
possessed plan amendment authority...."
As the first line of this quotation makes clear, the Supreme
Court deliberately did not reach the question of what remedy
might be available for a violation of Section 402(b)(3). Under these
circumstances the only statutory provision that authorizes a claim
against the employer (here, acting in its nonfiduciary settlor
capacity) is Section 502(a)(3). Thus, the remedy for an improper
amendment procedure, whether it is in the form of a flawed plan
document that fails the statutory requirements of Section
402(b)(3), or in the form of an employer who fails to follow the
plan's stated amendment procedure, would be the remedy
provided under Section 502(a)(3).
c. Category III: Breach of Fiduciary Responsibilities (Including
Wrongfully Denied Claims for Plan Benefits)
Breach of fiduciary duty claims under Section 502(a)(3) cover
the broadest range of claims under the modeling exercise. This
result is consistent with the history and purpose of ERISA, which
Congress enacted primarily in response to the need for greater
federal regulation of fiduciary conduct.326 In carrying out its

325. Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
326. See H.R. REP. NO. 93-533, (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4639, 4645-46; S. REP. No. 93-127 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
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duties, a fiduciary with respect to a plan is subject to numerous
requirements found in part 4 of title I of ERISA. 32 7 The primary
requirements are contained in Sections 404(a) and 405.28 These
fiduciary and co-fiduciary duties are supplemented by an
additional set of restrictions, the prohibited transaction rules, that
prohibit a fiduciary from engaging or causing the plan to engage in
certain transactions, or from holding certain assets.31 9 Fiduciaries
also are charged with additional responsibilities found outside of
part 4 of title I, such as ensuring compliance with the reporting
and disclosure rule of part 1 of title I of ERISA,33° and following the
administrative procedures for reviewing denied benefit claims
described in Section 503 of ERISA. 331
i. Claims for Individual Monetary Relief for Breach of Fiduciary
Responsibilities
A threshold issue for any Category III claim is whether the
claim properly lies under Section 502(a)(2) or Section 502(a)(3). 2
Explicit judicial recognition of the payee principle, described
previously in Part III.C.2.b. of the Article, will shift a significant
number of breach of fiduciary duty claims to Section 502(a)(2).
Nevertheless, claims where the breach of fiduciary duty results in
a loss of plan benefits that cannot be remedied by a restorative
payment to the plan's trustee will still arise, such as where the
benefits "lost" are payments due under an insurance policy."a
Strom v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.334 illustrates a claim for
individual monetary relief that is properly brought under Section
502(a)(3). In Strom, the participant completed the paperwork
necessary to apply for a $1,000,000 death benefit under the terms
of the employer's life insurance plan. The plan's administrator
delayed forwarding the paperwork in a timely manner to the
insurance company, resulting in a one-month delay of the
participant's effective date of coverage under the plan.
Unfortunately, the participant suddenly died before his coverage
began under the plan, thereby leaving his widow ineligible for the
plan's $1,000,000 death benefit. The insurance company was not
4838, 4847; H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, pt. V (1973), reprinted in 1974

U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5038, 5075-87.

Unlike the fiduciary duties imposed on

trustees under the common law, an individual cannot waive ERISA's fiduciary
duties. See 29 U.S.C. § 1110(a) (2000) (declaring exculpatory clauses void as

against public policy).
327. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1113 (2000).

328. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104-1105.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1106(a)-(b), 1107.
29 U.S.C. § 1021 (2000).
29 U.S.C. § 1133 (2000).
See discussion supra Part III.C.2.b.
See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
202 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 1999).
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liable for payment under the terms of the policy because coverage
under the policy had not yet commenced. The only option for the
participant's widow was to bring a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty against the negligent plan administrator under Section
502(a)(3). The Second Circuit in Strom awarded monetary relief to
the widow based on a theory of make-whole relief. 5
Griggs v. E.I. Dupont de Nemeurs & Co. 6 illustrates another
set of circumstances where individual monetary relief under
Section 502(a)(3) may be necessary to remedy a breach of fiduciary
duty. In Griggs, the participant elected to receive a lump sum
distribution from the plan instead of an annuity because the plan
administrator erroneously informed the participant that the lump
sum distribution qualified for a tax-deferred direct rollover. 7 As a
result, the participant paid $58,000 in income taxes on his lump
sum distribution, leaving him with a net benefit of $74,627."
The district court concluded that the Supreme Court's prior
decision in Mertens precluded a monetary remedy under Section
502(a)(3). The Fourth Circuit reversed, and ultimately approved a
complicated remedy involving the partial rescission of the
participant's lump sum distribution election. 9
The Fourth
Circuit's remedy permitted the participant to repay the net benefit
amount he had received back to the plan and re-elect the annuity
payment option.
The participant's net distribution amount
($74,627), rather than his original pre-tax benefit amount
($132,900), determined the monthly annuity benefit. Under this
partial rescission remedy, the participant had the option to file an
amended tax return and try to recover his additional income tax
payment attributable to the original distribution election." °
What the Fourth Circuit attempted to do in Griggs was to
make the participant as "whole" as possible for the plan
administrator's breach of fiduciary duty. The better approach
would be to permit a straightforward monetary award calculated
to restore the participant's benefits that were "lost" due to the
payment of additional income taxes that could have been avoided
if the participant had received accurate information at the outset
concerning the tax consequences of his distribution election
decision.
ii

Claims Involving a Breach of the Duty to Inform

Much of the increased volume in breach of fiduciary duty
claims under Section 502(a)(3) is a direct result of the Supreme
335. Id. at 150.
336. 385 F.3d 440 (4th Cir. 2004).

337. Id. at 443.
338. Id. at 442.
339. Id. at 445-49.
340. Id. at 452.
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Court's 1996 decision in Varity Corporation v. Howe.341 Before
Varity, it was unclear whether a fiduciary's violation of ERISA's
rules governing fiduciary conduct that resulted in harm to an
individual plan participant, rather than injury to the plan itself,
could form the basis for a breach of fiduciary duty claim under
Section 502(a)(3). Varity answered this question affirmatively,
and in the process spawned a new generation of breach of fiduciary
duty claims based not on the misuse of plan assets by the
fiduciary, but rather on the fiduciary's duty to provide relevant
information to individual plan participants beyond the statutory
reporting and disclosure requirements contained in part lof title I
of ERISA. 2 Because by definition the fiduciary's duty to inform
does not involve the fiduciary's mismanagement of the plan's
assets, but instead is concerned with the fiduciary's
communications (or lack thereof) with an individual plan
participant, a claim for relief for an alleged breach of this fiduciary
duty can only be brought under Section 502(a)(3).
Duty to inform cases are based on the premise that if the
participant had received the appropriate information from the
fiduciary, the participant would have made a different decision
that would have resulted in more or better plan benefits, or could
have selected an option that would have better suited the
participant's individual circumstances. Griggs illustrates how the
duty to inform may arise in the context of a pension plan
distribution election decision. Eddy v. Colonial Life Insurance
Co. 3 1 illustrates how the duty to inform may arise in the context of
341. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
342. The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals was the first federal
circuit to recognize the fiduciary's so-called 'duty to inform" as part of a
fiduciary's general duty of prudence under ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(B), 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B). See Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 75051 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Since Eddy, the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals appear to have recognized the
duty to inform in various forms. See generally Becker v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
120 F.3d 5, 8 (2d Cir. 1997); Bixler v. Central Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare
Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1300 (3d Cir. 1993); Switzer v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 52
F.3d 1294, 1299 (5th Cir. 1995); Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir.
1997); Barker v. American Mobile Power Corp., 64 F.3d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir.
1995).
The duty to inform imposes an affirmative duty upon the plan fiduciary to
disclose all material facts or other information to the plan participant in
response to participant questions. This duty includes an affirmative duty to
speak up when the plan fiduciary knows that silence itself might be
misleading.
The plan fiduciary must convey complete and accurate
information that is material to the participant's circumstances, even if the
participant has not made a specific inquiry concerning such information.
MEDILL, supra note 247, at 422-26. The duty to inform arises in numerous
factual contexts. See Howard Shapiro & Robert Rachal, The Duty to Inform
and Fiduciary Breaches: The "New Frontier" in ERISA Litigation, 14 LAB.
LAW. 503-24 (1999) (addressing the developing duty to inform imposed by
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a health care plan. In Eddy, the plan participant received a memo
from his employer less than one week before a previously
scheduled surgery informing him that the company had
Consequently, the
terminated its group health care plan.
participant personally was responsible for paying the expenses of
his upcoming surgery.
The participant called the plan's
administrator and inquired about his health insurance coverage.
The plan administrator failed to inform the participant that he
had the contractual right to convert his group plan coverage into
an individual insurance policy. As a result, the participant
incurred several thousand dollars in medical expenses that the
individual insurance policy would have covered if the plan
administrator had informed the participant of the contractual
conversion option.'
iii. Claims Involving Statutory Reporting and Disclosure
Requirements
The scope of the fiduciary's duty to inform overlaps with, but
potentially reaches beyond, the statutory requirements of notice,
reporting and disclosure imposed on the plan administrator by
part 1 of title I of ERISA."5 The legislative history of ERISA
indicates Congress believed a lack of adequate information
concerning the design, operation and assets of employee benefit
plans played a significant role in the pre-ERISA problem of
fiduciary misuse of plan assets." Congress found that inadequate
information provided to plan participants often unfairly deprived
them of promised plan benefits.347 The notice, reporting and
disclosure requirements found in part 1 of title I of ERISA are
based on the premise that if participants have adequate
information, they can more effectively enforce their rights under
the plan and deter fiduciary misconduct. Congress built upon the
underlying philosophy of ERISA's reporting and disclosure

ERISA in various settings).
343. 919 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
344. See id. at 749.
345. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-25 (2000).
346. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4639, 4645-46.
347. Congress determined that:
[iut is grossly unfair to hold an employee accountable for acts which
disqualify him from benefits, if he had no knowledge of these acts, or if
these conditions were stated in a misleading or incomprehensible

manner in plan booklets.

Subcommittee findings were abundant in

establishing that an average plan participant, even where he has been
furnished an explanation of his plan provisions, often cannot
comprehend them because of the technicalities and complexities of the
language used.

Id. at 4646.
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requirements when it later enacted parts 6 and 7 of title I of
ERISA. These statutory sections contain similar notice and
disclosure requirements that are unique to the administration of
health care plans."
Compliance with the statutory notice, disclosure and
reporting requirements of parts 1, 6 and 7 of title I of ERISA is
part of the plan administrator's duty of prudence under Section
404(a)(1)(B).3 49
One component of the plan administrator's
fiduciary responsibility in operating the plan is to ensure that
these statutory requirements are satisfied.
The plan
administrator's failure to comply with one of these statutory
requirements does not give rise to a separate category of claim
under Section 502(a)(3). Rather, the violation of these statutory
requirements properly is conceptualized as a particular subset of
Category III claims for breach of fiduciary duty.
A claim challenging a defective summary plan description
("SPD") provided by the plan administrator illustrates this
particular subset of Category III claims. ERISA Section 102 of
ERISA35° ("Section 102") requires that the plan administrator must
provide a SPD document to plan participants that "shall be
written in a manner calculated to be understood by the average
plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and
comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants... of their
rights and obligations under the plan."35' In essence, Section 102
creates a federal statutory standard for the readability and
accuracy of the SPD document.
The federal courts have long struggled with how to reconcile
the statutory standard for the readability and accuracy of the SPD
document under Section 102(a) with the written plan document
rule of Section 402.52 To resolve this dilemma, the lower federal
courts have developed an elaborate set of rules based on the
factual distinctions between: (1) SPDs that directly conflict with
the provisions of a plan document; (2) SPDs that are silent on the
point of information at issue, but the language of the plan
document is clear; or (3) SPDs that are silent on the point of
information at issue, and the language of the plan document is
silent or ambiguous."' A silent or ambiguous plan document or
SPD, supplemented by a misleading or inaccurate oral statement
by the plan administrator, forms yet a fourth situation. In this
fourth situation, the appropriate claim is still one for breach of
348. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-69; 1171-85b (2000); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, supra

note 300.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000).
29 U.S.C. § 1022(a).
29 U.S.C. § 1022(a).
29 U.S.C. § 1102 (2000).
See MEDILL, supra note 247, at 72-77.
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fiduciary duty, but the duty would be the fiduciary's duty not to
misinform the participant by an oral statement.3s
Rather than relying upon a federal common law claim of
equitable estoppel,355 the better conceptualization is to treat claims
involving flawed SPDs as part of a particular subset of Category
III claims. The appropriate theory is that the plan administrator
has breached the fiduciary duty of prudence.'
A flawed SPD
gives rise to a breach of fiduciary duty claim based upon the plan
administrator's imprudent actions in failing to comply with the
statutory criteria for a readable and accurate SPD under Section
102(a).
iv. Breach of FiduciaryResponsibility Claims Involving Other
Statutory Requirements
Title I of ERISA contains other statutory requirements with
which a fiduciary must comply. These statutory requirements are
directly related to the administration and operation of the plan
and are imposed, expressly or implicitly, on the plan's
administrator.
Compliance with these other statutory
requirements is properly conceptualized as part of the plan
administrator's duty of prudence under Section 404(a)(1)(B).
Thus, a violation of one of these other statutory requirements does
not give rise to a separate category of claim under Section
502(a)(3), but rather is a particular subset of Category III claims
for breach of fiduciary duty.
Section 402(a)'s written plan document rule illustrates this
particular subset of breach of fiduciary duty claims. Under
Section 402(a), the plan must be "established and maintained"
pursuant to a written plan document.357 Clearly, one cannot avoid
regulation under title I of ERISA simply by maintaining an oral
plan - ERISA's requirements will still be applied even if a written
plan document does not exist.35 Nevertheless, Section 402(a)'s
requirement of a written plan document is central to the plan
administrator's task of administering the plan.
Knowingly
administering an oral plan in the face of this statutory
requirement is properly conceptualized as a breach of the plan
administrator's fiduciary duty of prudence under Section
404(a)(1)(B).

354. See id.
355. See infra Appendix A.

356. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000).
357. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a).
358. See Donovan v. Dillingham, 688 F.2d 1367, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982).
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v. Claims for a Violation of the ProhibitedTransactionRules by a
Fiduciary
Part III.B.4 of the Article previously described the two ways a
fiduciary could violate the prohibited transaction rules of ERISA.
An authorizing fiduciary could cause the plan to engage in a
prohibited transaction. 59 Alternatively, a fiduciary personally
could engage in a transaction involving plan assets that is
prohibited under the fiduciary prohibited transaction rules of
Section 406(b).3'° Rather than characterizing these violations of
the prohibited transaction rules by a fiduciary as giving rise to a
separate category of claims, the better conceptualization is to treat
these claims as a particular subset of Category III claims for
breach of fiduciary duty.
This characterization applies when the defendant who
authorized or engaged in the prohibited transaction is a fiduciary.
When the defendant is a nonfiduciary party in interest or a third
party with respect to the plan, the claim is properly characterized
as either a Category V claim361 or a Category VI claim,3 2
respectively.
vi. Claims Involving a Wrongful Denial of Plan Benefits
The justification for including wrongful denial of benefits
claims as a subset of Category III claims is that the plan
administrator has a statutory fiduciary duty to follow the terms of
the plan under Section 404(a)(1)(D). 31 In Varity Corporation v.
Howe,3 the Supreme Court acknowledged the fiduciary duty
implications of a claim for wrongfully denied benefits brought
The Varity opinion merely
under Section 502(a)(1)(B). 31
highlighted this issue rather than resolving it. 3" Since Varity, the
lower federal courts have had no further guidance from the
Supreme Court as to when additional relief under Section
502(a)(3) may be appropriate in situations where the federal court
has determined that a plan administrator has wrongfully denied a
participant's claim for plan benefits.
Varity can be read to support the conceptualization of a
wrongful claim denial by the plan administrator as also giving rise
to a breach of the plan administrator's duty under Section
404(a)(1)(D) to follow the terms of the plan." ' Interpreting the
359. See 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (2000) (introductory clause).
360. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b).
361. See discussion infra Part III.C.3.e.

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.

See discussion infra Part III.C.3.f.i.
See discussion supra Part III.C.2.a.
516 U.S. 489 (1996).
See id. at 514-15.
See discussion supra Part III.C.2.a.
See discussion supra Part III.C.2.a.
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statute in this fashion so as to authorize a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty under Section 502(a)(3) does not, however,
guarantee a remedy under Section 502(a)(3) for every instance in
which a plan administrator has wrongfully denied a participant's
claim for plan benefits. Later in Part III.D.3.d. of the Article, I
take up the question of when a remedy under Section 502(a)(3), in
addition to the remedy afforded by Section 502(a)(1)(B), would be
"appropriate" in the context of a wrongfully denied claim for plan
benefits.
d.

Category IV: Violation of Plan Terms by Participants
Category IV claims differ from the other categories in that the
alleged violation is not based on a statutory requirement of title I
of ERISA, but on the terms of the employee benefit plan itself.
Category IV claims are limited to defendants who are plan
participants. If the person who violates a plan term is a fiduciary
with respect to the plan, the proper claim against the defendant
fiduciary would be a Category III claim for breach of the
fiduciary's duty to follow the terms of the plan document under
Section 404(a)(1)(D). If the defendant who violates a plan term is
not a fiduciary with respect to the plan, but is either a party in
interest or a third party, the proper claim against the defendant
would be a Category V claim or a Category VI claim,
respectively. 6 ' Category IV claims against plan participants do
not overlap with Category V claims against parties in interest
because the modeling exercise excludes plan participants from the
class of party in interest defendants. 69 Similarly, Category III
claims against fiduciaries do not overlap with Category V claims
against parties in interest because the modeling exercise excludes
fiduciaries from the class of party in interest defendants.37 °
Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson37' and
Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.372 illustrate a
Category IV claim. In both Great-West and Sereboff, the terms of
the employer's health care plan required that if a participant
received medical care benefits under the plan for an injury caused
by a third party tortfeasor, the participant had to reimburse the
plan for such benefits if the participant later recovered against the
third party tortfeasor who was responsible for causing the
participant's injury.373
In both cases, the plan participants
recovered against the tortfeasors, but did not fully reimburse the
plan.
368. See discussion infra Parts III.C.3.e-f.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
534 U.S. 204 (2002).
126 S. Ct. (2006).
Great-West, 534 U.S. at 207; Sereboff, 126 S.Ct. at 1872.
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Claims for reimbursement also arise in the context of
disability benefit plans. Disability plans typically provide that the
amount of the monthly benefit payable by the plan is to be reduced
or offset by Social Security disability benefit payments.374 To make
the participant's reimbursement obligation clear to the
participant, the plan may even require the participant to execute
an agreement stating that the participant will reimburse the plan
in the event that the participant later receives a retroactive award
of Social Security disability benefits.7 5 Claims for reimbursement
typically arise when the Social Security Administration
retroactively pays disability benefits due as a lump sum award,
and the participant refuses to reimburse the plan.
Disability plans with Social Security offset provisions usually
provide that if the participant fails to reimburse the plan, the plan
may suspend or reduce future disability benefit payments until the
plan has been fully reimbursed. The federal courts generally have
upheld the plan administrator's authority to suspend or reduce
future disability benefit payments so as to recoup overpayments
over time based on an equitable set-off theory.376 The better
practice would be for the federal courts also to permit the plan
administrator to bring a claim under Section 502(a)(3) against the
participant to enforce the Social Security offset provisions of the
plan and compel immediate and full reimbursement. '
Mistaken overpayment cases provide a third illustration of a
Category IV claim against a plan participant. The facts of Ramsey
v. Formica Corp.3"' are typical of these mistaken overpayment
cases.
In Ramsey, the plan administrator miscalculated the
benefit payment amounts due under the formula established by
the terms of the plan. The overpayments to retired participants
began in 1985, but were not discovered until many years later
after an audit of the plan in 2003. In Ramsey, as in many of the
mistaken overpayment cases, the retired participants had no
374. See, e.g., Coop. Benefit Adm'rs v. Ogden, 367 F.3d 323, 325 (5th Cir.
2004); Northcutt v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Employees Pension Plan, 2005
WL 2886211, *1 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 31, 2005); Butler v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare,
Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 856, 857-58 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
375. See Ogden, 367 F.3d at 326; Northcutt, 2005 WL 2886211 at *2.
376. See Butler, 109 F. Supp. 2d at 861 (listing numerous prior cases
permitting recoupment by the plan of overpayments caused by a participant's
receipt of a retroactive Social Security disability award).
377. Compare Ogden, 367 F.3d at 336 (stating that ERISA does not
recognize a federal common law claim for reimbursement), with Northcutt,
2005 WL 2886211 at *6 ("Plaintiffs lawsuit is premised on a novel
interpretation of a recent Supreme Court decision in hopes that it will support
their effort to prohibit defendants from reducing or suspending plan benefits
to recoup overpayments ....
The Court finds no basis on which to conclude that
enforcement of the contractual provisions of the Pension Plan and the

Disability Plan would violate ERISA policy or its statutory scheme.").
378. 398 F.3d 421 (6th Cir. 2005).
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knowledge of the plan administrator's error in calculating the
benefit amount.379 In some cases, however, the participant has
notice of the calculation error.310 Prior to Great-West, the federal
courts generally permitted the plan administrator to bring a claim
against the participant to recover the overpayment amount.3 8'
After Great-West and Sereboff, the federal courts should continue
to interpret Section 502(a)(3) as authorizing these claims based on
the plan administrator's fiduciary obligation to enforce the terms
of the plan, which limit the participant to a lesser benefit
amount.3 2
It is important to reiterate that the above discussion has
focused solely on the various types of Category IV claims. As with
wrongfully denied claims for plan benefits, the issue of what
remedies are "appropriate" under section 502(a)(3) for such claims
is a difficult one. I address remedies issues later in Part III.D.3. of
the Article.
e.

Category V: Knowing Participation in Breach of Fiduciary

Duties or Prohibited Transactions by Parties in Interest
Category V claims focus on the conduct of persons who are
parties in interest 3 3 with respect to a plan. A Category V claim is
typically brought against a person who is a party in interest by
virtue of providing services for the plan administrator or the plan's
sponsoring employer.
Category V claims involve two types of misconduct by a party
in interest. For both types of misconduct, the factual prerequisite
to a Category V claim is the knowing breach or violation by a plan
fiduciary of the fiduciary responsibility provisions found in part 4

379. See id. at 423; Kaliszewski v. Sheet Metal Workers' Nat'l Pension Fund,
No. 03-216E, 2005 WL 2297309, *3 (W.D. Pa. July 19, 2005); Lumenite
Control Tech., Inc. v. Jarvis, 252 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702-03 (E.D. Ill. 2003);
Whitman v. Hawaiian Tug & Barge Corp./Young Bros., Ltd. Salaried Pension
Plan, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1228 (D. Haw. 1998).
380. Tynan v. Am. Airlines, Inc. Pilot Ret. Benefit Program, No. 04-cv-335,
2005 WL 2203172, *4 (D.N.H. Sept. 9, 2005); Iron Workers Tri-State Welfare
Plan v. Jaraczewski, No. 02-c-2596, 2002 WL 31854972, *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19,
2002).
381. E.g., Jaraczewski, 2002 WL 31854972, at *3.
382. Compare Tynan, 2005 WL 2203172 at *6 (permitting recoupment claim
on equity principles), with Kaliszewski, 2005 WL 2297309, at *4-*7 (relying on
Great-West to deny summary judgment against participant on plan
administrator's claim to recoup overpayments).
383. Recall that as part of the modeling exercise parties in interest as
defendants were defined to exclude persons who are fiduciaries or employees
who are plan participants. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
384. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14)(B) (2000) (defining "party in interest" to
include a person providing services to a plan).
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of title I of ERISA.3"
The party in interest may knowingly
participate in a fiduciary's breach of duty. This type of Category V
claim, which was predicted by the modeling exercise, has been
previously suggested as theoretically possibly by Professor Susan
Stabile3" based on the Supreme Court's analysis and reasoning in
Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.3"7
A Category V claim also may be brought against a party in
interest who knowingly engages in a prohibited transaction
involving plan assets.
This type of Category V claim was
recognized explicitly by the Supreme
Court in Harris Trust as
3 s
authorized by Section 502(a)(3).
The statutory provision that underlies both types of Category
V claims is Section 502(l) of ERISA."9' Congress added Section
502(l), which is a civil money penalty provision, to ERISA in
1989.390 Section 502()(1) states:
In the case of(A) any breach of fiduciary responsibility under (or other
violation of) part 4 by a fiduciary, or
(B) any knowing39' participation in such a breach or violation by
any other person,
the Secretary shall assess a civil penalty against such fiduciary or
385. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1113 (2000).
386. Stabile, supra note 121, 5 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. at 154.
387. 530 U.S. 238, 242 (2000).

388. Id. at 245.
389. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l) (2000).
390. Congress added Section 502(l) to ERISA in Section 2101 of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 2101, 103 Stat. 2106
("OBRA '89"); see 55 Fed. Reg. 25288 (June 20, 1990). Department of Labor
regulations implementing Section 502(l) are codified at 29 C.F.R. § 2570.80.88. Although Congress made Section 502(l) effective for violations occurring
on or after December 19, 1989, see Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 2101(c), under the

Department of Labor's "continuing violations" interpretation of the statute a
penalty can be assessed on conduct that predates the enactment of the statute.
See 55 Fed. Reg. 25288, 25288-89 & nn.5-8 (June 20, 1990).
391. Section 502(l) assesses a civil money penalty only if the other person
"knowingly" participates in the fiduciary's breach or violation of a statutory
provision found in part 4 of title I of ERISA. As interpreted by the Supreme
Court in Harris Trust, "knowledge" by the party in interest is actual or
constructive knowledge.
Only a transferee of ill-gotten trust assets may be held liable, and then
only when the transferee (assuming he has purchased for value) knew or
should have known of the existence of the trust and the circumstances
that rendered the transfer in breach of the trust. Translated to the
instant context, the transferee must be demonstrated to have had actual
or constructive knowledge of the circumstances that rendered the
transaction unlawful.
See HarrisTrust, 530 U.S. at 251 (emphasis added).
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other person in an amount equal to 20 percent of the applicable
recovery amount.392
Section 502(l)(2) defines the "applicable recovery amount"
(used to calculate the 20 percent penalty amount referenced above)
as follows:
For purposes of paragraph (1), the term "applicable recovery
amount" means any amount which is recovered from a fiduciary or
other person with respect to a breach or violation described in
paragraph(1)(A) pursuant to any settlement agreement with the Secretary, or
(B) ordered by a court to be paid by such fiduciary or other person
to a plan or its participants and beneficiaries in a judicial
proceeding instituted by the Secretary under subsection
[502] (a)(2) or[5021(a)(5).393
The statutory language of Section 502(a)(5) is virtually
identical to Section 502(a)(3), thereby permitting the Secretary of
Labor to seek exactly the same type of relief that a private plaintiff
may seek under Section 502(a)(3). 39 4 It is this parallel structure
between Sections 502(a)(5) and 502(a)(3) that, according to the
Supreme Court's analysis in Harris Trust, justifies Category V
claims as authorized by the statutory language of ERISA.399
Standing alone, Section 502() appears to present a curious
basis for authorizing claims under Section 502(a)(3) against a
party in interest. After all, Section 502(l) was not added to title I
of ERISA until 1989, long after Section 502(a)(3) was enacted." 5
Moreover, Section 502(l) is a civil money penalty provision that
can only be enforced by the Secretary of Labor, not by a private
civil plaintiff.97 Nevertheless, Harris Trust was a 9-0 decision by
the Supreme Court. Such unanimity suggests that the Justices
firmly believed that the plan fiduciary's claim in Harris Trust
against the party in interest who engaged in a prohibited
transaction was authorized by Section 502(a)(3) based on Section
502(l). '9

392. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l)(1)(emphasis added).
393. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l)(2)(emphasis added).
394. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000) with 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(5)
(2000).
395. As the Supreme Court explained in HarrisTrust, if the Secretary may
bring suit against an "other person" under subsection [502](a)(5), it follows
that a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary may bring suit against an "other
person" under the similarly worded subsection [502](a)(3). Harris Trust &
Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, 530 U.S. 238, 248-49 (2000).
396. See note 390.
397. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(l) (2000).
398. The Harris Trust Court succinctly described its reasoning in the
following terms.

2006]

Equitable Relief Under ERISA Section 502(A)(3)

Although not mentioned by the Supreme Court in Harris
Trust, there is a procedural provision in Section 502 that further
supports the Supreme Court's conclusion. Under Section 502(h) of
ERISA,3" ("Section 502(h)") a private plaintiff who brings an
action for any violation of title I of ERISA (other than a claim for
denied benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B)) is required to provide a
copy of the complaint to the Department of Labor. The purpose of
this provision is to give the Secretary of Labor notice and
opportunity to intervene in the case. If the Secretary decides to
intervene in private litigation where the plaintiffs claim is
brought under Section 502(a)(3), then the Secretary's claim must
be brought under Section 502(a)(5). It would be a strained reading
of the parallel statutory language of Sections 502(a)(3) and
502(a)(5) to permit the Secretary of Labor, as intervenor in the
plaintiffs case, to bring additional claims under Section 502(a)(5)
against the defendant that the original plaintiff could not bring
under Section 502(a)(3).
Thus far, my discussion of Category V claims against a party
in interest has been limited to situations where the statutory
elements of Section 502() are satisfied. These requirements are
discussed in detail in the next part of the Article concerning
Category VI claims against third parties. °°
It is possible for a claim to be brought against a party in
interest where the statutory elements of Section 502(l) are not
satisfied. The analysis of a claim against a party in interest that
is outside the scope of Section 502(l) is identical to the analysis for
such a claim against a third party defendant. Again, to avoid
repetition, I discuss claims that are outside the scope of Section
502(l) in the next part of the Article concerning Category VI claims
against third parties.
f.

Category VI: Claims Against Third Parties

Category VI claims against unrelated third parties are based
on the common characteristic that the defendant is a person who
does not have a relationship with an employee benefit plan that is
recognized by the statutory definitions contained in Section 34o1 In
this sense, Category VI claims are the only true "catch-all"
category of claims under Section 502(a)(3).
The modeling exercise predicted several claims for Category

In ERISA cases, "as in any case of statutory construction, our analysis
begins with the language of the statute ....
And where the statutory
language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well." Section
502(a)(3), as informed by § 502(l), satisfied this standard.
Harris Trust, 530 U.S. at 254.
399. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(h) (2000).
400. See discussion infra Part III.C.3.f.
401. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.
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VI that, based on my research, have not yet appeared before the
federal courts. For purposes of analysis, Category VI claims are
divided into two types: (1) claims against third parties based on
the statutory elements of Section 502(l); and (2) claims against
third parties that are outside the scope of Section 502(l). Each
type of Category VI claim is discussed separately below.
i.

Third Party Defendant Claims Based on Section 502(l)

Section 502(l) provides a statutory basis for the first type of
Category VI claims against third party defendants because the
term "other person" is sufficiently broad to include unrelated third
parties.4"2 Section 502(l) suggests two elements for a claim that
may be brought under Section 502(a)(3) against a third party.
First, a plan fiduciary must have breached or otherwise violated a
statutory responsibility described in part 4 of title I of ERISA.
4 3
Here, the most likely possibilities are a breach of fiduciary duty,
a breach of a co-fiduciary duty,4° or a violation of the prohibited
transaction rules.4 5 Second, the third party must have had actual
or constructive knowledge of the fiduciary's breach or violation at
the time the third party participated in the breach or other
violation by the fiduciary."
An illustration of a Category VI claim that fits squarely
within the statutory elements of Section 502(l) is a claim by the
plan administrator to recover plan benefits that were paid to a
third party-a stranger to the plan-by mistake. In this type of
mistaken payment case, the administrative error clearly is a
breach of the administrator's fiduciary duty of prudence. This
breach of fiduciary duty satisfies the first element for a claim
based on Section 502(l). The second element of Section 502(l) also
is satisfied because the third party who receive the payment has,
at a minimum, constructive knowledge of the plan administrator's
error and knowingly participates in the administrator's breach of
fiduciary duty by accepting the payment. Although the third party
may not know all of the details of the plan administrator's breach
of fiduciary duty, the third party recipient of the payment
certainly should know that money does not magically fall from the
sky in the form of a payment from an employee benefit plan.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Harris Trust4 7 suggests a
second illustration of a Category VI claim based on the statutory
elements of Section 502(l). In Harris Trust, the Court suggested
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

(2000).

See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(l)(1)(B) (2000); § 1002(9) (2000) (defining person).
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(2000).
29 U.S.C. § 1105 (2000).
29 U.S.C. § 1106 (2000).
See supra note 391.
Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, 530 U.S. 238
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that a Section 502(a)(3) claim could be brought against a
subsequent transferee of plan assets that are tainted by a prior
prohibited transaction.4 "8 Although the facts of Harris Trust
involved a party in interest defendant as the first transferee of the
plan assets at issue, one can easily imagine a scenario where a
party in interest, who has purchased plan assets in violation of the
prohibited transaction rules, subsequently transfers the plan
assets to a third party. If the plan fiduciary later seeks to rescind
the transaction as a violation of the prohibited transaction rules,
and the plan assets are unique (as in the case of real property), the
plan fiduciary may want to assert a claim for rescission against
the third party under Section 502(a)(3). To prevail on a rescission
claim, the plan fiduciary must show that the third party knew that
the assets were tainted as the subject of a prior prohibited
transaction. This knowledge requirement will be satisfied where
the defendant party in interest has a prearranged understanding
with the third party to transfer the assets from the plan as part of
a prohibited transaction.
In cases of collusion, permitting the plan fiduciary to bring a
Category VI claim against a third party who holds assets that
were the subject of a prohibited transaction serves an important
deterrence and enforcement function. Conversely, not permitting
a claim against the third party under Section 502(a)(3) in this type
of collusion situation would significantly undermine the purpose
and function of the prohibited transaction rules.
Party Defendant Claims Beyond the Scope of Section
ii. Third
4

502(l)

M

There are circumstances where the plaintiffs claim may not
This
satisfy the two statutory elements of Section 502(l).
possibility raises the question of whether Section 502(l) limits the
language of Section 502(a)(3) when the defendant is a third party,
or whether Section 502(a)(3) itself imposes a duty on third parties
and simultaneously authorizes such a claim.410
One such situation arises where the plan administrator
innocently makes a payment from the plan to or for the benefit of a
third party based on the fraudulent misrepresentations made by a
408. See HarrisTrust, 530 U.S. at 251 (quoting Moore v. Crawford, 130 U.S.
122, 128 (1889)) ("[A] court of equity has jurisdiction to reach the property
either in the hands of the original wrongdoer, or in the hands of any

subsequent holder, until a purchaser of it in good faith and without notice
acquires a higher right and takes the property relieved from the trust").
409. For purpose of this discussion, the analysis of a third party defendant
also applies to a defendant who is a party in interest.
410. HarrisTrust, 530 U.S. at 245 ("[Section] 502(a)(3) itself imposes certain
duties, and therefore.. .liability under that provision does not depend on
whether ERISA's substantive provisions impose a specific duty on the party
being sued").
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plan participant.41' Fraudulent misrepresentation cases illustrate
most vividly why claims against third party defendants under
Section 502(a)(3) should not be limited strictly to factual
circumstances where the two statutory elements of Section 502(l)
are satisfied. To date, the federal courts have resolved these cases
by straining to find that the plaintiff plan administrator's state
law claim of fraud41 or restitution412 against the third party was
not preempted by Section 514(a).1 "
Why would a plaintiff plan administrator use a state law
claim in these fraudulent misrepresentation cases, rather than
bringing a claim under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA? The likely
reason is that the availability of such a claim under ERISA
against a third party defendant is uncertain. 415 Fundamentally,
however,
the
plaintiffs
claim
in
these
fraudulent
misrepresentation cases is one to enforce the terms of the plan.
When conceptualized in this fashion, such a claim is authorized by
the plain language of Section 502(a)(3). Instead of forcing plan
administrators to rely on the vagaries of state law to recover
fraudulently induced payments, the better judicial interpretation
is to characterize these claims against third parties as expressly
authorized by Section 502(a)(3) as claims to enforce the plan terms
of the plan.
Another situation that lies outside the scope of Section 502(l)
arises if a participant recovers against a tortfeasor who caused the
participant's injury, but the participant refuses to reimburse the
health care plan for the participant's medical expenses. The
participant's attorney also may claim a portion of the funds
411. See Trustees of the AFTRA Health Fund v. Biondi, 303 F.3d 765 (7th
Cir. 2002) (describing a situation in which a participant misrepresented that
ex-wife was his spouse); Nat'l Benefit Adm'rs, Inc. v. Miss. Methodist Hosp. &
Rehab. Ctr., 748 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Miss. 1990) (describing a situation in
which participant misrepresented son's age and student status for purposes of
receiving benefits under dependent coverage).
412. See Langbein, supra note 13, at 1359, n. 249 (discussing how the Biondi
court used a state law claim of fraud in order to reclaim plan assets).
413. See Nat'l Benefit Adm'rs, Inc., 748 F. Supp. at 46.
414. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
415. See Biondi, 303 F.3d at 782. In Biondi, the Second Circuit reasoned
that:
[b]ecause ERISA does not provide any mechanism for plan
administrators or fiduciaries to recoup monies defrauded from employee
benefit trust funds by plan participants, garden-variety state-law tort
claims must, as a general matter, remain undisturbed by ERISA;
otherwise there would be no way for a trust fund to recover damages
caused by a plan participant's fraudulent conduct....
Id.; see also Nat'l Benefit Adm'rs, 748 F. Supp. at 464 (stating that "this area
of the law has not been displaced by ERISA; it has not been displaced by the
exclusive provisions of that statute because ERISA does not regulate it. It
follows that if this area is not regulated by ERISA, no cause of action can arise
therefrom").
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recovered from the tortfeasor as attorney's fees.416 If the amount of
the tort recovery is insufficient to satisfy both the health care
plan's claim for reimbursement and the attorney's claim for
payment for legal services, a dispute over the priority of claims to
the funds recovered may arise between the health care plan and
the participant's attorney. If part of the proceeds has been
disbursed to the participant's attorney, the attorney similarly may
refuse to reimburse the plan.
A variation on this theme is suggested by the facts of GreatWest,41 where most of the tort recovery funds were paid to the
trustee of a private express trust established for the benefit of the
participant. 8 In a future case, the participant may transfer the
funds recovered from the tortfeasor to the trustee of an express
trust established for the benefit of the participant, or better yet,
for the benefit of the participant's spouse or other family members.
The objective of the transfer is, of course, to put the tort recovery
funds out of the reach of the plan administrator.
In these situations, can the plan administrator enforce the
terms of the plan's reimbursement clause by bringing a claim
under Section 502(a)(3) against the attorney or the trustee?
Another way of framing this question is to ask: does Section 502(l)
limit the scope of claims possible under Section 502(a)(3) when the
defendant is a third party?
The analytical difficulty with each of these scenarios is that a
statutory element of Section 502(l) - misconduct by a plan
fiduciary - is lacking. The better judicial interpretation of Section
502(a)(3) in each situation is that the universe of possible third
party claims under Section 502(a)(3) should not be limited solely to
situations where the two statutory elements of Section 502(l) are
satisfied. The reasoning for this conclusion differs depending on
whether it is a trustee or an attorney who holds the tort recovery
funds.
The easier of the two scenarios is where a plan participant
transfers all or part of his tort recovery to the trustee of an express
trust. In this situation, the Supreme Court's opinion in Serebof"9
suggests that an equitable lien attaches to the funds. The
participant should not be able to shed this lien via a transfer of the
tort recovery funds to the trust, just as under the common law the
416. See Bombardier Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan, 354 F.3d
348, 361 (5th Cir. 2003); Admin. Comm. Of the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs.
Health & Welfare Plan v. Varco, 338 F.3d 680, 692 (7th Cir. 2003); Wal-Mart
Stores Health and Welfare Plan v. Wells, 213 F.3d 398, 403 (7th Cir. 2000);
Hotel Employees Int'l Union Welfare Fund v. Gentner, 50 F.3d 719, 721-23
(9th Cir. 1995); Greenwood Mills, Inc. v. Burris, 130 F. Supp. 2d 949, 963
(M.D. Tenn. 2001).
417. Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. at 204 (2002).
418. Id. at 207-8.
419. Sereboffv. Mid Atlantic Medical Servs. Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1869 (2006).
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settlor of a trust could not defeat his creditors by transferring his
own assets to a trust while retaining the benefit of those assets as
a trust beneficiary."'
Under these circumstances, the better
interpretation is that Section 502(a)(3) permits the plan
administrator to bring a claim directly against the third party
trustee who holds the tort settlement funds."' This interpretation
is consistent with the Supreme Court's statement in Harris Trust
that
"502(a)(3)
itself
imposes
certain
duties,
and
therefore.. .liability under that provision does not depend on
whether ERISA's substantive provisions impose a specific duty on
'
the party being sued." 22
The justifications for interpreting Section 502(a)(3) as
authorizing a claim against the participant's attorney are based on
ERISA's statutory provisions concerning federal subject matter
jurisdiction.42 3 If the federal courts interpret Section 502(a)(3) as
not authorizing a claim against a participant's attorney, plan
administrators will be forced to aggressively intervene in state
court tort actions in hopes of convincing the state court judge to
enforce the terms of the plan's reimbursement clause as part of a
tort settlement agreement or judgment.
Leading employee
benefits practitioners have criticized this development, which
flows directly from the Supreme Court's opinion and reasoning in
Great-West, as a costly litigation maneuver that may not always
produce a satisfactory result for the plan.424
Fundamentally, what the plan administrator seeks to do by
intervening in the participant's state court tort action is to enforce
the terms of the plan. A claim to enforce the terms of an employee
benefit plan is expressly authorized by the statutory language of
Section 502(a)(3). It is the federal courts, not the state courts, that
have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over Section 502(a)(3)
claims. 25'
Section 502(a)(3) should not be interpreted by the
federal courts in such a manner as to abrogate the exclusive
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts by forcing plan
administrators to intervene in state court tort proceedings to
litigate their reimbursement claims.
Due to the uncertainty surrounding claims for reimbursement
in the federal courts, plan administrators have turned to another
technique to buttress their ability to enforce a reimbursement plan
420. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(1) (1959); GEORGE T.
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 223, 446-51 (rev. 2d ed. 1992).
421. Moreover, any trust agreement terms that prohibit the trustee from

distributing the funds held in the trust to the plan administrator in
satisfaction of a claim for reimbursement should be viewed by the federal
courts as preempted by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
422. HarrisTrust, 530 U.S. at 245 (emphasis added).
423. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1)(2000).

424. See sources cited supra note 96.
425. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1).
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term through the state courts. This technique requires that the
participant and any attorney who represents the participant must
sign a contractual agreement directly with the plan agreeing that
the plan's expenses shall be recovered first out of any eventual tort
recovery."' Execution of this agreement is made a precondition to
the plan's payment of any medical expenses incurred as a result of
the participant's injuries. If the attorney later refuses to abide by
the terms of the agreement, the plan administrator may bring a
state law breach of contract claim in state court.427
This "manufactured" state law breach of contract claim brings
to the forefront the role that another statutory provisionpreemption of state law under Section 514(a) 428 -plays in
determining the breadth of Category VI claims that fall outside of
Section 502(Y). If ERISA preemption extends to enforcement of the
contractual agreement between the attorney and the plan, then a
claim under Section 502(a)(3) becomes the only means of enforcing
the plan's reimbursement terms. If, however, ERISA does not
preempt state contract law in this situation, then such contractual
arrangements may be enforced in the state courts using state lawbased principles .429
The second outcome may appeal to those federal judges who
desire to hear fewer cases involving ERISA. If the federal courts
encourage the law to develop in this direction, the perceived
judicial economy benefits for the federal courts are, in the long
run, likely to prove illusory.
Permitting contractual
reimbursement agreements to be enforced via state law contract
claims in state courts is unsound because it creates a split federalstate forum for resolution of the underlying dispute.
The
contractual reimbursement agreement is based on the terms of the
plan. Moreover, the cooperation of the plan participant may be
required to enforce the agreement's terms. Even if the state court
rules against the attorney on the breach of contract claim, the
federal courts still retain exclusive subject matter jurisdiction
under Section 502(e)(1) to enforce the reimbursement clause of the
plan against the participant as a claim brought under Section
502(a)(3).
Permitting enforcement of contractual reimbursement
426. See Robert N. Eccles & David E. Gordon, Great-West Life VII, 12 ERISA
LIT. REP. (Glasser Legal Works) at 1 (April 2004) (describing this technique);

Kress v. Food Employers Labor Relations Ass'n, 391 F.3d 563, 565 (4th Cir.
2004) (stating that the plan refused to pay participant's claim for benefits
because participant's attorney refused to execute subrogation agreement).
427. This technique was the subject of the litigation in Providence Health
Plan v. McDowell, 385 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2004).
428. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
429. See Providence Health Plan, 385 F.3d at 1168, 1173 (holding that the

plan administrator's state law contract claim for reimbursement was not
preempted by ERISA).
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agreements against an attorney through state law contract claims
in state courts also is unsound policy. Such an approach is likely
to prove administratively costly and burdensome, particularly for
employers who operate in more than one jurisdiction. Over time,
different state courts are likely to come up with different
interpretations of the same health care plan's contractual
reimbursement agreement-exactly the sort of problem that
ERISA's statutory preemption provision was designed to
address." ° Tailoring the terms of each contractual reimbursement
agreement to suit the contracts law of each state would lead to
more complex and more costly plan administration at a time when
employers and employees are struggling with the rising costs of
health care plan benefits.
iii. Section 514(a) As "FloodControl"for ClaimsAgainst Third
Parties
The above discussion should not be read as dismissive of the
significant role of state law in defining the scope of Category VI
claims against third parties that are outside the scope of Section
502(l). Indeed, the possibility of an alternative viable claim under
state law should be a crucial factor when a federal court must
decide whether a claim against a third party that is outside the
scope of Section 502(l) may be brought under Section 502(a)(3). In
this sense, the federal judiciary may control the proverbial
"floodgates" of third party claims under Section 502(a)(3) through
a reasonable and measured interpretation of the scope of ERISA
preemption of state law claims under Section 514(a).
As articulated by the Supreme Court in New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Insurance Co.," the starting point for analysis is the presumption
that state law claims against third parties are not preempted by
title I of ERISA.
But when there are compelling policy
justifications under ERISA, such as assuring uniformity of plan
interpretation and administration, the federal courts should view
a competing state law claim as preempted, and interpret Section
502(a)(3) as authorizing a claim against the third party defendant.
4. Summary of the Six Categories of Claims
A picture is worth a thousand words. The diagram below
provides a helpful summary of the results of the modeling exercise
430. See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001). ("One of the
principal goals of ERISA is to enable employers 'to establish a uniform
administrative scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures to guide
processing of claims and disbursement of benefits.' Uniformity is impossible,
however, if plans are subject to different legal obligations in different States."

(citation omitted)).
431. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
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by showing the six categories of defendants and related claims,
along with the particular subsets of claims possible within each
category.
SUMMARY DIAGRAM OF CLAIMS CATEGORIES

I
Violation
of Plan
Design
Requirement

II

Claims
Against
Employer
in a Nonfiduciary
Capacity

Unlawful
Retaliation

Inurement
of Plan
Assets
Improper
Plan
Amendment
Procedure

IV
Violation
of Plan
Terms by
Participants

V
Claims
Against
Nonfiduciary
Parties in
Interest

VI
Against
Third
Parties

Knowing
Participati
on in BFD
Knowing
Participation in
PT

Claims
Based on
§ 502(l)
Claims
Outside
the Scope
of § 502(l)

Claims
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D. Determining "Appropriate" Equitable Relief
Once the six categories of claims authorized by Section
50 2 (a)( 3 ) have been identified, it becomes possible to determine
the types of equitable relief available for each category based on
ERISA's underlying policies. Using this approach, the federal
courts would no longer conceptualize the remedies available under
Section 502(a)(3) as a potential judicial slippery slope. Rather,
federal judges would be engaged in determining, in light of
ERISA's policy objectives, the unique set of equitable remedies
that are best-suited for each claim category. Different types of
equitable remedies for each claim category may be "appropriate"
because of the multiple, and sometimes conflicting, policies that
underlie ERISA.
This proposed judicial approach is consistent with ERISA's
legislative history.
Congress intended the federal courts to
interpret ERISA's new fiduciary responsibility standards "bearing
in mind the special nature and purpose of employee benefit
plans.""
Congress further gave the federal courts the task of
modifying the equitable remedies available under the common law
of trusts where necessary to ensure effective enforcement of
ERISA's policies."a
The devil in executing this task has always lain in the details.
Exactly when are modifications to the equitable remedies
available under the common law of trusts justified in light of the
unique nature of the employee benefits system created by ERISA,
and when are they not? Part III.D of the Article proposes a

432. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5083; S. REP.
No. 93-127, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4865; H.R. REP. No. 93-533,

reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4650; Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489,
497 (1996).
433. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 497 (explaining that "ERISA's standards and
procedural protections partly reflect a congressional determination that the

common law of trusts did not offer completely satisfactory protection," and
"courts must go on to ask whether, or to what extent, the language of the
statute, its structure, or its purpose require departing from common-law trust
requirements."); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110
(1989) ("[Clourts are to develop a 'federal common law of rights and

obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.'" (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell,
473 U.S. 134, 155-57 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring) (explaining that

Congress authorized the federal courts to "fine-tune ERISA's remedial
scheme" by developing federal common. law to fashion appropriate equitable
relief under Section 502(a)(3)); Franchise Tax Bd. V. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983) ("'[A] body of Federal substantive
law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and
obligations under private welfare and pension plans."' (quoting 129 CONG.
REC. 29942 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Javits))).
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conceptual framework for the federal courts to use in resolving
these questions.
1.

The ERISA Policy Triangle

The three core policies that underlie ERISA form the
foundation for my proposed conceptual framework, which I call the
ERISA Policy Triangle. These three core ERISA policies are:

(1) to protect the rights of plan participants to the benefits
promised to them under the terms of the plan (the "benefit
protection policy");
(2) to avoid imposing an undue administrative burden on
employers that would financially deter them from voluntarily
sponsoring plans for their employees (the "cost-minimization
policy"); and
(3) to preserve the right of the employer as the settlor of the
plan to customize the design of the plan and the plan's package of
benefits (within the limits of any statutory plan design
requirements established by title I of ERISA) for the employer's
workforce and budget (the "settlor function policy").
The benefit protection and cost-minimization policies are
found in ERISA's legislative history 4 and the Supreme Court has
expressly relied on those policies in several of its opinions
interpreting Section 502(a)(3). 5 Less well-recognized, but equally
important, is the settlor function policy, which derives from the
judicially created settlor function doctrine. 6 The settlor function
doctrine recognizes that an employer's decision to establish,
modify, amend, or terminate an employee benefit plan is not a
fiduciary act,4 3' and therefore it is not subject to judicial review for
compliance with ERISA's fiduciary duty provisions. 7 The policy
434.

H.R. REP. No. 93-533, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4639-47; S.

REP. No. 93-127, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4838-51.
435. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 497 (stating that in interpreting the provision,
courts must consider the competing goals of benefits protection and costminimization); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262-63 (1993) (noting
the tension between the two policies).
436. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443 (1999);
Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. at 882, 890 (1996) (explaining that plan
sponsors who change the plan do not act as fiduciaries); Curtiss-Wright Corp.
v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995) ("Employers.. .are generally free
under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate
welfare plans").
436. Curtiss-WrightCorp. 514 U.S. at 78.
437. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443 (1999);
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purpose behind the settlor function doctrine is to encourage
employers voluntarily to sponsor benefit plans by preserving the
autonomy of the employer to make decisions concerning the
benefits offered to employees based upon the nature of the
employer's business, budget, and workforce. 8
Although the
settlor function policy to date has not been expressly invoked by
the Supreme Court in interpreting Section 502(a)(3), the policy has
been invoked in the Supreme Court's analysis of breach of
fiduciary duty claims"' and claims of retaliation under Section 510
of ERISA."'
These three core ERISA policies and the interrelationships
among them form the ERISA Policy Triangle, which is illustrated
by Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1
ERISA Policy Triangle
Benefit Protection Policy

Cost Minimization Policy

Settlor Function Policy

The ERISA Policy Triangle visually summarizes several
fundamental principles. First, the primary benefit protection
policy is superior to the secondary cost-minimization"' and settlor
function policies.' Hence, it has a superior location at the top of
Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. at 882,890 (1996).
438. For further discussion on the settler function doctrine see Colleen E.
Medill, supra note 284 at 510 and Jane K. Stanley, The Definition of Fiduciary
Under ERISA: Basic Principles, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 237, 244-45
(1992).
440. Hughes Aircraft Co., 525 U.S. at 443; Lockheed Corp., 517 U.S. at 88991.
441. See Inter-Modal Rail Employees Ass'n. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 515-17 (1997).
442. Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262-63 (1993).
443. Under ERISA Section 404(a)(1)(D), the settlor's plan design is expressly

made subject to the statutory requirements for employee benefit plans
contained in title I of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000). These
statutory requirements protect plan participants and their benefits. See
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the triangle. Second, the cost-minimization and settlor function
policies, which form the base of the triangle, are mutually
reinforcing in the sense that an employer's choice of plan design
often is related to minimizing the costs of plan sponsorship. Third,
although the cost-minimization and settlor function policies are
secondary, they form the supporting base for the employee benefits
plan system.
Plan sponsorship by employers is voluntary.
Remedies jurisprudence under Section 502(a)(3) that "guts" this
supporting base is likely to undermine the entire employee
benefits system, and take with it the plan benefits that ERISA was
enacted to protect. 4
The ERISA Policy Triangle is a useful tool for conceptualizing
how ERISA's overall statutory scheme balances these three core
policies. Plan participants are closely associated with the apex of
the ERISA Policy Triangle. Protection of this group represents
ERISA's primary policy priority. 5 Protection of plan participants
is achieved through ERISA's provisions for reporting and
disclosure' and the statutory provisions that govern fiduciary
conduct concerning the administration and management of the
plan and its assets."Y
Additional statutory provisions for
participants are provided through specific plan design
requirements for retirement plans6 and health care plans."9
discussion supra Part III.B.1.
444. See Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 215 (2004) ("The limited
remedies available under ERISA are an inherent part of the 'careful balancing'
between insuring fair and prompt enforcement of rights under a plan and the
encouragement of the creation of such plans." (citation omitted)).
445. See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 262-63 (referring to the goal of protecting
employee benefits as primary); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S.
101, 113 (1989) (stating that ERISA was enacted to protect participants).
Some may argue that the protection of plan assets, rather than plan
participants, is ERISA's primary policy priority. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516
U.S. 489, 524-25 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting). The ultimate purpose of
preserving plan assets, however, is to ensure that plan participants can
receive their promised benefits. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4649-50; S. REP. NO. 93-127, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 4865. As the majority in Varity made clear, the fiduciary duty provisions of
ERISA are not simply limited to protection of plan assets, but rather also
extend directly to the plan's participants. Varity, 516 U.S. at 507.
446. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1030 (2000) (establishing requirements for
disclosure and reporting); see generally Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Implementing
ERISA: Of Policies and "Plans,"72 WASH. U. L.Q. 559, 567 (1994) (describing
ERISA's notice and reporting requirements as disclosure controls).
447. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1110, 1133 (2000).
448. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1052 establishing minimum participation standards
for pension plans) (2000); § 1053 (establishing minimum vesting standards for
pension plans) (2000); § 1054 (2000) (establishing benefit accrual requirements
for pension plans and restrictions on pension plan amendments); § 1055 (2000)
(establishing joint, survivor, and pre-retirement survivor annuity
requirements for pension plans); § 1056 (2000) (establishing other
requirements for the form and payment of benefits from pension plans); § 1058
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Employers who sponsor plans, fiduciaries, and nonfiduciary
parties-in-interest are closely associated with the left base of the
ERISA Policy Triangle, which represents the cost-minimization
policy. It is well recognized that this secondary policy may conflict
with ERISA's primary policy of protecting plan par*ticipants. This
inherent policy tension often requires the federal judiciary to
engage in a balancing of competing policy objectives.45 °
Employers also are closely associated with the right base of
the ERISA Policy Triangle, which represents the settlor function
policy. The settlor function doctrine gives employers flexibility to
design a system of plan benefits tailored to their particular
businesses and budgets. The doctrine also allows employers to
modify plan benefits to better accommodate changes in an
employer's business or financial circumstances." The employer's
prerogative as settlor of the plan to amend the terms of the plan is
secondary, however, to ERISA's statutory plan design
Thus, where such statutory plan design
requirements.
requirements exist, the employer must amend the plan so as to
continue to comply with any applicable statutory requirements.
2. Aligning Claim Categoriesand Policies
Balancing these three core policies is a delicate, but not
impossible, task for the federal courts in determining
"appropriate" equitable remedies under Section 502(a)(3). The
ERISA Policy Triangle provides an analytical framework to use in
determining how each claim category aligns with each of ERISA's
Once this alignment is established, the
three core policies.
remedies that are "appropriate" for each claim category can be
more easily ascertained. Figure 1.2 below illustrates my proposed
alignment position for each of the six categories of claims.

(2000) (establishing restrictions on the merger and consolidation of plans or
the transfer of plan assets); § 1082 (2000) (establishing minimum funding
standards for pension plans).
449. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161 (2000) (requiring group health plans to offer
continuation of coverage under specified conditions); § 1169 (2000)
(establishing other standards for group health plans); § 1181 (2000)
(establishing limitations on pre-existing condition exclusions for health plans);
§ 1182 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination based on health status for health
plans); § 1183 (2000) (regulating multi-employer health plans); § 1185 (2000)
(establishing minimum benefit standards for mothers and newborns); § 1185a
(2000) (establishing standards for mental health benefits); § 1185b (2000)
(establishing standards for breast cancer-related benefits).
450. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 497 (stating that courts must consider the two
competing policy goals); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 243, 262-63
(1993) (noting the tension between the two policies).
451. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443 (1999); Lockheed
Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996).
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Figure 1.2
Alignment of Policies and Claim Categories

Benefit Protection Policy

of
0 I

V

Cost Minimization Policy

lV

IOVI

Senior Function Policy

Category I claims involving a violation of ERISA's statutory
plan design standards are very closely associated with the benefit
protection policy. Category II claims for retaliation, improper plan
amendment procedures, or inurement of plan assets, and Category
III claims against a fiduciary for a violation of ERISA's fiduciary
responsibility rules, function primarily to protect the rights of plan
participants with respect to their plan benefits. Claims in
Categories II and III are essential to deterring conduct by an
employer, in both a nonfiduciary and fiduciary capacity, that
would otherwise circumvent or erode ERISA's benefit protection
policy. For these reasons, Categories I, II and III are assigned a
position that is more closely aligned with the apex of the ERISA
Policy Triangle. Because Category II claims also are strongly
associated with the settlor function policy, Category II claims are
placed toward the right side of the ERISA Policy Triangle.
Category IV claims against plan participants to enforce the
terms of the plan implicate all three core ERISA policies. For this
reason, Category IV claims are assigned a position in the center of
the ERISA Policy Triangle that is equally related to all three
policies. All of the plan's participants are subject to the terms of
the plan. The plan terms dictate the benefits that each individual
participant in the plan is entitled to receive. If an individual
participant receives a greater benefit amount than is permitted
under the terms of the plan, the administrator must have the
ability to enforce the plan's terms and recoup the excess benefit
amount. If the plan administrator is unable to effectively enforce
the terms of the plan, ultimately the plan's ability to pay the
benefits promised to the other participants financially may be
compromised. ERISA's cost-minimization and settlor function
policies also underlie Category IV claims. Lack of effective
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enforcement of the plan's terms undermines the employer's ability
to accurately estimate the costs of the plan's benefits and design a
benefit structure that is affordable to the employer.
Category V claims against a nonfiduciary party in interest
that are based on the Section 502(l) doctrine have as a prerequisite
fiduciary misconduct.452 Therefore, Category V claims that are
based on Section 502 (1) are property conceptualized as secondary
to, and thus aligned below, a Category III claim for breach of
fiduciary responsibility.
Parties in interest often have a statutorily recognized
connection with the operation and administration of the plan.
Such defendants are likely to react negatively to judicial remedies
under Section 502(a)(3) that effectively increase their risk of
potential liability. To the extent that the relationship of a
Category V defendant to the plan is based on nonfiduciary services
involving plan administration or transactions involving plan
assets, such Category V defendants are likely to respond to
increased risk by raising the price of their services. For this
reason, Category V claims generally are more closely associated
with the cost-minimization policy that forms the left base of the
ERISA Policy Triangle.
A Category VI claim is brought against an unrelated third
party who is not subject to ERISA's regulatory scheme.
Fundamentally, Category VI defendants are persons whom
Congress did not view as integral to the protection of plan benefits
and the associated rights of plan participants. Such unrelated
third party defendants have no direct connection with the plan
itself. Rather, these defendants may have an indirect connection
with the plan through a relationship with another person whose
conduct is regulated by either the statutory provisions of title I of
ERISA or by the terms of the plan itself.
A Category VI claim that satisfies the statutory elements of
Section 502(l) is, like a similar Category V claim, secondary to a
prerequisite Category III claim against a fiduciary. A Category VI
claim against a third party may, however, be outside the scope of
Section 502(l) and yet still present a viable claim under Section
502(a)(3). Although this type of Category VI claim is difficult to
align with policy objectives in the abstract, one likely scenario is
that the claim is outside the scope of Section 502(l) because the
third party has knowingly participated in a violation of plan terms
Therefore, the element of fiduciary
by a plan participant.
misconduct is missing. With the substantial caveat that Category
VI claims are the claim category least susceptible to
generalization, I aligned Category VI claims along the baseline of
the ERISA Policy Triangle underneath both Category III claims

452. See discussion supra Part III.C.3.e.
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against fiduciaries
participants.

and

Category

IV

claims

against

plan

3. Aligning Claim Categorieswith "Appropriate"Equitable
Remedies: Some ObservationsConcerningEmerging Issues and
ProposedJudicialSolutions
The Supreme Court has made clear that the remedies of
injunction, mandamus, and restitution are available for each of
the six categories of claims that may be brought under Section
502(a)(3). 45
In the future the Supreme Court will have the
opportunity to add to and further clarify this list. In particular,
the law of restitution includes a variety of equitable devices such
as the equitable lien' and its close cousin, the constructive trust.4 55
Other possible remedies are derived from the common law of
trusts, such as money damages awarded under a make-whole
relief standard, 56 and judicial reformation of trust terms.457
Finally, the Supreme Court may reconsider the availability of a
monetary award under Section 502(a)(3) in exceptional cases
where a wrongful denial of a claim for plan benefits injures the
plan participant. 4'
In this part of the Article, I offer some
observations concerning remedies available under Section
502(a)(3) and suggest the categories of claims for which various
equitable remedies are well-suited based on ERISA's underlying
core policies. I also explain why, based on ERISA's statutory
provisions, not all remedies available in equity under the common
law of trusts should be imported into Section 502(a)(3).
a.

Monetary Awards: Restitution Versus Make-Whole Relief

For purposes of discussion, it is important to explain what I
mean by the terms "restitution" and "make-whole relief." I use the
term "restitution" to refer to a monetary award in an amount that
is necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendant.
Thus, if the defendant has not been enriched by his wrongful
conduct, restitution is not available as a remedy.
453. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 215
(2002); Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256-58 (1993).
454. See Sereboffv. Mid Atlantic Medical Servs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1869 (2006);
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 161 (1937) (providing that when a person
can reach another's property in equity as security for a claim based on unjust
enrichment, an equitable lien is formed).
455. See Great-West, 534 U.S. at 213; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160
(1937).
456. See Langbein, supra note 13, at 1333-38.
457. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §62 cmt. b (2003) (explaining that
judicial reformation of trust terms is permitted if a mistake of fact or law
affects the specific terms of the document).
458. See Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 222-23 (2004) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring).
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I use the term "make-whole relief' to refer to a monetary
award in an amount that will "restore[] the victim to the position
that he or she would have had"'59 but for the defendant's wrongful
conduct. Because make-whole relief focuses on the plaintiffs
injury, it may be awarded even if the defendant has not been
unjustly enriched as a result of the ERISA violation or the terms
of the plan. For the moment, I am purposefully limiting the term
"make-whole relief' in this discussion to a monetary award
calculated to restore the plaintiffs economic losses. Later in Part
III.D.3.d of the Article, I take up the question of whether Section
502(a)(3) could be read to authorize a monetary award designed to
compensate the plaintiff for physical and emotional pain and
suffering caused by a wrongful denial of plan benefits under
Section 502(a)(1)(B).
When the plaintiff seeks a monetary award, the policy
distinctions between Category I, II, and III claims, and Category
IV, V, and VI claims, justify corresponding distinctions among the
available remedies. Monetary awards for Category I, II, and III
claims should be determined under the more comprehensive makewhole relief standard.
For these categories of claims, the
defendant's lack of unjust enrichment should not prevent the
federal courts from providing a remedy under Section 502(a)(3) for
the plaintiffs economic losses. Permitting monetary awards under
a make-whole relief standard for Category I, II, and III claims also
serves to encourage employers and plan fiduciaries to comply with
ERISA's regulatory regime by providing a significant financial
deterrent for violations. This policy justification is especially
strong in the context of Section 510 claims for retaliation. As
applied in the context of a Category II claim under Section 510,
make-whole relief necessarily would include back-pay, and in some
situations may also necessitate front-pay, as appropriate forms of
make-whole relief.
Proposing that monetary awards based on a make-whole
relief standard should be available for Category I, II, and III
claims does not mandate that the federal courts must, in every
instance, award monetary make-whole relief for such claims in
every case.
Section 502(a)(3)'s statutory authorization of
"equitable relief" is modified by the word "appropriate."" ° There
may be instances where ERISA's secondary policy objectives
render a sizeable monetary award based on a make-whole relief
standard "inappropriate."
For example, if the proper
interpretation of a statutory requirement for plan benefits design
is subject to substantial uncertainty, 461 the federal court may
459. Langbein, supra note 13, at 1335 &n.102.
460. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)((3)(ii)(B) (2000).
461. Here, the example that comes to mind is the application of ERISA's
statutory provision prohibiting age discrimination to cash balance plans. See
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consider the potential chilling effect a large monetary award based
on a make-whole relief standard may have on other employers who
voluntarily sponsor similar plans."2 Where the potential chilling
effect may harm the overall employee benefits system, the federal
court may choose to render a monetary award that is limited to the
extent of the employer's unjust enrichment (if any), or award
another form of equitable relief, such as injunctive relief.
ERISA's cost-minimization policy justifies a restitution
standard for monetary awards for Category V claims against a
nonfiduciary party in interest who knowingly participates in a
breach of fiduciary duty or a prohibited transaction. Financial
liability under ERISA is a factor that influences the price that
plan service providers - the primary pool of potential defendants
for Category V claims - charge for the services they provide to the
employer who voluntarily sponsors the plan."" Limiting monetary
awards for Category V claims to the amount of the defendant's
unjust enrichment avoids the chilling effect that application of a
make-whole relief standard would have on plan service providers.
For Category V claims, the more limited standard of restitution as
necessary to prevent the unjust enrichment of the party in interest
defendant strikes the correct balance between the benefitprotection policy and the cost-minimization policy.
Restitution is also a more suitable standard than make-whole
relief for monetary awards for Category VI claims. Category VI
claims involve a third party defendant whose conduct is not
directly regulated under ERISA's statutory scheme. ERISA's
failure to regulate directly third party defendants warrants
caution in awarding any form of monetary relief for a Category VI
claim. It would be a foolish overabundance of caution, however,
for the federal courts effectively to create a license for these third
party defendants to profit or benefit at the expense of the plan and
its participants by knowingly assisting a fiduciary or a plan
participant who violates the terms of title I of ERISA or the terms
29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H)(i) (2000).
462. The uniqueness of the terms of the plan that are challenged as illegal
would be an additional factor for the federal court to consider in determining
whether a monetary award based on a make-whole relief standard is
"appropriate" under Section 502(a)(3). Obviously, the more unique the
challenged provisions of the plan, the less likely a monetary award based on a
make-whole relief standard would deter other employers from voluntarily
sponsoring plans for their employees.
463.
All that ERISA has eliminated.. .is the common law's joint and several
liability, for all direct and consequential damages suffered by the plan,
on the part of persons who had no real power to control what the plan

did. Exposure to that sort of liability would impose high insurance costs
upon persons who regularly deal with and offer advice to ERISA plans,

and hence upon ERISA plans themselves.
Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993).
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of the plan. Under these circumstances, the federal courts should
deter such conduct by third party defendants by permitting a
monetary award based on a restitution standard against the third
party defendant.
Category IV claims against plan participants present a more
complex range of situations and circumstances. For example, in
mistaken overpayment cases where the plan administrator errs
and overpays benefits due the participant-wholly innocent of
wrongdoing-under the terms of the plan, under principles of
equity a monetary award measured by a restitution standard
seems more "appropriate" than a make-whole relief standard. A
restitution standard would return the participant's windfall back
to the plan. If the plan administrator's mistake caused economic
injury to the plan that is not fully compensated by the
participant's restitution (such as where the plan has suffered lost
investment earnings) it is the plan administrator who should
make up the shortfall to cure the administrator's breach of
fiduciary duty in originally authorizing the overpayment.
Conversely, if the overpayment is the product of fraud or
misrepresentation by the participant, or the participant has
knowingly violated the terms of the plan, a make-whole relief
standard for a monetary award against the participant would
discourage such conduct in the future by other plan participants.
b. Reformation and "Quasi-Reformation" (Equitable Estoppel as
a Remedy)
If the federal courts recognize a make-whole relief standard
for monetary awards, the question is likely to arise whether other
equitable remedies that are unique to the world of the common
law express trust are available under Section 502(a)(3). One such
unique trust law remedy is judicial reformation of the terms of the
trust agreement that are affected by a mistake of law or fact.4"4
The nature and circumstances of a Category I claim based on
illegal plan terms may suggest reformation as a possible form of
equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3).
A close cousin to
reformation (so close, in fact, I refer to it as "quasi-reformation") is
the remedy of equitable estoppel for Category III claims involving
a breach of the fiduciary's duty to inform"' or a fiduciary's failure
to comply with ERISA's notice and disclosure requirements by
providing a participant with a flawed summary plan description.'
Where the claim under Section 502(a)(3) is that the terms of
the plan violate one of ERISA's statutory plan design
requirements, the federal courts have at least two other equitable

464. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS §62 cmt. b (2003).

465. See discussion supra Part III.C.3.c.ii.
466. See discussion supra Part III.C.3.c.iii.
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remedies available in addition to reformation. If the illegal terms
are the product of a plan amendment, the federal court may
exercise its equitable powers of injunction and mandamus to
declare the amendment to be void and unenforceable, thereby
returning the plan's benefit design to the pre-amendment status
quo. 7 Or, the federal court may exercise its equitable injunctive
powers and order the employer to enact retroactively an
amendment to the plan that conforms the terms of the plan to
ERISA's statutory plan design requirements.r
There are both practical and policy-based reasons why the
federal courts should not embrace judicial reformation as a third
alternative to these two remedies for a Category I claim under
Section 502(a)(3). From a practical perspective, any amendment
to the terms of a qualified retirement plan 9 would require the
drafter to have specialized legal expertise in the highly technical
rules of the Internal Revenue Code.47° In the defined benefit plan
context, specialized actuarial expertise often is needed to resolve
claimed violations of ERISA's vesting and benefit accrual plan
design standards.471 To state the obvious, few federal judges are
competent to undertake this complex drafting task. Those who are
competent are likely to prove wise enough to be unwilling.
From a policy perspective, for qualified retirement plans there
are often multiple compliance options available to the employer
under ERISA's statutory plan design standards.472
Judicial

467. See Frank P. VanderPloeg, Role-Playing UnderERISA: The Company as
"Employer"and "Fiduciary",9 DEPAuL BUS. L.J. 259, 276 (1997) (arguing that
an amendment that violates the plan design requirements of ERISA should be
viewed as illegal and therefore void). Nullifying a purported plan amendment
was the remedy approach adopted by the Third Circuit in Curtiss-Wright
Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 18 F.3d 1034, 1036 (3d Cir. 1994). The Third Circuit
adopted this remedy after finding that the plan's document failed to specify an
amendment procedure as required by Section 402(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3)
(2000), thereby rendering the attempted plan amendment void. CurtissWright Corp., 18 F.3d at 1040. The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit
because the Court found that the plan's amendment procedure satisfied
ERISA's statutory requirement. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen,
514 U.S. 73, 78-85 (1995). The Supreme Court expressly did not reach the
question of whether the Third Circuit's remedy, declaring the amendment to
be invalid, was permissible. Id. at 85.
468. See Devito v. Pension Plan of Local 819 I.B.T. Pension Fund, 975 F.
Supp. 258, 266-70 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that the court need not decide
whether it has jurisdiction to reform the plan benefit formula that violates
ERISA because court may order plan sponsor to adopt retroactive amendment
to benefit formula that conforms the formula to ERISA's requirements).
469. The term "qualified retirement plan" refers to a pension plan that is
intended to comply with the statutory requirements described in Section
401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, I.R.C. § 401(a)(2006).
470. See I.R.C. § 401(a).
471. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1053-54 (2000).
472. See Devito, 975 F. Supp. at 267-70.
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reformation of the plan would usurp the employer's right under
the settlor function policy to select the compliance option that is
best suited to the employer's unique business operations,
workforce and financial circumstances. Judicial reformation also
would undermine the cost-minimization policy. It is the employer
sponsoring the plan who would bear the unanticipated cost of any
additional benefits provided by a judicially reformed plan. The
very possibility of judicial reformation might have a chilling effect
on employers, who may exercise their prerogative to terminate the
plan altogether.
It is entirely possible to conceive of a Category I claim where
the alleged statutory violation does not involve a qualified
retirement plan or present alternative methods of compliance. For
example, the requirements for health plan continuation coverage73
74
or the requirements for health care plan eligibility and benefits
may present a clear violation, sympathetic facts, and a defiant and
recalcitrant employer. Under these circumstances, a federal judge
may be tempted to award instantaneous relief from the bench in
the form of judicial reformation of the illegal plan terms. Even
under such egregious circumstances, the better interpretation of
"equitable relief" available under Section 502(a)(3) is that judicial
reformation of illegal plan terms is not available as a remedy.
Quite simply, judicial reformation of plan terms is not
"appropriate" because such reformation is contrary to the spirit, if
not the letter, of both the written plan document rule of Section
402(a)(1)447576 and the plan amendment procedure rule of Section
402(b)(3).
Fortunately, remedies other than reformation are available to
protect plan participants in these circumstances. The federal
court may enjoin the implementation of an illegal plan
amendment, and thereby reinstate the original plan terms. Or,
the federal court may issue an order pursuant to the court's
injunctive and mandamus powers that requires the employer to
amend the plan retroactively to comply with ERISA's statutory
design requirements.477 These equitable remedies, when combined
with monetary make-whole relief if necessary, are adequate to
protect plan participants and restore any benefits due to them
under the statutory plan design requirements of title I of ERISA.

473. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-69 (2000).
474. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1171-85(b) (2000).
475. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(1) (2000).
476. 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3)(2000).
477. See Devito v. Pension Plan of Local 819 I.B.T. Pension Fund, 975 F.
Supp. 258, 270 (S.D.N.Y., 1997) (ordering plan sponsor to adopt retroactive
amendment to bring benefit formula into compliance with ERISA
requirements).
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Similar policy considerations render "quasi-reformation,"
pleaded by the plaintiff in the form of an equitable estoppel
remedy, an inappropriate form of equitable relief under Section
502(a)(3). Equitable estoppel may be asserted as an equitable
remedy (rather than as a type of federal common law claim78 ) for
Category III claims involving a breach of the fiduciary's duty to
inform or based on a fiduciary's failure to comply with ERISA's
statutory notice and disclosure requirements. If the federal courts
embrace a make-whole relief standard for monetary awards under
Section 502(a)(3) as a remedy for Category III claims, the need for
equitable estoppel as a remedy vanishes. The better judicial
interpretation is for the federal courts to reject equitable estoppel
as a remedy under Section 502(a)(3), and instead award monetary
relief based on a make-whole relief standard for Category III
claims.
c.

The Equitable Lien and the Constructive Trust

Earlier in the Article, I described the Supreme Court's
decision in Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services., Inc.,"' where
the Court explicitly recognized the equitable devices of the
equitable lien and the constructive trust as forms of restitution
available as remedies under Section 502(a)(3). I also predicted
how, in the future, participants and their tort attorneys may
attempt to avoid reimbursement to the plan by circumventing the
facts of Sereboff."°
In applying the equitable lien and the constructive trust as
remedial equitable devices available as restitutionary relief under
Section 502(a)(3), federal courts should follow the congressional
directive to "bear[ I in mind the special nature and purpose of
employee benefit plans.""1 In future cases, the federal courts
should be flexible in construing the technical elements required at
common law for the imposition of an equitable lien or a
constructive trust. 2 For example, a strict judicial interpretation
of the common law requirement of a "separate fund" to which an
equitable lien can attach would only encourage participants or
their tort attorneys to commingle or dissipate the tort recovery
funds.
The federal courts should interpret the federal law
standards for the imposition of an equitable lien or a constructive

478. See discussion infra Appendix A.
479. 126 S. Ct. 1869 (2006).
480. See discussion supra Part III.C.3.f.ii.
481. H.R. REP. No. 93-1280 reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5083; S. REP.
No. 93-127, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4865; H.R. REP. No. 93-533,
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4650; Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489,
497 (1996).
482. See Sereboff, 126 S. Ct. at 1875 (rejecting application of "strict" tracing
rules required for imposition of an equitable lien at common law).
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trust under Section 502(a)(3) in a manner that will encourage
compliance with the terms of the plan, rather than rewarding
defendants who violate these terms.
d.

Monetary Awards for a Wrongful Denial of Plan Benefits

The "rule" that monetary awards are not available as
additional equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3) for economic
losses or personal injury caused by a wrongful denial of plan
benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B) dates back to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Russell.'
In Russell, the Supreme Court characterized the
plaintiffs claim for monetary compensation for economic losses
and physical and mental pain and suffering resulting from an
improper delay in processing the participant's claim for disability
plan benefits as "extra-contractual." The term "extra-contractual"
was the Russell Court's short-hand reference for a monetary
award that goes beyond the benefits the participant is entitled to
receive under the contractual terms of the plan. Russell held that
"extra-contractual" monetary awards are not available as a
remedy under Section 502(a)(2) of ERISA, which was the sole
statutory basis for relief asserted by the Russell plaintiff, because
in the context of Russell a monetary award was not "plan-wide"
relief.'
All nine Justices in Russell agreed with this interpretation of
the remedy available under Section 502(a)(2)." The Justices were
sharply divided (5-4) over whether such a monetary award to the
participant might be available under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA.48
Eight years after Russell, the Supreme Court addressed the
types of "equitable" relief available under Section 502(a)(3) in
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates."7 The precise question before the
Supreme Court in Mertens was whether a remedy of money
damages was available under Section 502(a)(3). The majority, in a
5-4 decision, ruled that the damages remedy requested by the
participants was not available under Section 502(a)(3) because
"[mioney damages are, of course, the classic form of legal relief."'
Writing for the majority in Mertens, Justice Scalia found that
Congress purposefully used the word "equitable" to limit the
remedies available under Section 502(a)(3) to exclude monetary

483. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
484. Id. at 139-42.
485. Id. The plaintiff in Russell expressly disclaimed reliance on Section
502(a)(3) in asserting her claim. Id. at 139, n.5.
486. See id. at 150-54 (Brennan, J., concurring).
487. 508 U.S. 248, 257 (1993). The need to define "equitable" relief did not
arise in Russell because Section 502(a)(2) authorizes both legal and equitable
relief. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2), 1109(a) (2000).
488. 508 U.S. at 255 (emphasis in original).
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damages, which were classified as "legal" relief." Justice White,
the author of the dissenting opinion in Mertens, offered an
alternative explanation of the statutory text. He proposed that
Congress have used the term "equitable" to exclude punitive
damages from Section 502(a)(3), while still permitting monetary
awards as a formal equitable "make-whole" relief.49 °
Justice White's proposed interpretation of the statutory
language has subsequently been corroborated by the insider
eyewitness account of the late Michael Gordon, who was appointed
to serve as minority counsel to the Senate Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare from 1970 to 1975. In a letter to the authors of
the ERISA Litigation Reporter, Mr. Gordon stated:
In Mertens, Scalia derides the notion that Congress wrote Section
502(a) the way it did because it was concerned about punitive
damages. He is wrong. In Russell, Stevens notes that the Senate
version of ERISA referred to both legal and equitable remedies but
the last version passed by the House and accepted in the ERISA
Conference deleted the reference to legal remedies, the implication
being-since ERISA is a "comprehensive and reticulated" statutethat punitive damages were being excluded. He is also wrong; the
matter was being fudged. Why was the matter being fudged?...
Certain key legislators in both the Senate and House felt that if
ERISA automatically provided access to punitive damages relief, it
would send a signal that Congress thought the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 should provide the same relief and that
Congress would overturn any court decision that ruled otherwise.
Of course, that possibility would create another cross for ERISA to
bear as opponents of ERISA were, as we know, looking for any
opportunity at hand to stop the bill's enactment. This meant that
the references in Section 502(a) to "legal" relief had to be deleted.
However, from the viewpoint of Senator Javits (and yours truly), the
deletion of "legal" relief did not mean there would never be access to
punitive damages under ERISA. In New York, then regarded as the
most important jurisdiction in terms of state jurisprudential
leadership, the merger of law and equity had proceeded quite
rapidly and the highest New York appellate court had ruled that
punitive damages could be awarded by a court of equity in
appropriate cases. The New York position could be harmonized with
the political imperative of avoiding embroiling the ERISA conferees
in yet another potentially ruinous dispute ....

[To tihose who

understood the trend toward the law-equity merger, it meant that
they would not be totally abandoning their desire to preserve access
to punitive damages relief; it only meant that access to such relief
would be provided infrequently and only under the most compelling
circumstances. There was nothing wrong with that. Even with
489. Id. at 255-58.
490. See id. at 270-73 (White, J. dissenting).
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Scalia's views on legislative history and the role of staff, none of the
foregoing has any official standing or legal significance. But it does
unofficially reinforce the suspicion that Scalia is off the mark in
holding fast to the myth that the ERISA authors only intended to
enact "typical" equitable remedies and that they rejected the lawequity merger process, then at its peak.49'
Following Mertens, in Varity Corp. v. Howe492 the Supreme
Court acknowledged that a wrongful denial of plan benefits under
Section 502(a)(1)(B) also was a breach of fiduciary duty that could
give rise to a claim for additional equitable relief under Section
502(a)(3). 493 The Varity Court concluded that "normally" further
relief under Section 502(a)(3) would not be appropriate, given that
Congress explicitly had authorized a remedy under Section
502(a)(1)(B).494 But the Supreme Court's statements in Russell and
Varity do not preclude awarding additional monetary relief under
Section 502(a)(3) in extraordinary cases of harm or hardship to the
participant resulting from a plan administrators' wrongful denial
of plan benefits.
The real obstacle to such a monetary award under Section
502(a)(3) is, I suspect, the perceived risk of a judicial slippery
slope. It is certainly possible that using Section 502(a)(3) to make
the participant whole might result in a legal effect judicial slippery
slope,495 where awarding additional monetary relief based on a
make-whole standard becomes the "normal" rule any time a
plaintiff successfully brings a claim for wrongfully denied benefits
under Section 502(a)(1)(B).
In addressing the potential risk of a judicial slippery slope,
Professor Eugene Volokh's theory of slippery slope counter
mechanisms is again instructive."
Fundamentally, it is the
statutory basis for the plaintiffs primary claim that forms a sound
basis for drawing a distinction.
Make-whole relief is an
appropriate equitable remedy under Section 502(a)(3) when the
plaintiffs primary claim is based on a violation of a fiduciary
responsibility provision of ERISA. "9 ' In contrast, the statutory
basis of the participant's primary claim for wrongfully denied
benefits is Section 502(a)(1)(B). 99
It is only after the plaintiff's
claim under Section 502(a)(1)(B) has been proven successfully by
the plaintiffthat the possibility of additional relief, in the form of a

491. Supreme Court Announces That It Was Not Kidding, supra note 96, at 68 (citations omitted).
492. 516 U.S. 489, 514-15 (1996).
493. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.a.
494. 516 U.S. at 515.
495. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
496. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
497. See Langbein, supra note 13, at 1319-20.
498. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
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monetary award based on a make-whole standard, would arise
under Section 502(a)(3).
Monetary make-whole relief normally would be awarded in
any case where the plaintiffs primary claim is for a breach of
fiduciary responsibility by the defendant. In contrast, where the
plaintiffs primary claim is a wrongful denial of plan benefits, the
normal remedy under Varity would be the remedy offered by
Section 502(a)(1)(B), which is limited to the payment of benefits
that should have been paid based on the terms of the plan. Only
in "extraordinary" cases would additional monetary relief be
awarded under Section 502(a)(3) to a plaintiff who was injured
personally by a denied claim for plan benefits.
This claim-based distinction negates the risk of a legal effect
judicial slippery slope. Yet there remains the problem of potential
equality/administrative cost judicial slippery slope.499 This type of
slippery slope risk arises if federal judges are unable to
distinguish "normal" denial of benefits cases (where the "normal"
remedy would be limited to the payment of benefits due under
Section 502(a)(1)(B)) from "extraordinary" denial of benefits cases
(where additional monetary relief could be awarded under Section
502(a)(3)). I propose that this risk can be reduced to a tolerable
level through definitive guidance to the lower federal courts in
future Supreme Court opinions.
Such definitive guidance should begin with the statutory
language of Section 502(a)(3). To award an additional monetary
award under Section 502(a)(3), an additional remedy beyond the
limited remedy provided by Section 502(a)(1)(B) must be
"appropriate." To determine whether an additional award is
"appropriate" under Section 502(a)(3), the federal courts first
should consider whether a state law claim, such as a medical
malpractice claim, is available to the participant. The federal
courts should consider further whether, if successful, a state law
claim could result in a damages award that may compensate the
participant for all or part of the participant's injuries. Clearly, if
the participant also has a viable claim under state law, an award
of additional monetary relief under Section 502(a)(3) could be
duplicative, and therefore would not be considered "appropriate."
In cases where a state law claim and remedy are not available
to the participant, the plaintiff-participant should bear the burden
of proving that additional monetary relief under Section 502(a)(3)
To determine whether the participant has
is "appropriate."
satisfied this burden of proof, the federal courts should weigh and
balance the potential for discouraging and deterring employers
from voluntarily sponsoring benefit plans (the cost-minimization

499. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
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and settler-function policies) against the following factors (which
serve as indicia of the benefit protection policy):
(1) the gravity of the economic loss and personal injury
caused by the plan administrator's wrongful denial of plan
benefits to the participant;
(2) whether the participant's injuries were foreseeable;
(3) the degree of abuse of fiduciary discretion by the plan
administrator in denying the participant's claim for benefits;
(4) whether the plan administrator's exercise of fiduciary
discretion was tainted by a pecuniary conflict of interest, or in
the more egregious cases, whether there was a pattern and
practice of systematically denying claims;"° and
(5) the potential future deterrent effect of an additional
monetary award.
The fifth factor, the potential deterrent effect of an additional
award, reflects a balancing of ERISA's competing policy goals. An
additional monetary award in cases involving a high degree of
fiduciary abuse in interpreting the terms of the plan would
promote ERISA's benefit-protection policy by deterring such
conduct in the future. The policy argument against an additional
monetary award under Section 502(a)(3) centers around ERISA's
cost-minimization policy. In considering this fifth factor, there are
several considerations that may render a cost-minimization policy
argument less compelling.
First, Varity instructs that normally the remedy under
Section 502(a)(1)(B) will "normally" be adequate."' Second, the
pool of cases that potentially will qualify for consideration of an
additional monetary award under Section 502(a)(3) will be limited
to situations where an adequate remedy is not available under
state law, and where severe bodily injury or serious economic
harm to the participant that was foreseeable has resulted from the
wrongfully denied claim for plan benefits. Third, the risk of an
additional monetary award that is disproportionate to the degree
of abuse of fiduciary discretion by the plan administrator in
denying the participant's claim for benefits and the severity of the
participant's resulting injuries is low. If additional monetary
500. For example, a pattern and practice by the insurer of systematically
denying claims has been found in the context of claims for long-term disability
plan benefits. See Radford Trust v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 321 F.
Supp. 2d 226, 247-49 (D. Mass. 2004).
501. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.a.
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relief under Section 502(a)(3) is characterized as "equitable," then
a jury trial is not available. ° Rather, the amount of an additional
monetary award will be determined by a federal district court
judge at the conclusion of a bench trial for the participant's claims.
Moreover, the district court's monetary. award will be subject to

502. The Seventh Amendment provides that "[iun suits at common law.. .the
right of trial by jury shall be preserved." U.S. Const. amend. VII. The
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial extends to "actions enforcing
[federal] statutory rights, and requires a jury trial upon demand, if the state
creates legal rights and remedies, enforceable in an action for damages in the
ordinary courts of law." Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 194 (1974). To
determine whether a claim under a federal statute involves legal rights and
remedies, the Supreme Court engages in a two-step analysis. The first step is
to compare "the statutory action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts
of England prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity." Teamsters
Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 567, 565 (1990). The second step is to
"examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in
nature." Id. Of these two steps, the Supreme Court weighs the second one
more heavily in its analysis. Id.
The Supreme Court has never addressed expressly the right to a jury
trial for claims under ERISA. In Great-West, the Supreme Court stated that
"restitution is a legal remedy when ordered in a case at law and an equitable
remedy. .. when ordered in an equity case, and whether it is legal or equitable
depends on the basis for the plaintiffs claim and the nature of the underlying
remedies sought." Great-West Annuity & Life Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S.
204, 213 (2002) (quoting Reich v. Continental Casualty Co., 33 F.3d 754, 756
(7th Cir. 1994)). This statement suggests that claims under Section 502(a)(3)
seeking monetary relief, either as restitution or as make-whole relief based on
the common law of trusts, would not be subject to a jury trial.
Further support for the conclusion that a jury trial right is not available
for claims brought under Section 502(a)(3) is found in the historical evolution
of the common law courts of chancery. At early common law, enforcement of
the terms of a trust agreement by a chancery court of equity, rather than by a
court of law, evolved in part as a response to the procedural weaknesses
inherent in cases tried before a jury.
See John H. Langbein, The
ContractarianBasis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L. J. 625, 635 (1995). For
example, at early common law the parties to civil litigation were disqualified
from testifying before the jury due to their self-interest in the outcome of the
litigation. Id. at 635. As Professor Langbein notes, in the case of a dispute
over interpretation or enforcement of the terms of a trust, such "a rule would
have silenced most of the relevant persons in a trust case." Id. In contrast, a
court of equity could hear such testimony in cases involving the enforcement of
the terms of the trust. Id. at 635-36.
Claims concerning trust administration historically were resolved by a
chancery court judge, not by a jury. "Questions of the administration of trusts
have always been regarded as of a kind which can adequately be dealt with in
a suit at equity rather than in an action at law, where questions of fact would
be determined by a jury and not by the court." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (1959); RESTATEMENT OF TRUSTS § 197 cmt. b (1935).
This is not to say that principles of contract law are irrelevant to the
enforcement of the terms of the trust; rather, the issue concerns who the trier
of fact - judge or jury - will be in resolving these disputes. See Langbein,
supra, at 648-50.
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further appellate review by the federal appellate courts, and
ultimately by the Supreme Court.
A closely related argument to the cost-minimization policy is
the risk that the possibility of additional monetary relief will perk
the interest of the plaintiffs' tort bar and provide a financial
incentive for more claims for wrongfully denied benefits to be filed
on behalf of plan participants under Section 502(a)(1)(B). In and
of itself, an increase in the number of such claims is not
necessarily an undesirable outcome for the employee benefits
system. The emergence of a plaintiffs' ERISA bar, and with it the
possibility of more skillful challenges to wrongfully denied claims
for plan benefits, would provide an incentive for plan
administrators to improve the quality of their decision-making
process in processing and reviewing claims for plan benefits.
Increased litigation certainly can lead to increased
administrative costs. Some additional costs inevitably will result
because, in a close case, the plan administrator may decide to
approve the claim for benefits. The federal courts should not be
concerned with this type of increased administrative cost, which
implicitly reflects a balancing of numerous factors by the plan
administrator. Such factors would include the cost of the claimed
benefit, the merits of the participant's claim, the possible damages
if the claim is denied and if the participant suffers personal injury
or economic loss as a result, and the standard of judicial review
under Section 502(a)(1)(B).
Some degree of additional administrative cost attributable
solely to litigation expenses could result due to claims that are
above the Rule 11 standard"° for sanctions, but that are clearly not
sufficient to overcome the Firestone abuse of discretion standard of
These
judicial review for the plan administrator's decision."
increased administrative costs can be curtailed by the federal
courts through an award of attorney's fees to the plan
administrator as the prevailing defendant in a Section 502(a)(1)(B)
case. Such an attorney's fee award is expressly authorized by
ERISA Section 502(g)(i), which provides that "the court in its
discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action
to eitherparty.50 5 Although the current judicial practice in ERISA
litigation is to award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant only
in rare instances, more frequent attorney's fees awards to a
prevailing plan administrator would deter relatively weak claims
under Section 502(a)(1)(B).

503. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
504. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108-115 (1989)
(outlining judicial standards for reviewing plan administrators' decisions).
505. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
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4. Reconciling PriorSupreme Court Decisions with the Model
Results and the ERISA Policy Triangle
Precedent is important for maintaining the stability of
ERISA's voluntary system of employer-sponsored pension and
welfare benefit plans. The Supreme Court's prior experience in
successfully adopting a "fresh start" for judicial interpretation of
another difficult statutory provision under title I of ERISA, the
preemption of state law under Section 514(a),"
provides
encouraging evidence that a shift in the judicial approach to
determining "appropriate equitable relief' under Section 502(a)(3)
can be implemented without significant disruption to the employee
benefit plan system.
Throughout the Article, I have attempted to demonstrate the
points at which the results of the modeling exercise touched on
prior Supreme Court precedents. The chart below summarizes the
six categories of defendantsand related claims generated by the
modeling exercise, along with their corresponding Supreme Court
precedents.
CATEGOR

DEFENDANT/CLAIM

SUPREME COURT

Employee Benefit Plan/
Plan Design Requirements
Employer/Retaliation

Heinz (2004)
Inter-Modal (1997)

Employer/Improper Plan
Amendment Procedure

Curtiss-Wright
(1995)

Y

I

II

CASE

Employer/Inurement of
Plan Assets
III
IV
V

VI

Fiduciary/Breach of
Fiduciary Responsibility
Participant/Enforce Plan
Terms
Party in Interest/Knowing
Participation in a Breach of
Fiduciary Duty or Prohibited
Transaction
Third Party/Knowing
Participation
in a Breach of Fiduciary Duty
or Prohibited Transaction or
Violation of Plan Terms

506. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(2000).

Hughes Aircraft
(1999)
Varity (1996)
Great-West (2004)
Sereboff (2006)
Mertens (1993)
HarrisTrust (2000)

None
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Close examination of the Supreme Court decisions listed in
the above chart shows that these prior precedents do not preclude
the Supreme Court from adopting the fresh approach proposed in
the Article. A few key points warrant further elaboration.
In Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,"' the Supreme Court rejected
what was essentially a request for a monetary award measured by
a make-whole relief standard. The plaintiffs in Mertens sought a
monetary award against the defendant actuarial firm that would
restore the plan's funding deficit. Given that Mertens was a
Category V claim against a nonfiduciary party in interest, the
Supreme Court in Mertens correctly rejected a make-whole relief
The ERISA Policy Triangle
standard for monetary relief."8
suggests that a restitution standard for monetary relief is the
appropriate equitable remedy for a Category V claim against a
nonfiduciary party in interest. 509
Harris Trust and Savings Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney51
also involved a Category V claim against a nonfiduciary party in
interest. The parties in Harris Trust agreed that the plaintiffs
requested remedies of "rescission of the transaction, restitution
from [the defendant] Salomon of the purchase price with interest,
and disgorgement of Salomon's profits made from use of the plan
assets transferred to it" were all "equitable" within the meaning of
Section 502(a)(3) as defined in Mertens.' All of these remedies
focused on preventing the unjust enrichment of the defendant, and
therefore are consistent with a restitution standard for a monetary
award.
The Supreme Court has never addressed whether a makewhole relief standard for a monetary award is available under
Section 502(a)(3) for a Category III claim against a fiduciary for
breach of fiduciary responsibilities. In Massachusetts Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Russell,512 the issue of the remedies available
under Section 502(a)(3) simply was not before the Supreme Court.
In Varity Corporationv. Howe,5 3 the Supreme Court's focus was on
whether the plaintiffs' claim for individual relief was authorized
by Section 502(a)(3)." 4 The defendant in Varity had conceded that
the remedy awarded to the plaintiffs by the district court was
"equitable" under Section 502(a)(3).515

507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.

508 U.S. 248 (1993).
See id. at 250-51, 263.
See discussion supra Part III.D.3.a.
530 U.S. 238 (2000).
Id. at 243.
73 U.S. 134 (1985).
516 U.S. 489 (1996).
See id. at 507-15.

515. See id. at 508.
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Much of the Supreme Court's discussion in Varity concerning
the validity of the plaintiffs' Category III claim under Section
502(a)(3) was centered around ERISA's grounding in the common
law of trusts and ERISA's benefit-protection policy.51
This
discussion strongly suggests that a make-whole relief standard, a
standard that originated under the common law of trusts for a
trustee's breach of fiduciary duty, is the appropriate measure for a
monetary award for a Category III claim.517
Great-West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson..8
suggested that the equitable lien and the constructive trust are
available as forms of equitable restitution under Section
520
502(a)(3),"'9 and Sereboff v. Mid Atlantic Medical Services, Inc.
explicitly verified this conclusion. 521 Both the equitable lien and
the constructive trust are restitutionary devices designed to
prevent the unjust enrichment of the defendant. 22 These remedies
are consistent with ERISA's balancing of policy interests for
claims against participants (Category IV), claims against a
nonfiduciary party in interest (Category V), and claims against
third parties (Category VI).
The majority and dissenting opinions in Great-West also
debated the implications of equitable relief under Section 502(a)(3)
for a Category II claim for unlawful retaliation under Section
510."3 This debate was premature, and could easily be dismissed
in a subsequent opinion as yet another instance where the
Supreme Court was merely "flagging the
issue" of possible
24
remedies available under Section 502(a)(3).1
In short, stare decisis is not an insurmountable obstacle to
resolving the judicial paradox of "equitable" relief under Section
502(a)(3). The Supreme Court may adopt a fresh approach to
judicial interpretation of the claims and remedies available under
Section 502(a)(3), while at the same time preserving the core of its
prior precedents.
IV. CONCLUSION

A better theory for determining "appropriate equitable relief"
under Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA is sorely needed. The Supreme
516. See id. at 507-15.
517. See discussion supra Part III.D.3.a.
518. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
519. See id. at 213-14.
520. 126 S. Ct. 1869 (2006).
521. See id. at 1875.
522. See discussion supra Part III.D.3.c.
523. Compare Great-West, 534 U.S. at 218, n. 4 (Scalia, J.) (discussing
equitable relief), with Great-West at 230, n. 2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(discussing equitable relief).
524. See Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, 530 U.S. 238,
249 (2000) (correcting prior erroneous dictum in Mertens).
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Court's law-equity paradigm negates ERISA's protections for plan
participants, thereby eroding the confidence of employees in the
modern employee benefits system. The law-equity paradigm
simultaneously discourages employers from offering benefits to
their employees by making their benefit plans more costly to
sponsor and administer. Ultimately, the law-equity paradigm has
led to judicial decisions under Section 502(a)(3) that contravene
Congress's intent to provide a uniform body of federal standards to
govern employee benefit plans upon which plan participants and
employers alike can depend.
Rather than looking to Congress for a solution, the Supreme
Court should acknowledge that relying upon the traditional
distinctions between remedies available at law and in equity has
produced less than satisfactory results for claims brought under
Section 502(a)(3) of ERISA. Just as the Supreme Court has
modified its approach to interpreting ERISA preemption of state
law under Section 514(a), the Supreme Court should adopt a fresh
approach to interpretation of "appropriate equitable relief'
available under Section 502(a)(3).
This Article presents an alternative statutory and policybased theory for judicial interpretation of the remedies authorized
by Section 502(a)(3). The Article demonstrates how the Supreme
Court may, consistent with the statutory scheme and the Court's
own prior precedents, use this proposed alternative theory to
resolve the judicial paradox of "equitable" relief available under
Section 502(a)(3).
The statutory and policy-based theory described in the Article
further provides a starting point for Congress, if it so chooses, to
develop legislation to modernize the private civil claims and
remedies available under title I of ERISA. When ERISA was
enacted in 1974, it was reasonable for Congress to frame Section
502(a)(3) as a catch-all remedies provision to deal with
unanticipated claims and remedies that inevitably would arise
under the newly created federal system of regulation for employee
benefit plans. Now, with the benefit of over thirty years of
experience, Congress is sufficiently informed to once again take up
the issue of ERISA claims and remedies in light of the modern
world of retirement and health care plans. As discussed in Part II
of the article, this modern world looks very different than the
system that existed in 1974.
Whether Congress has the political will to take up this task,
however, is less clear. The preferred approach, advocated by this
Article, is for the Supreme Court itself to resolve the judicial
paradox of "equitable" relief under Section 502(a)(3).
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APPENDIX A
FEDERAL COMMON LAW CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 502(A)(3)
In conducting the modeling .exercise, I excluded federal
common law claims from the universe of possible claims that could
be brought under Section 502(a)(3). My reasons for excluding
federal common law claims were based on the statutory language
and structure and the potential implications for the doctrine of
complete preemption. Upon closer examination of various types of
federal common law claims, I further concluded that such claims
are either unnecessary or an illegitimate attempt to circumvent
the statutory scheme of fiduciary liability established by title I of
ERISA.
a.

Statutory Language

The statutory text underlying Section 502(a)(3) was my first
reason for excluding federal common law claims. The language of
Section 502(a)(3) is clear that the nature of the claim must be
limited to a violation of a statutory provision of title I of ERISA or
a violation of plan terms.' Thus, the plain language of the statute
appeared to preclude any claim not founded expressly on one of
these two bases.
To confirm this reading of the statutory text, I examined the
legislative history of ERISA and concluded that it does not support
the assertion that Section 502(a)(3) creates federal common law
claims. Rather, the focus of the legislative history is on the
development of remedies by the federal courts, particularly in the
context of claims for breach of ERISA fiduciary responsibilities.2
This interpretation of Section 502(a)(3) as precluding implied
federal common law claims is consistent with statements made by
the Supreme Court in Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Russell3 and Mertens v. Hewitt Associates.4
In Russell, the
Supreme Court rejected the possibility that a cause of action could
be implied under Section 502(a)(2) of ERISA, explaining that:
1. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (2000).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4639,
4655 ("The enforcement provisions have been designed specifically to provide
both the Secretary and participants and beneficiaries with broad remedies for

redressing or preventing violations of the Act... [and] provide the full range of
legal and equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts and to
remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles."); S. REP. No. 93-127 (1973),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4838, 4871 (stating the same purpose as its
counterpart in the House).
3. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
4. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
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[tihe six carefully integrated civil enforcement provisions found in
§ 502(a) of the statute as finally enacted, however, provide strong
evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies
that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly. The assumption of
inadvertent omission is rendered especially suspect upon close
consideration
of ERISA's
interlocking,
interrelated,
and
interdependent remedial scheme, which is in turn part of a
"comprehensive and reticulated statute." We are reluctant to
tamper with an enforcement scheme crafted with such evident care
as the one in ERISA.5
In Mertens, the Supreme Court affirmed that the reasoning of

Russell applied with equal force under Section 502(a)(3).
In Russell we emphasized our unwillingness to infer causes of action
in the ERISA context, since that statute's carefully crafted and
detailed enforcement scheme provides "strong evidence that
Congress did not intend to authorize
other remedies that it simply
6
forgot to incorporate expressly."

b. The Complete Preemption Doctrine and Implied Claims Under
Section 502(a)(3)
My second reason for excluding federal common law claims
from the modeling exercise was based on the potential
implications for the doctrine of complete preemption. Normally,
the well-pleaded complaint rule bars removal of a state law claim
filed in state court to federal court where a federal question is not
present on the face of the plaintiffs complaint.7 The doctrine of
complete preemption recognizes as an exception to the wellpleaded complaint rule "that Congress may so completely pre-empt
a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group
of claims is necessarily federal in character," and therefore
removal to federal court is appropriate based on federal question
jurisdiction!
Complete preemption issues arise when the plaintiff is
asserting a state law claim that could be asserted under one of the
civil enforcement provisions of Section 502(a) of ERISA. 9 To date,
the Supreme Court has addressed the doctrine of complete
preemption under ERISA only in the context of state law claims
that could have been brought as claims asserting a wrongful

5. Russell, 473 U.S. at 146-47 (italics in original) (quoting Nachman Corp. v.

Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)).
7. See Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908).

8. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2000); see Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S.
200, 209 (2004) (stating that any state law claim that duplicates the ERISA

civil enforcement remedy is pre-empted because it conflicts with Congress'
intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive).
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denial of plan benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B)."' The Supreme
Court has yet to directly address the doctrine of complete
preemption in the context of state law claims that could have been
brought under Section 502(a)(3).
In Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon," the Supreme Court
suggested that, if squarely faced with the issue, the Court would
rule that the doctrine of complete preemption also applied to
claims under Section 502(a)(3). The Ingersoll-Rand Court relied in
part upon Section 502(a)(3) for support of its conclusion that
Section 514(a) of ERISA1 preempted a wrongful discharge claim
under Texas state law. The Supreme Court reasoned that the
state law claim "conflicted" with a Section 510 claim for
retaliation, a violation which gives rise to a claim under Section
502(a)(3). 3 The Supreme Court in Ingersoll-Rand emphasized the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts to hear claims under
Section 502(a)(3), and also cited Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor" as further support for its preemption analysis. 5
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's written opinion in
Ingersoll-Rand lacked the magical words "complete preemption."
The lower federal circuits subsequently have become divided over
whether the doctrine of complete preemption applies to a state law
claim that could have been brought as a claim under Section
502(a)(3).' 6
The case for application of the complete preemption doctrine
in the Section 502(a)(3) setting appears to be even more
compelling than for Section 502(a)(1)(B) claims. Section 502(e)(1)
of ERISA, 17 which grants the federal courts exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction over Section 502(a)(3) claims, indicates that a
state law claim filed in state courts that could have been brought
as a claim under Section 502(a)(3) is removable to federal court
under the complete preemption doctrine. Quite simply, why would
Congress choose to completely preempt claims under Section
502(a)(1)(B), over which state and federal courts have dual subject

10. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2000); see Davila, 542 U.S. at 209; Taylor, 481

U.S. at 62-63.
11. 498 U.S. 133, 145 (1990).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
13. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 142-45.
14. 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987).
15. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 144-45.
16. Compare Wood v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 207 F.3d 674, 678 (3d Cir.
2000) (holding that complete preemption applies to a claim under Section 510)
and Anderson v. Elec. Data Systems Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1994)
(stating that complete preemption applies to claims under Sections 502(a)(2)
and 502(a)(3)) with Lupo v. Human Affairs Int'l, Inc., 28 F.3d 269, 273 (2d Cir.
1994) (stating that complete preemption is limited to claims under Section
502(a)(1)(B)).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1) (2000).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[39:827

matter jurisdiction under Section 502(e)(1), and yet not intend to
completely preempt claims under Section 502(a)(3), over which the
federal courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction?
The better statutory interpretation, based on Congress's grant
of exclusively federal subject matter jurisdiction over claims
brought under Section 502(a)(3), is to apply the doctrine of
complete preemption to Section 502(a)(3) claims. Adding federal
common law claims to the universe of possible Section 502(a)(3)
claims, therefore, potentially would expand the number and types
of state law-based claims, originally filed in state courts, that a
state court defendant could remove to federal court under the
doctrine of complete preemption. The potential for unwarranted
judicial expansion of the doctrine of complete preemption provided
further support for excluding federal common law claims from the
universe of possible claims under Section 502(a)(3).
c.

Unnecessary or Illegitimate Federal Common Law Claims
My third reason for excluding the federal common law claims
from the modeling exercise was based on a close examination of
several of the more prevalent types of federal common law claims
that have been asserted in federal court litigation. The federal
common law claims I examined were:
(i)

equitable estoppel;

(ii)

specific performance;

(iii)

vicarious (respondeat superior) liability; and

(iv)
not a

contribution or indemnification against a person who is
fiduciary.

For the reasons discussed below, none of these federal
common law claims presented a persuasive case for recognizing
federal common law claims under Section 502(a)(3).
i.

Equitable Estoppel

The federal common law claim of equitable estoppel
originated prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Varity Corp. v.
Howe."8 Prior to Varity, it was unclear whether a breach of
fiduciary duty claim could be brought for individual (as opposed to
plan-wide) relief under Section 502(a)(3). 9
Post-Varity, the
18. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
19. Slice v. Sons of Norway, 34 F.3d 630, 635 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding that
employee failed to state a claim for equitable estoppel in a claim adjustment of
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fiduciary's duty to act prudently in providing information to plan
participants concerning the administration of the plan and its
benefits provides a statutory basis under Section 404(a)(1)(B)' for
pleading this type of claim as a breach of the fiduciary's statutory
duty of prudence."'
More recent cases addressing equitable estoppel under
Section 502(a)(3) have characterized equitable estoppel as a
remedy available under Section 502(a)(3), rather than as a federal
common law claim." The purpose of characterizing equitable
estoppel as an equitable remedy under Section 502(a)(3) is to avoid
the paradoxical result that an adequate remedy otherwise may not
be available under Section 502(a)(3) for the plaintiffs injury.
Resolving the judicial paradox of equitable remedies under Section

benefits after computation error overpaid benefits because the employee failed
to establish that the estoppel would merely hold his employer to a plausible
interpretation of the plan, rather than a modification); Coleman v. Nationwide
Life Ins. Co., 969 F.2d 54, 60-61 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding that employee's suit
for employer's non-payment of benefit premiums could not be based on
estoppel because it was preempted); Miller v. Coastal Corp., 978 F.2d 622,
624-25 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that employee's claim that oral and written
representations, regarding credited service under pension plan failed because
an employee benefit plan could not be modified by informal communications);
Cefalu v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 871 F.2d 1290, 1295 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that
employee had no cause of action for estoppel in a breach of contract where
state employee benefits were preempted by ERISA); Degan v. Ford Motor Co.
869 F.2d 889, 894 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that ERISA preempted employees'
suit for breach of oral contract to pay early retirement benefits, and did not
allow an estoppel claim); Straub v. Western Union Tel. Co., 851 F.2d 1262,
1265-66 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that estoppel did not encompass oral
representations regarding the continuation of benefit plan under a
partnership sale because Congress did not intend for ERISA to incorporate
state law promissory estoppel); Davidian v. S. Cal. Meat Cutters Union &
Food Emp. Benefit Fund, 859 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
employee's estoppel claims in a suit for payment of major medical benefits for
surgery). See generally, COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE, 72-77 (2004) (summarizing the various

circuit approaches to estoppel claims).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000).
21. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 502-03, 506-07 (discussing nature of ERISA
fiduciary communications and remedies for individual beneficiaries); see also
discussion supra Article Part III C.3.c.ii. (discussing the parameters of the
fiduciary duty to inform).
22. The Third Circuit has expressly stated that it views equitable estoppel as
an additional remedy to the three equitable remedies of mandamus, injunctive
relief, and restitution identified in Mertens. In re Unisys Corp. Retiree
Medical Ben. ERISA Litig., 58 F.3d 896, 907 n.22 (3d Cir. 1995). The Second
Circuit also appears to view equitable estoppel as an appropriate equitable
remedy under Section 502(a)(3) after Mertens. See Devlin v. Empire Blue
Cross and Blue Shield, 274 F.3d 76, 88-89 (2d Cir. 2001). The Ninth Circuit
views Mertens as precluding an equitable estoppel remedy under Section
502(a)(3). Watkins v. Westinghouse Handford Co., 12 F.3d 1517, 1527-28 (9th
Cir. 1993).
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502(a)(3) by permitting make-whole relief for a breach of fiduciary
duty claim, a proposed solution that I discuss in Part III.D.3.a. of
the Article, eliminates the need for equitable estoppel as a remedy
as well.
ii. Specific Performance
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Great-West Life and
Annuity Insurance. Co. v. Knudson,2" plan administrators
attempted to assert the federal common law claim of specific
performance under Section 502(a)(3) as a means to enforce the
terms of a plan reimbursement clause against a plan participant.24
Characterizing the claim as one for specific performance (an
equitable theory under the law of contracts) neatly circumvented
the "rule" of Mertens v. Hewitt Associates2" that an award of money
damages was a form of legal relief not available under Section
502(a)(3).26
The majority opinion in Great-West appears to dismiss
"specific performance of a past due monetary obligation"
as a
remedy not "typically" available in equity, and therefore not
available as a remedy under Section 502(a)(3)." The Supreme
Court's subsequent decision in Sereboff v.Mid Atlantic Medical
Services, Inc.28 enables plan administrators to enforce the terms of
a plan reimbursement clause using the equitable remedy of an
equitable lien or a constructive trust.29 If construed in a flexible
manner by the federal courts, permitting an equitable lien or a
constructive trust as an equitable remedy under Section 502(a)(3)
will eliminate the need for a plan administrator to assert a federal
common law claim of specific performance. Instead, the plan
administrator may assert a claim to enforce the terms of the plan,
a claim that is expressly authorized by the plain language of
Section 502(a)(3).
iii. Vicarious (RespondeatSuperior)FiduciaryLiability
Another prevalent federal common law claim is the vicarious
(respondeat superior) fiduciary liability claim. Under the common
law, "respondeat superior is a 'judge-made doctrine, applicable to
most tort cases. . ., that makes an employer liable even if faultless

23. 534 U.S. 204 (2002).
24. See Administrative Comm. v. Gauf, 188 F.3d 767, 770-71 (7th Cir. 1999);
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347, 1353 n.5 (11th
Cir. 1998).
25. 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
26. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 218
(2002).
27. Id. at 211-12.
28. 126 S.Ct.1869 (2006).
29. See id. at 1875.
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for the torts its employees commit in the course of their
employment.' 29
In the ERISA context, a vicarious fiduciary
liability claim is asserted as a means of making a person (the
"principal"), who is a not otherwise a fiduciary with respect to a
plan, liable for a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA committed
by an agent of the principal.
Vicarious fiduciary liability has become a fashionable claim in
litigation concerning company stock held in the employer's 401(k)
plan. In these 401(k) plan cases, the implied claim asserted under
Section 502(a)(3) is that the company who sponsors the plan is
liable as an entity under a theory of vicarious fiduciary liability for
the actions of a company director, officer, or employee who is a
plan fiduciary and who breached a fiduciary duty under ERISA.3"
Vicarious fiduciary liability claims are possible in a variety of
factual circumstances32 and the case law in this area is still

29. Howell v. Motorola, Inc., 337 F.Supp. 2d 1079, 1093 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(quoting Gernetzke v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1, 274 F.3d 464, 467-68
(7th Cir. 2001)).
31. See eg., DiFelice v. US Airways, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 2d 758 (E.D. Va.
2005); In re Westar Energy, Inc., ERISA Litig., No. 03-4032, 2005 WL 2403832
(D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2005); Pietrangelo v. NUI Corp., No. 04-3223, 2005 WL
1703200 (D.N.J. July 20, 2005); In re Sprint Corp. ERISA Litig., 388 F.Supp.
2d 1207 (D. Kan. 2004); Howell, 337 F.Supp. 2d 1079; In re Reliant Energy
ERISA Litig., 336 F.Supp. 2d 646 (S.D. Tex. 2004); In re AEP ERISA Litig.,
327 F.Supp. 2d 812 (S.D. Ohio 2004); Kling v. Fidelity Mgmt. Trust Co., 323
F.Supp. 2d 132 (D. Mass. 2004); In re Elec. Data Sys. Corp. "ERISA" Litig.,
305 F.Supp. 2d 658 (E.D. Tex. 2004); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivation &
ERISA Litig., 284 F.Supp. 2d 511 (S.D. Tex. 2003); In re Worldcom, Inc.
ERISA Litig., 263 F.Supp. 2d 745 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (allowing plaintiffs to raise
vicarious liability causes of action).
32. See Hamilton v. Carell, 243 F.3d 992, 1001-03 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding
that defendant corporation and individual comptroller who made investments
for the plaintiff's trust fund could not be held liable for breach of fiduciary
duty because those actions were outside the scope of discretionary acts of the
plan administration under ERISA); Nat'l Football Scouting, Inc. v. Cont'l
Assurance Co., 931 F.2d 646, 649 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that lower court
erred in holding that defendant individual was not an agent of the defendant
corporation, who converted funds that were entrusted to it by the plaintiff for
a pension investment fund); Am. Fed'n. of Unions Local 1002 Health &
Welfare Fund v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 841 F.2d 658, 663 (5th Cir.
1988) (finding insurance agent who was serving as administrator of plaintiffs
fund liable as fiduciary for claims paid to ineligible people and commissions on
illegitimate claims approved); In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 403 F. Supp. 2d
434, 448 (D. Md. 2005) (holding that denial of fiduciary duty under respondeat
superior was an inappropriate affirmative defense at motion to dismiss stage,
but that such a defense would be unlikely); Crowley v. Corning, Inc., 234
F.Supp. 2d 222, 228-29 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding sponsor of stock had no
responsibility to administer the plan and no fiduciary duty to the retireeplaintiff); Tool v. Nat'l Employee Benefit Services, Inc. 957 F.Supp. 1114, 1121
(N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that to expand the definition of fiduciary to include
insurance company on respondeat superior contradicted strict constructions of
ERISA liability provisions).
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nascent. An examination of this developing body of law reveals
that vicarious fiduciary liability claims appear to cluster in two
groups. Many vicarious fiduciary liability claims appear to be
unnecessary because these claims can be recast as statutory
claims under title I of ERISA. A claim can be recast either as a
breach of the fiduciary's duty to prudently select and monitor
individuals (whether fiduciaries or not) who assist in the
administration of the plan under Section 404(a)(1)(B),' or as a
breach of a co-fiduciary duty under Section 405.. These statutorybased claims for breach of fiduciary and co-fiduciary duties often
are made in conjunction with vicarious fiduciary liability claims. 5
A vicarious fiduciary liability claim provides an alternative
basis for liability if the federal court determines that the principal
is not a fiduciary with respect to the plan, and therefore cannot be
liable for a breach of fiduciary or co-fiduciary duty. When the
principal is found not to be a fiduciary with respect to the plan,
however, a vicarious fiduciary liability claim functions as a
strategic subterfuge to impose ERISA fiduciary liability upon the
nonfiduciary principal.36 In this situation, the vicarious fiduciary
liability claim is an illegitimate attempt to circumvent the system
of fiduciary liability that Congress carefully crafted in designing
the fiduciary conduct and liability rules of title I of ERISA.37
iv. Contributionand IndemnificationAgainst a Nonfiduciary
Claims under Section 502(a)(3) for contribution or
indemnification brought by a plan fiduciary against a person who
is not a fiduciary under ERISA provide yet another example where
the plaintiff seeks to gain more federal rights than Congress
intended to create under ERISA. To understand why this is so, it
is helpful to step back and first view these claims in the greater
context of claims for contribution and indemnification among cofiduciaries that are brought under Section 502(a)(2)."
When one fiduciary of the plan sues a co-fiduciary for
contribution or indemnification, Section 502(a)(2) controls such
claims. The federal courts are divided over whether ERISA
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000); see Leigh v. Engle, 727 F.2d 113, 135

(7th Cir. 1984) (stating that fiduciaries responsible for selecting and retaining
plan administrators have a duty to monitor the actions of the administrators).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 1105 (2000).
35. See Bannistor v. Ullman, 287 F.3d 394, 407-08 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting
that the two claims are often brought together); Howell, 337 F.Supp. 2d at
1092-95; Kling, 323 F.Supp. 2d at 141-45.
36. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (2006) (defining fiduciary); Hamilton, 243
F.3d at 1001-03; Howell, 337 F. Supp.2d at 1093-95; Kling, 323 F. Supp. 2d at

145-47.
37. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 261-63 (1993) (rejecting
that an implied federal common law claim of vicarious fiduciary liability).
38. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (2000).
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permits federal common law claims for contribution and
indemnification among co-fiduciaries under Section 502(a)(2).39
The case for contribution and indemnification claims among cofiduciaries under Section 502(a)(2) appears to lack substantial
support in the statutory language of title I of ERISA and its
legislative history." Although such claims among co-trustees were
permitted under the common law of trusts, there are compelling
policy reasons to disallow co-fiduciary claims for contribution and
indemnification under ERISA.41
These claims among co-fiduciaries under Section 502(a)(2)
provide the context for analyzing the question of whether a
fiduciary may bring a federal common law claim for contribution
or indemnification against a nonfiduciary under Section 502(a)(3).
At least one federal circuit has suggested that a fiduciary may
bring a claim for contribution or indemnification against a
nonfiduciary under Section 502(a)(3).42
Given the fact that the case for contribution and
indemnification claims among co-fiduciaries is weak,' a claim
against a nonfiduciary for contribution or indemnification under
Section 502(a)(3) is even weaker. As with vicarious fiduciary
liability claims, permitting a federal common law claim under
Section 502(a)(3) for contribution and indemnification by a
fiduciary against a nonfiduciary would negate the system of
fiduciary liability that Congress carefully crafted in designing the
fiduciary conduct and liability rules of title I of ERISA."

39. Compare Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank/Md., 939 F.2d 12,
20 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that incorporating doctrines of contribution and
indemnity was appropriate) and Free v. Briody, 732 F.2d 1331, 1337 (7th Cir.
1984) with Call v. Sumitomo Bank of Cal., 881 F.2d 626, 631 (9th Cir. 1989)
(finding a contribution claim in favor of breaching fiduciary inappropriate).
40. See George Lee Flint, Jr. & Philip W. Moore, Jr., ERISA: A Co-Fiduciary
Has No Right to Contribution and Indemnity, 48 S.D. L. REV. 7, 48-50 (2003).
41. See Flint & Moore, supra Appendix A note 40, at 27-29, 50 (discussing
that allowing contribution and indemnity would interfere with the risk
allocation system set up by Congress).
42. See McDannold v. Star Bank, N.A., 261 F.3d 478, 485-87 (6th Cir. 2001)
(noting that there is a circuit split as to whether a fiduciary may bring a claim
against a nonfiduciary).
43. After an exhaustive review of all relevant material on the topic, Flint and
Moore conclude, in a compelling fashion, that ERISA should not permit claims
for contribution and indemnification among co-fiduciaries. See Flint & Moore,
supra Appendix A note 40, at 51 (noting that ERISA differs considerably from
traditional trust law). Rather than repeating their comprehensive analysis
here, I urge the reader to read their original article.
44. Flint & Moore, supra Appendix A note 40, at 50; see also Mertens v.
Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 261-263 (1993) (noting that ERISA
eliminated joint and several liability to reduce high insurance costs on ERISA
plans).
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APPENDIX B
THE PROBLEM OF INTERTWINED FIDUCIARY CLAIMS
To determine the potential impact of the problem of
intertwined fiduciary claims on the modeling exercise, I focused on
the following two questions:
(1) Why does a breach of fiduciary duty claim become
intertwined with the other four groups of claims that are
possible under Section 502(a)(3)?
(2) What makes a breach of fiduciary duty claim distinct from
each of the other four groups of claims that are possible under
Section 502(a)(3)?
My analysis and conclusions concerning these two questions
are described below.
a. Intertwined Group 1 Claims
Breach of fiduciary duty claims can become intertwined with
Group 1 claims because enforcement or implementation by a
fiduciary of a plan term that is illegal under ERISA's statutory
plan design requirements is itself a breach of the fiduciary's duty
of prudence. Enforcement or implementation of an illegal plan
term also is a breach of the fiduciary duty to disregard plan terms
that are inconsistent with the statutory provisions of title I of
ERISA. 1 Therefore, a breach of duty claim against a fiduciary who
administers an illegal plan term may accompany a Group 1 claim
challenging the legality of the plan term itself.
In these circumstances, the breach of fiduciary duty claim is
distinct from the Group 1 claim. The Group 1 claim challenges the
design of the plan itself as illegal under the statutory plan design
requirements of Title I of ERISA. In contrast, the breach of
fiduciary duty claim challenges the conduct of the plan fiduciary
who administers the illegal plan term when, under Section
404(a)(1)(D), the fiduciary had an affirmative fiduciary duty to
disregard it.'
Decisions by the employer concerning the design of the plan
are, under the settlor function doctrine, not subject to judicial
scrutiny as fiduciary conduct.3 Therefore, the employer's decisions
concerning plan design must be challenged directly as a Group 1
1. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000).
2. Id.
3. See discussion supra Article Part III.D.1.
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claim under title I of ERISA, or challenged indirectly through a
Group 3 claim for breach of fiduciary duty.
b. Intertwined Group 2 Claims
The types of claims in Group 2 may require the cooperation of
a fiduciary to implement fully the employer's illegal conduct that
gives rise to the Group 2 claim. The fiduciary's cooperation in the
employer's illegal act or conduct would result in the intertwining
of breach of fiduciary duty claims with Group 2 claims. For
example, the cooperation of the plan's fiduciary administrator is
necessary to deny plan benefits to a participant as part of an
illegal retaliatory employment action by the employer under
Section 510.'
The cooperation of the plan's administrator is
necessary to implement and administer an employer amendment
that was not enacted in accordance with the plan's stated
amendment procedure.5 Similarly, the cooperation of the plan's
fiduciary trustee is necessary for the employer to access the plan's
assets and use or distribute those assets for the benefit of the
employer in violation of the anti-inurement clause.'
In each of these situations, the breach of fiduciary duty claim
is distinct from the Group 2 claim. Group 2 claims are based on
statutory provisions that regulate the conduct of the employer
when the employer is not acting as a fiduciary. Group 2 claims are
unique under title I of ERISA because these claims can be brought
directly against the employer when the employer is not acting in a
fiduciary capacity with respect to the plan.' In contrast, a breach
of fiduciary duty claim targets the fiduciary's actions in
cooperating with and facilitating the employer's illegal conduct.
c.

Intertwined Group 4 Claims

A Group 4 claim for a violation of the prohibited transaction
rules may become intertwined with a breach of fiduciary duty
claim in two distinct situations. The first situation focuses on the
fiduciary with authority to cause the plan to engage in a
transaction involving plan assets (the "authorizing fiduciary").
The party in interest prohibited transaction rules prohibit the
authorizing fiduciary from causing the plan to engage in a
transaction if the fiduciary "knows or should know" that such

4. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2000) (stating that interference with a beneficiary
of an employee benefit plan's protected rights is unlawful).
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (2000) (requiring every employee benefit plan
to "provide a procedure for amending such plan, and for identifying the
persons who have authority to amend the plan").
6. See 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (2000) (assets of the plan shall be held for the
exclusive benefit of participants).
7. See discussion supra Article Part III.B.2. (discussing Group 2 claims).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[39:827

transaction constitutes a direct or indirect violation of the
prohibited transaction rules of Section 406(a)(1). 8
If, despite this prohibition, the authorizing fiduciary causes
the plan to engage in a transaction that is prohibited under
Section 406(a), two intertwined claims arise under Section
502(a)(3). A Group 4 claim exists against the party in interest who
engaged in the prohibited transaction with the plan.9 In addition,
if the authorizing fiduciary knew or should have known that the
transaction was prohibited, then the authorizing fiduciary has, at
a minimum, violated the fiduciary duty of prudence under Section
404(a)(1)(B). "
In this situation, the two claims are distinguishable. The
Group 4 claim focuses on the conduct of the party in interest as the
defendant. In contrast, the breach of fiduciary duty claim focuses
on the lack of prudence by the authorizing fiduciary in authorizing
the plan to enter into the prohibited transaction in the first place.
The second situation, where a Group 4 claim and a breach of
fiduciary duty claim may become intertwined, involves a violation
of the fiduciary prohibited transaction rules of Section 406(b).1
Here, any fiduciary of the plan (not just a fiduciary with the
authority to authorize transactions involving plan assets) is
prohibited from self-dealing with plan assets, from transacting
with the plan on behalf of another party whose interests are
adverse to the interests of the plan, or from personally 12receiving
kickbacks from a party who has transacted with the plan.
In this second situation, the Group 4 claim may become
intertwined with a claim for breach of the fiduciary's duty of
loyalty under Section 404(a)(1)(A). 3 In this example, the same
conduct by the fiduciary defendant may give rise to both a breach
of fiduciary duty claim and a Group 4 claim for violation of the
fiduciary prohibited transaction rules of Section 406(b).
In my example, these two claims nevertheless are distinctly
different in terms of the legal standard for adjudicating liability.
In a Group 4 claim for a violation of the fiduciary prohibited
transaction rules, if the facts of the transaction are proven, the
fiduciary is liable per se even if the transaction did not cause
injury to the plan. 14 A breach of fiduciary duty claim is different in

8. 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a) (2000).
9. Harris Trust & Say. Bank v. Salomon Smith Barney, 530 U.S. 238, 246

(2000).
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B) (2000).
29 U.S.C. § 1106(b) (2000).
See 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(1)-(3).
29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (2000).
See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 720-21 (2d ed.

2000) (discussing prohibited transactions under ERISA); Donovan v.
Cunningham, 716 F.2d 1455, 1464-66 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating purpose of
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that the plaintiff asserting the claim must prove that the
fiduciary's unlawful conduct caused injury to the plan or to a plan
participant. 5 I concluded that the element of causation was
sufficient justification to retain the distinction.
d.

Intertwined Group 5 Claims
Group 5 claims for a violation of plan terms may become
intertwined with breach of fiduciary duty claims because Section
404(a)(1)(D) requires a fiduciary to discharge his duties "in
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the
plan," but only "insofar as such documents and instruments are
consistent with the [statutory] provisions of [title I of ERISA]. ",r
Section 404(a)(1)(D) creates a dual duty for the fiduciary when
administering the terms of the plan. The fiduciary has an
affirmative duty to follow the terms of the plan that are consistent
with the statutory requirements of title I of ERISA. At the same
time, the fiduciary has an affirmative duty to disregard those plan
terms that
are contrary to the statutory requirements of title I of
7
ERISA.1
An illustration of this double-edged fiduciary duty is a
retirement plan with an investment policy that authorizes the
fiduciary to invest plan assets in the stock of the company who
sponsors the plan. For example, assume the plan's investment
policy requires the fiduciary to invest employer contributions to
the plan in company stock. The fiduciary may conclude that
following the terms of the plan violates the fiduciary's duties of
prudence, loyalty, or prudent diversification, and refuse to follow
the terms of the plan. Such a refusal may give rise to a claim for
breach of the fiduciary's duty to follow the terms of the plan.
Alternatively, the fiduciary may decide to follow the terms of the
plan. Later, after the plan has suffered an investment loss due to
a decline in the market value of the company stock, this decision
may give rise to a claim for breach of the fiduciary's duty to
disregard the plan terms under Section 404(a)(1)(D).
In my investment policy example, the terms of the plan are
unambiguous and leave no room for discretionary interpretation
by the fiduciary. Group 5 claims also can involve the plan
fiduciary's discretionary authority to interpret the terms of the
plan. This authority, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in

Section 406 to make illegal per se transactions that may have a high potential
for abuse).
15. See COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW:
POLICY AND PRACTICE, 530 (2004); EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW, supra Appendix
B note 14, at 702-05.

16. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000).
17. See MEDILL, supra Appendix B note 15, at 417-18.
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Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch,8 is derived from the
historical fiduciary power of the trustee of a trust to interpret the
terms of the trust. 19
In the everyday world of plan administration, fiduciaries are
routinely called upon to interpret the terms of the plan and
determine a participant's eligibility for plan benefits. As Firestone
makes clear, interpretation of the terms of the plan is a task that
is inherently fiduciary in nature. 20 Thus, a Group 5 claim for a
violation of plan terms (failing to pay for benefits authorized by
the terms of the plan) and a breach of fiduciary duty claim (for
failure to follow the terms of the plan, which authorizes the
benefits to be paid) are inherently intertwined.
In Varity Corporationv. Howe," the Supreme Court implicitly
acknowledged that a claim for wrongfully denied benefits under
Section 502(a)(1)(B)" is intertwined with a breach of fiduciary duty
claim under Section 502(a)(3). The Supreme Court in Varity did
not reject the premise that a claim to enforce the terms of the plan
entitling the participant to benefits under Section 502(a)(1)(B)
potentially co-exists with a claim for breach of fiduciary duty
under Section 502(a)(3) based on the fiduciary's failure to follow
the terms of the plan. 2' Rather, the Varity Court stated that
"normally" the remedy for a wrongfully denied claim for plan
limited to the remedy available under Section
benefits would
4 be
502(a)(1)(B).2
My initial objective was merely to identify and clarify the
various types of intertwined fiduciary claims. In the third order
analysis stage of the modeling exercise, I determined that
wrongfully denied claims for plan benefits were eligible for
additional relief under Section 502(a)(3).15 In Part III.D.3.d of the
Article, I proposed a solution for how the federal courts should
resolve the question of when an additional remedy under Section
502(a)(3) is "appropriate" for injury caused by a plan
administrator's wrongful denial of plan benefits.

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

489 U.S. 101 (1989).
See id. at 110-11 (discussing applicability of trust law to ERISA plans).
See id. at 113-15 (discussing role of a fiduciary in ERISA plans).
516 U.S. 489 (1996).
29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B) (2000).
See Varity, 516 U.S. at 515.

24. See id.
25. See discussion supra Article Part III.C.2.a.
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APPENDIX C
CONSOLIDATION OF PLAINTIFF-DEFENDANT-CLAIM
COMBINATIONS

Consolidation Procedure
Used

Combination
(Plaintiff v. Defendant Claim)
1.

Participant v. Employee
Benefit Plan - Plan
Design Requirements

2.

Fiduciary v. Employee
Benefit Plan - Plan
Design Requirements

3.

Participant v. Employer Plan Design
Requirements

4.

Fiduciary v. Employer Plan Design
Requirements

5.

Participant v. Fiduciary Plan Design
Requirements

6.

Fiduciary v. Fiduciary Plan Design
Requirements

7.

Participant v. Participant
- Plan Design
Requirements

1.

Consolidated with #2.
(common
defendant/common
claim)

2.

Consolidated with #1.
(common
defendant/common claim)

3.

Not possible due to settler
function doctrine.

4.

Not possible due to settlor
function doctrine.

5.

Not possible due to settlor
function doctrine.!

6.

Not possible due to settlor
function doctrine.2

7.

Not possible due to settlor
function doctrine.

1. A fiduciary who administers an illegal plan term is subject to a breach
of fiduciary duty claim.
2. See supra Appendix C note 16.
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8.

Fiduciary v. Participant Plan Design
Requirements

8.

Not possible due to settlor
function doctrine.

9.

Participant v. Party In
Interest - Plan Design
Requirements

9.

Impossible.

10.

Fiduciary v. Party In
Interest - Plan Design
Requirements

11.

Participant v. Third
Party - Plan Design
Requirements

12.

Fiduciary v. Third Party Plan Design
Requirements

13.

Participant v. Employee
Benefit Plan Retaliation,
Improper Amendment
Procedure, or Inurement

14.

Fiduciary v. Employee
Benefit Plan Retaliation, Improper
Amendment Procedure,
or Inurement

10. Impossible.

11. Impossible.

12. Impossible.

13. Impossible.

14. Impossible.

15. Participant v. Employer Retaliation, Improper
Amendment Procedure, or
Inurement

15. Consolidated with #16.
(common defendant/
common claim)

16. Fiduciary v. Employer Retaliation, Improper
Amendment Procedure, or
Inurement

16. Consolidated with #15.
(common defendant/
common claim)
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17. Participant v. Fiduciary Retaliation, Improper
Amendment Procedure, or
Inurement

17. Not possible due to settlor
function doctrine. 3

18. Fiduciary v. Fiduciary Retaliation, Improper
Amendment Procedure, or
Inurement

18. Not possible due to settlor
function doctrine.4

19. Participant v. Participant
- Retaliation, Improper
Amendment Procedure, or
Inurement

19. Impossible.

20. Fiduciary v. Participant Retaliation, Improper
Amendment Procedure, or
Inurement

20. Impossible.

21.

Participant v. Party In
Interest Retaliation,
Improper Amendment
Procedure, or Inurement

21. Impossible.

22.

Fiduciary v. Party In
Interest - Retaliation,
Improper Amendment
Procedure, or Inurement

22. Impossible.

23. Participant v. Third Party
- Retaliation, Improper
Amendment Procedure, or
Inurement

23. Impossible

24. Fiduciary v. Third Party Retaliation, Improper
Amendment Procedure, or
Inurement

24. Impossible.

3. A fiduciary who administers the plan in violation of these statutory
provisions is subject to a breach of fiduciary duty claim.
4. See supra Appendix C note 3.
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25.

Participant v. Employee
Benefit Plan - Breach of
Fiduciary Duties

25. Impossible.

26.

Fiduciary v. Employee
Benefit Plan - Breach of
Fiduciary Duties

26. Impossible.

27.

Participant v. Employer Breach of Fiduciary
Duties

27. Impossible.

28.

Fiduciary v. Employer Breach of Fiduciary
Duties

31.

Participant v. Participant
- Breach of Fiduciary
Duties

31.

32.

Fiduciary v. Participant Breach of Fiduciary
Duties

32. Impossible.

33.

Participant v. Party In
Interest - Breach of
Fiduciary Duties

33. Combination is valid based
on § 502(l) if party in
interest knowingly
participates in a fiduciary's
breach. Consolidated with
#34 due to common
defendant/common claim,
and with #45 and #46
based on § 502(l) as a
common statutory source
for the claim.

28. Impossible.

Impossible.
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34.

Fiduciary v. Party In
Interest - Breach of
Fiduciary Duties

34. Combination is valid based
on § 502(l) if party in
interest knowingly
participates in a fiduciary's
breach. Consolidated with
#33 due to common
defendant/common claim,
and with #45 and #46
based on § 502(l) as a
common statutory source
for the claim.

35.

Participant v. Third
Party - Breach of
Fiduciary Duties

35. Combination is valid based
on § 502(l) if third party
knowingly participates in
a fiduciary's breach.
Consolidated with #36 due
to common defendant/
common claim, and with
# 47 and #48 based on
§ 502(l) as a common
statutory source for the
claim.

36. Fiduciary v. Third Party Breach Fiduciary Duties

36. Combination is valid based
on § 502(l) if third party
knowingly participates in
a fiduciary's breach.
Consolidated with #35 due
to common defendant/
common claim, and with
# 47 and #48 based on
§ 502(l) as a common
statutory source for the
claim.

37. Participant v. Employee
Benefit Plan - Prohibited
Transaction

37. Impossible.

38. Fiduciary v. Employee
Benefit Plan - Prohibited
Transaction

38. Impossible.
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39. The defendant employer
could be sued for a
prohibited transaction in
its capacity as a party in
interest.
40. The defendant employer
could be sued for a
prohibited transaction in
its capacity as a party in
interest.

41. Participant v. Fiduciary Prohibited Transaction

41.

42. Fiduciary v. Fiduciary Prohibited Transaction

42. Consolidated with #41 due
to common defendant/
common claim, and with
#29 and #30 based on the
common statutory source
of fiduciary responsibilities
under part 4 of
title I of ERISA.

43. Participant v. Participant
- Prohibited Transaction

43. The defendant participant
who is also an employee of
the employer who sponsors
the plan is a party in
interest, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(14)(H), and could be
sued for a prohibited
transaction in his or her
capacity as a party in
interest.

Consolidated with #42 due
to common defendant/
common claim, and with
#29 and #30 based on the
common statutory
source of fiduciary
responsibilities under part
4 of title I of ERISA.
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44. Fiduciary v. Participant Prohibited Transaction

44. The defendant participant
who is also an employee of
the employer who sponsors
the plan is a party in
interest, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 1002(14)(H), and could be
sued for a prohibited
transaction in his or her
capacity as a party in
interest.

45. Participant v. Party In
Interest - Prohibited
Transaction

45. Combination is valid based
on § 502(l) if party in
interest knowingly
participates in the
prohibited transaction.
Consolidated with #46 due
to common defendant/
common claim, and with
#33 and #34 based on
§ 502(l) as a common
statutory source.

46. Fiduciary v. Party In
Interest - Prohibited
Transaction

46. Combination is valid based
on § 502(l) if party in
interest
knowingly participates in
the prohibited transaction.
Consolidated with #45 due
to common defendant
/common claim, and with
#33 and #34 based on
§ 502(l) as a common
statutory source.

47. Participant v. Third Party
- Prohibited Transaction

47.

Combination is valid based
on § 502(l) if third party
knowingly participates in
prohibited transaction.
Consolidated with #48 due
to common defendant
/common claim, and with
#35 and #36, based on
§ 502(l) as a common
statutory source.
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48. Fiduciary v. Third Party Prohibited Transaction

48. Combination is valid based
on § 502(l) if third party
knowingly participates in
prohibited transaction.
Consolidated with #47 due
to common defendant
/common claim, and with
#35 and #36, based on
§ 502(l) as a common
statutory source.

49. Participant v. Employee
Benefit Plan Violation/Enforcement of
Plan Terms

49. Impossible. The
appropriate defendant
here would be the plan
administrator charged
with administering the
terms of the plan.

50.

50.

Fiduciary v. Employee
Benefit Plan - Violation/
Enforcement of Plan
Terms

51. Participant v. Employer Violation/Enforcement of
Plan Terms

Impossible. The
appropriate defendant
here would be the plan
administrator charged
with administering the
terms of the plan.

51. Action by the employer
that is contrary to the
terms of the plan would
result in an exercise of
administrative or
managerial authority over
the plan and thereby
render the employer a
defacto fiduciary with
respect to such action. The
defendant employer could
be sued in its capacity as a
defacto fiduciary for a
breach of fiduciary duty
(failure to follow plan
terms).

2006]

Equitable Relief Under ERISA Section 502(A)(3)

52. Fiduciary v. Employer Violation/Enforcement of
Plan Terms

52. Action by the employer
that is contrary to the
terms of the plan would
result in an exercise of
administrative or
managerial authority over
the plan and thereby
render the employer a
defacto fiduciary with
respect to such action. The
defendant employer could
be sued in its capacity as a
defacto fiduciary for a
breach of fiduciary duty
(failure to follow plan
terms).

53. Participant v. Fiduciary Violation/Enforcement of
Plan Terms

53. Consolidated with #54 due
to common defendant/
common claim, and with
#29 and #30 based on a
common statutory source
(§ 404(a)(1)(D)) for a
breach of fiduciary duty
claim.

54. Fiduciary v. Fiduciary Violation/Enforcement of
Plan Terms

54. Consolidated with #53 due
to common defendant/
common claim, and with
#29 and #30 based on a
common statutory source
(§ 404(a)(1)(D)) for a
breach of fiduciary duty
claim.

55. Participant v. Participant
Violation/Enforcement of
Plan Terms

55.

Consolidated with #56.
(common defendant/
common claim)

56. Fiduciary v. Participant
Violation/Enforcement of
Plan Terms

56.

Consolidated with #55.
(common defendant/
common claim)
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57. Participant v. Party In
Interest
Violation/Enforcement of
Plan Terms

57.

58. Fiduciary v. Party In
Interest Violation/
Enforcement of Plan
Terms

58. Consolidated with #57 due
to common defendant/
common claim. If a party
in interest knowingly
participates in a
fiduciary's violation of plan
terms (a breach of duty by
the fiduciary) the claim is
consolidated with #33 and
#34. If party in interest
knowingly participates in
a violation of plan terms
by a participant, the
claim is consolidated with
#59 and #60.' See Article
Part II.C.3.f for discussion
of validity of this claim.

Consolidated with #58 due
to common defendant/
common claim. If a party
in interest knowingly
participates in a
fiduciary's violation of plan
terms (a breach of duty by
the fiduciary) the claim is
consolidated with #33 and
#34. If party in interest
knowingly participates in
a violation of plan terms
by a participant, the claim
is consolidated with #59
and #60'. See Article Part
II.C.3.f for discussion of
validity of this claim.

5. If the claim is based solely on a violation of plan terms that does not
involve a breach of duty by a fiduciary, the claim is outside the scope of
§ 502(l). For purposes of analysis, the status of the defendant as a party in
interest in this situation is indistinguishable from a third party who
participates in a nonfiduciary's violation of plan terms.
6. See discussion supra Appendix C note 5.
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59. Participant v. Third Party
- Violation/Enforcement
of Plan Terms

59. Consolidated with #60 due
to common defendant/
common claim. If a third
party knowingly
participates in a
fiduciary's violation of plan
terms (a breach of duty by
the fiduciary) the claim is
consolidated with #33 and
#34. If a third party
knowingly participates in
a violation of plan terms
by a participant the claim
is consolidated with #57
and #58. See Article Part
II.C.3.f for discussion of
the validity of this claim.

60. Fiduciary v. Third Party Violation/Enforcement of
Plan Terms

60. Consolidated with #59 due
to common defendant/
common claim. If a third
party knowingly
participates in a
fiduciary's violation of plan
terms (a breach of duty by
the fiduciary) the claim is
consolidated with #33 and
#34. If a third party
knowingly participates in
a violation of plan terms
by a participant the
claim is consolidated with
#57 and #58. See Article
Part II.C.3.f for discussion
of the validity of this
claim.

